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Summary
This thesis contains three essays on the macroeconomic effects of labor markets with a special
emphasis on the determinants of internal migration, spatial inequality, labor market power, and the
determination of wages.
In the first chapter, I study a potential reason of why workers stay in economically distressed
areas: people like to live close to what they call home. Using administrative data for France, I
find: (i) the share of migrants who return to their birthplace is almost twice as large as the share of
migrants who go to any other particular location; (ii) there is a negative relationship between labor
flows and distance from the workers’ birthplace; and (iii) workers accept a wage discount between
9 to 11 percent to live in their home location. To understand the implications of these findings, I
build a dynamic quantitative migration model into which I introduce home bias, understood as a
utility cost of living away from one’s birthplace. I use the model to separately identify home bias
and migration costs from the data. I find that differences in birth location lead to average welfare
differences of up to 30 percent in consumption-equivalent terms, and explain 43 percent of the total
dispersion in welfare. Finally, I show that a migration model without home bias overstates the
migration response of agents. This underestimates the pass-through of local productivity to real
wages and overestimates the efficiency costs associated with place-based policies.
In the second chapter, Miren Azkarate-Askasua and I study the efficiency and welfare effects of
employer and union labor market power. We use data of French manufacturing firms to first doc-
ument a negative relationship between employment concentration and wages and labor shares. At
the micro-level, we identify the effects of employment concentration thanks to mass layoff shocks
to competitors. Second, we develop a bargaining model in general equilibrium that incorporates
employer and union labor market power. The model features structural labor wedges that are
heterogeneous across firms and potentially generate misallocation of resources. We propose an
estimation strategy that separately identifies the structural parameters determining both sources
of labor market power. Furthermore, we allow different parameters across industries which con-
tributes to the heterogeneity of the wedges. We show that observing wage and employment data
is enough to compute counterfactuals relative to the baseline. Third, we evaluate the efficiency and
welfare losses from labor market distortions. Eliminating employer and union labor market power
increases output by 1.6% and the labor share by 21 percentage points translating into significant
welfare gains for workers. Workers’ geographic mobility is key to realize the output gains from
competition.
In the third chapter, Miren Azkarate-Askasua and I propose a bias correction method for estima-
tions of quadratic forms in the parameters of linear models. It is known that those quadratic forms
exhibit small-sample bias that appears when one wants to perform a variance decomposition such
as decomposing the sources of wage inequality. When the number of covariates is large, the direct
computation for a bias correction is not feasible and we propose a bootstrap method to estimate the
correction. Our method accommodates different assumptions on the structure of the error term in-
cluding general heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Our approach has the benefit of correcting
the bias of multiple quadratic forms of the same linear model without increasing the computational
cost and being very flexible. We show with Monte Carlo simulations that our bootstrap procedure
is effective in correcting the bias and we compare it to other methods in the literature. Using ad-
ministrative data for France, we apply our method by doing a variance decomposition of a linear
model of log wages with person and firm fixed effects. We find that the person and firm effects are
less important in explaining the variance of log wages after correcting for the bias and depending
on the specification the correlation becomes positive after the correction.
Résumé
Ce travail de thèse est composé de trois chapitres traitant des effets macroéconomiques du
marché du travail en mettant l’accent sur les déterminants de la migration interne, les inégalités
spatiales, le pouvoir du marché du travail et la détermination des salaires.
Dans le premier chapitre, j’étudie une raison potentielle pour laquelle les travailleurs restent
dans des zones économiquement en difficulté: les gens aiment vivre près de leur location d’origine.
En utilisant des données administratives françaises, j’obtiens les résultats suivants: (i) la part de
migrants qui retournent dans leur lieu de naissance est presque deux fois plus grande que la part
de migrants qui se rendent dans une autre localité; (ii) il existe une relation négative entre les flux de
main-d’œuvre et la distance par rapport au lieu de naissance des travailleurs; et (iii) les travailleurs
acceptent une réduction de salaire de 9 à 11 pourcent pour vivre dans leur localité d’origine. Pour
comprendre les implications de ces résultats, je construis un modèle de migration quantitative
dynamique dans lequel j’introduis un biais d’origine, compris comme un coût en terme d’utilité
de la vie loin de son lieu de naissance. J’utilise le modèle pour identifier séparément le biais
domestique et les coûts de migration à partir des données. Je trouve que les différences de lieu
de naissance entraînent des différences de bien-être moyen allant jusqu’à 30 pourcent en termes
d’équivalence de consommation et expliquent 43 pourcent de la dispersion totale du bien-être.
Enfin, je montre qu’un modèle de migration sans biais d’origine surestime la réponse migratoire des
agents. Cela sous-estime la répercussion de la productivité locale sur les salaires réels et surestime
les coûts d’efficacité associés aux politiques territoriales.
Dans le second chapitre, Miren Azkarate-Askasua et moi étudions les effets du pouvoir du
marché des employeurs et les syndicats sur l’efficience et le bien-être. Nous utilisons des don-
nées du secteur de la production industrielle française pour documenter premièrement la relation
négative entre concentration d’emploi avec les salaires et la partie de la valeur ajoutée qui va au
paiement du travail. Au niveau micro, nous identifions les effets de la concentration d’emploi grâce
à un choque de licenciement aux compétiteurs. À la suite nous construisons un modèle de négo-
ciations en équilibre général avec pouvoir de marché des employeurs et les syndicats. Ce modèle
délivre des wedges structurelles hétérogènes à travers des entreprises que génère potentiellement
une mis-allocation des ressources. Nous proposons une estimation qu’identifie séparément chaque
source de pouvoir du marché au marché de travail. En outre nous permettons que les paramètres
soient flexibles à travers des secteurs ce qui contribue à l’hétérogénéité des wedges. Nous montrons
que l’observation des salaires et niveau d’emploi est suffisant pour calculer des contrefactuelles rel-
atives à la base. Nous évaluons le coût des distorsions du marché du travail. Éliminer le pouvoir
du marché des employeurs et les syndicats augmente la production en 1.6% et la partie qui va au
paiement de la main d’oeuvre en 21 points pourcentuelles ce qui signifie une augmentation signi-
ficative du bien-être des salariés. La mobilité géographique est la clé pour réaliser les gains de la
compétition.
Dans le dernier chapitre, Miren Azkarate-Askasua et moi proposons une méthode de correction
de biais qui apparait dans les estimations des formes quadratiques des paramètres de modèles
linéaires. Ce biais de faible échantillonnage apparait quand nous voulons faire une décomposition
de variance comme par exemple pour décomposer les sources des inégalités salariales. Quand le
nombre de variables indépendantes est grand, le calcul directe du biais n’est pas faisable. Nous
proposons une méthode de bootstrap pour corriger le biais. Notre méthode s’adapte à différentes
hypothèses de la structure des erreurs comme heteroscdecasticité et autocorrélation. Nous pouvons
corriger le biais de plusieurs formes quadratiques d’un modèle linéaire sans augmenter le coût
des calculs. Nous montrons à travers de simulations de Monte Carlo que notre procédure de
bootstrap effectivement corrige le biais et nous le comparons à d’autres méthodes de la littérature.
Nous misons en application notre méthode avec des données administratives françaises pour faire
une décomposition de la variance des salaires avec effets fixes de travailleur et entreprise. Nous
trouvons que les effets de personne et entreprise sont moins importants une fois nous avons corrigé
pour le biais.
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Why do people stay in economically distressed areas? In this paper, I explore a simple, yet overlooked hy-
pothesis: people like to live close to what they call home. Using administrative data for France, I find: (i)
the share of migrants who return to their birthplace is almost twice as large as the share of migrants who go
to any other particular location; (ii) there is a negative relationship between labor flows and distance from
the workers’ birthplace; and (iii) workers accept a wage discount between 9 to 11 percent to live in their
home location. To understand the implications of these findings, I build a dynamic quantitative migration
model into which I introduce home bias, understood as a utility cost of living away from one’s birthplace. I
use the model to separately identify home bias and migration costs from the data. I find that differences in
birth location lead to average welfare differences of up to 30 percent in consumption-equivalent terms, and
explain 43 percent of the total dispersion in welfare. Finally, I show that a migration model without home
bias overstates the migration response of agents. This underestimates the pass-through of local productivity
to real wages and overestimates the efficiency costs associated with place-based policies.
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1.1 Introduction
Large groups of people tend to stay in less favorable areas within the same countries. It is puzzling
that, even without legal impediments, they don’t move to supposedly attractive locations. The lit-
erature has offered two main explanations. First, migration costs reduce mobility across regions,
which limits workers’ ability to arbitrage away differences in welfare.2 Second, the observed vari-
ation in pecuniary measures, like real wages, might only reflect variation in local amenities. Thus,
low-wage regions might only reflect a high level of amenities.3
In this paper, I focus on a different explanation for low mobility: people like to live close to their
home. This home bias makes workers born in attractive regions better-off, as they don’t have to
compete with workers born in poorer regions who are reluctant to leave their home. Home bias can
then generate significant average utility differences across space and birth cohorts. For example,
considering the case of France, I find that the average worker born in an attractive area—like Paris,
Nice, or Toulouse—has 5 to 7 percent more utility than the average French worker, measured in
consumption terms. In contrast, the average worker born in Cantal, within the Massif Central
region, or in Haute Marne in the North-East, has around 20 percent less utility than the average
French worker. Thus, the difference between having a “good” and a “bad” birthplace can turn
into a welfare difference of more than 30 percent, which is significant considering that France is a
centralized and well-connected country.
In relative terms, these numbers imply that differences in birth location explain 43 percent of the
overall welfare dispersion. With 53 percent of the welfare dispersion due to workers’ idiosyncratic
shocks, this means that differences in birth location account for almost all the rest of the variation.
This result reflects the importance of home bias in shaping workers’ location decisions which,
combined with location-specific heterogeneity, makes the birthplace an important driver of expected
lifetime utility. Ignoring the effect of home bias overstates the role of migration costs and the
potential for policies to enhance mobility. It also overstates the costs of subsidizing poor locations,
that may drive away workers from productive to unproductive regions.
I proceed in four steps. First, using administrative data for France, I document the prevalence
of home bias in workers’ migration decisions. The French data stand out as they register the birth
location for all workers. This feature allows me to look at labor flows between two regions for
workers who were born in different places, which is key for isolating the home bias from the effect
of proximity in migration decisions. I find that labor flows are biased towards workers’ home
locations, even after controlling for proximity between origin and destination locations, and that
workers who live in their home location have lower wages. Second, I build a general equilibrium
dynamic Roy model of migration in which workers with heterogeneous preferences—defined by
their birthplace—sort across locations with heterogeneous productivities and amenities. I use the
structure of the model and the observed data on labor flows and wages to separately identify the
standard migration costs from the home bias. Third, I use the estimated model to quantify the
2Bryan and Morten (2019) and Caliendo et al. (2019) have models with costly adjustment of labor across regions; Ahlfeldt et al. (2015)
and Monte et al. (2018) propose a model where commuting is costly.
3Compensating variation in real wages because of amenities is a standard result in the traditional urban framework of Rosen (1979)-
Roback (1982).
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birthplace premium: the average utility a worker from a particular birthplace has in excess of the
national average. Fourth, I illustrate the effect of ignoring home bias when modeling workers’
mobility decisions.
I start by briefly describing the data in Section 1.2 and explaining how I define the different lo-
cations within France. The most disaggregated level of information for place of birth is the départe-
ment. There are 94 départements in continental France with great variation in size and connectivity.4
I aggregate them according to commuting flows, such that every location is a well integrated local
labor market. I end up with 73 locations which still allows me for a disaggregated analysis of the
home bias.
Section 1.3 provides empirical evidence of the home bias. I examine the labor flows across
locations in France for the years 2002 to 2017. I find that the share of migrants who return to
their birthplace is, on average, almost twice as large as the share of migrants who go to any other
particular location. To distinguish between the effect of standard migration costs and home bias,
I run a gravity-type regression, as used in the trade literature, and find that the labor flows to a
particular destination is negatively related to distance from the workers’ birthplace. This result
holds while controlling for distance between origin and destination locations, that would capture
normal migration frictions, as well as origin and destination fixed effects.
The biased labor flows suggest that workers dislike living away from their birthplace. This
allows me to test whether idiosyncratic differences in wages are an important driver of workers’
migration decisions. If workers select across locations based on differences in potential wages, and
leaving the birthplace is costly, then workers who move away from their birthplace should have, on
average, higher wages than those workers who stayed in their birth location. I find that for the vast
majority of locations/periods of my sample the wages of workers living outside their birthplace
are larger than the wages of workers living within their birthplace. This corresponds to an average
15 percent wage difference between the two groups. Thus, the evidence suggests that selection via
wages is an important driver of the workers’ location decision. I then estimate the average penalty
workers face by living in their birthplace. I find that among workers who changed jobs between
years, those who move back to their birthplace face a wage discount of 9 to 11 percent compared to
going to another location.
In Section 1.4, I build a quantitative migration model in the spirit of Bryan and Morten (2019)—
where differences in idiosyncratic productivities drive workers’ migration decisions—but allowing
for migration to be a dynamic decision, as in Caliendo et al. (2019). I add a fixed worker character-
istic, birthplace, that biases the migration decision of workers towards their home. The static part of
the model is a trade model à la Eaton and Kortum (2002) with housing, which works as a congestion
mechanism. The combination of all these elements results in a dynamic discrete choice model—
where workers with heterogeneous preferences defined by birthplace sort across heterogeneous
locations based on idiosyncratic productivity shocks—with a static trade equilibrium determining
output at each location.
The methodological challenge is to disentangle the role of home bias from standard migra-
tion costs along with identifying location-specific characteristics, like productivities and amenities,
4For continental France I mean the French départements that are in Europe, excluding the island of Corsica.
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that are common in the trade and urban economics literature. Adding worker heterogeneity—like
birthplace—allows for a richer analysis of phenomena, but it comes with a cost. A common feature
in the discrete choice literature, especially when choices are persistent, is that a large probability
mass is concentrated in a single alternative. Then, is usual to observe in the data a large fraction
of alternatives where the number of people taking them is zero. Adding group heterogeneity, by
conditioning in an extra dimension, increases the prevalence of zeros in the data. This represents a
challenge when trying to bring together model and data. In my context, although the data consists
of millions of observations, the number of workers migrating in a given year is around 4 percent
of the total sample. Moreover, the number of origin-destination combinations per each group of
workers with same birthplace is 73× 73 ≈ 5, 000. These two elements make the data on observed
combinations, conditional on birthplace, very sparse.5
As in Dingel and Tintelnot (2020), I address the “many-zeros” problem by assuming a discrete
number of workers in the model. This assumption rationalizes the zeros in the data and guides the
identification strategy in a transparent way. However, it poses challenges when solving the general
equilibrium of the model.6 Thus, I present two versions of the model: one with a discrete number
of workers where the equilibrium needs not be in steady-state, and a more standard steady-state
continuous-population model, which I use for computing general equilibrium counterfactuals.
In Section 1.5, I show how to identify and estimate the parameters of the model, using data on
labor flows and wages. I show that, if migration costs are symmetric, they are non-parametrically
identified from labor flows across locations.7 I relax the sufficient identification conditions provided
by Bryan and Morten (2019)—and the associated data requirements—such that the migration costs
are identified from the location-pair fixed effects of a gravity Poisson regression on labor flows.8
Bryan and Morten show that migration costs can be directly identified from the gross migration
flows between two locations. In the context of my application, this requires to observe, for every
pair of locations, an out-flow and an in-flow of labor for workers with the same birthplace and in
the same year. In the data, less than 70 percent of the location pairs satisfy Bryan and Morten’s
conditions. With my weaker conditions, this number increases to more than 98 percent.
For tractability, I assume that the idiosyncratic productivity shocks are distributed Type 1 Ex-
treme Value (or Gumbel). This assumption—ubiquitous in the discrete choice literature—delivers
a closed form expression for the migration probability as a function of the expected utility and
the migration costs.9 Using the identified migration costs and count data on labor flows I esti-
mate the underlying migration probabilities via maximum likelihood. I show that the solution to
5The sum of origin-destination combinations across workers with different birthplace is then 733 = 389, 017. I observe around 5% of
the combinations each year.
6The lack of information about different alternatives might lead researchers to aggregate the alternatives into a smaller choice set,
which makes it easier to combine model and data. This is a reasonable route for some applications. For example, Heise and Porzio (2019)
analyze the effect of home bias for location decisions of East and West German workers. Germany stands out against other countries as
it is obvious in how to group different locations in few regions for its analysis. For France though, is not obvious how to group locations
into two, three or few more aggregate regions. Thus, aggregation could mask the effect of home bias in workers’ migration decisions.
7By non-parametric I mean that I identify a single migration costs for every pair of locations.
8The gravity Poisson regression would be a three-way regression in the sens that it includes origin, destination and location-pair fixed
effects.
9For a textbook treatment, see Train (2009).
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this maximization problem is equivalent to solving for the ’source-country effects’ of a balanced
trade condition from a gravity-trade model.10 I use the identified migration probabilities to impute
model-consistent wages for those missing combinations in the data.
The result linking the maximization of the conditional likelihood and the gravity model com-
plements the work of Dingel and Tintelnot (2020) on how to combine spatial quantitative models
and sparse data on alternatives. Within my migration context, the system to solve is a collection of
labor-movement equations, where the total labor at a destination is the sum of the probability of
migrating to the destination—which is a function of the fixed effects—times the number of workers
at origin locations. Thus, the fixed effects are estimated with the number of workers at every origin
and destination in a given time and not the labor flows which are oftentimes unobserved. Fortu-
nately, trade economists have already tackled the problem of how to efficiently solve these type
of systems.11 Thus, my result adds to the set of ’computational tricks’ that allow for the feasible
estimation of quantitative spatial models.
Next, I identify the home bias parameters using the information contained in the difference
between the average wage of workers living outside their birthplace and the average wage of those
returning to home. The idea is that the worker who returns home would accept a wage penalty,
everything else equal. Similar to Artuç et al. (2010), I use the information from next period wages
to control for the option value of future employment opportunities at each location which are
embedded in the workers’ continuation values. Similarly to the migration costs, I assume the home
bias is symmetric across locations and birthplaces to non-parametrically identify them from the
data.
I identify the remaining parameters, the distributions of productivities and amenities, following
the standard approach in the quantitative spatial economics literature; see Redding and Rossi-
Hansberg (2017). I identify the distribution of productivities by inverting the static part of the
model such that the recovered distribution is consistent with the equilibrium and the observed
wages. The amenities are recovered as a residual that explains the remaining variation in labor
flows.
In Section 1.6 I compute counter-factuals to assess the welfare impact of birthplace preferences
using the steady-state continuous-population version of the model.
As my main result, I compute the different birthplace premia and decompose welfare inequality
where I distinguish between aggregate dispersion at the birthplace/location level and idiosyncratic
dispersion, stemming from the individual-specific productivity shocks and geographic sorting. I
find that individual heterogeneity and sorting explain 53% of the variance of individual welfare lev-
els. Variance of between-birthplace average welfare explains 43% of the variance. The importance of
home bias in determining where workers end up living—along with heterogeneity in attractiveness
of locations—means that birthplace is a big determinant of expected lifetime utility.
10The term ’source-country effects’ is borrowed from Eaton and Kortum (2002). In a gravity-type equation, let Xi,j be the share of
expenditure a country i spends in goods from country j. If Xi,j = f (F j) is a function of some fixed effect F j specific of the source country
j, then all of these fixed-effects {F j} are the ’source-country effects’.
11In particular, I borrow the algorithm proposed by Pérez-Cervantes (2014) which is well suited for a very large number of fixed effects
and very easy to implement. Ahlfeldt, Redding, Sturm, and Wolf (2015) propose an alternative algorithm in the web appendix of their
paper.
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The main result shows that geography shapes long-run welfare inequality through birthplace.
The reason is that home bias changes workers’ location patterns in the long-run by making them
gravitate around their home location. Thus, large differences across locations imply large welfare
differences across workers with different birthplaces.12 In contrast, without home bias, workers
can arbitrage away the differences across locations, especially in the long-run. This makes initial
geographic differences less important in shaping inequality.
Next, I compare the magnitudes of migration costs and home bias. To make migration costs,
which are paid once, comparable to home bias, which corresponds to a flow utility costs, I rely on
a compensating variation argument. I compute how much more consumption a migrant worker
needs to have the same utility as a non-migrant worker. Similarly, I compute the compensating
variation in consumption for a worker who lives outside her birthplace to have the same lifetime
utility as a worker who lives in her birthplace. I find that the compensation for a migrant is 55.6
percent, while the compensation for a worker who lives outside her birthplace is 18.6 percent.
I then compare the effects of removing migration costs or home bias on output. Removing the
home bias increases output by 11%, while removing migration costs raises output by more than
30%. In both cases, productivity gains are the result of better sorting of workers by idiosyncratic
productivities, while gains from reallocation to more productive areas are minor and can even be
negative.
In addition, I compare my model to one without home bias. I find that, while the estimated
average migration cost is 10% larger, the average migration elasticity is 8% larger in the model
without home bias, overstating the mobility response of agents. This in turn underestimates the
average pass-through of productivity to real wages by 50% in the model without home bias, as the
in-migration flow is larger which increases the price of housing.
In a similar vein, the model without home bias changes the predictions when evaluating place-
based policies compared to my model with home bias. A common concern of such policies, is
that, while aiming at some spatial redistribution of income, it also distorts the location decisions of
workers of non-targeted locations. Thus, it can drive workers away from productive to unproduc-
tive locations, resulting in efficiency losses. However, if workers mobility is limited by their home
bias, the associated efficiency costs to a place-based policy is limited. I impose a labor subsidy to
each location, and compare the response on social welfare one-by-one in both models.13 I find that
the model without home bias has a misdiagnosis rate of 52%. This means that for more than half
of the cases, the model without home bias predicts that subsidizing a particular location has the
opposite effect on social welfare than a model with home bias.
All together, the different exercises teach us that home bias matters for the aggregate economy.
By hindering the mobility of workers, home bias makes the birthplace an important determinant
of overall welfare inequality. Neglecting its importance leads to over-stating the role of worker
mobility as a force for welfare equalization.
12Consider the extreme case where home bias is prohibitive, and all workers live in their respective birthplace. Then, if geography
would be the same, then there should be no dispersion of welfare across workers with different birthplaces.
13The social welfare would correspond to the sum of welfare across all agents in the economy, not just those that live in the subsidized
location.
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Literature This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, it adds to the empirical
evidence of the presence of a home bias in migration decisions. For example, Kennan and Walker
(2011) find, for a sample of U.S. individuals, that half of the people who move return to their home
location; Bryan and Morten (2019) find, for the case of Indonesia, that the share of people that
migrate to a location from a particular birthplace is negatively correlated with distance; similarly,
Heise and Porzio (2019) using data from Germany for the years 2009-2014, find that people born in
East Germany are more attracted to live in East counties than individuals born in West Germany.
My paper contributes to this literature by documenting a home bias effect for France. The presence
of a strong home bias effect in France is not obvious a priori as: (i) it is a relatively small and
well connected country, at least compared to the U.S. and Indonesia; (ii) it has been historically
unified, in contrast to Germany; and (iii) it faces no linguistic or geographical barriers, which is
the case of Indonesia.14 Furthermore, the administrative data that I use allow for a clear separation
of birthplace versus origin of the labor flow. This allows me to disentangle the effect of home bias
versus the effect of proximity in driving the labor flows.
Second, the paper is related to the growing literature on the macroeconomic implications of
worker sorting.15 Akin to Bryan and Morten (2019), my paper bridges this literature on worker
selection with the literature on the aggregate implications of workers’ geographic mobility across
heterogeneous locations.16 Differently from them though, I combine selection and costly mobility
in a dynamic framework to disentangle migration costs from the home bias. I also allow for costly
trade across regions, where workers benefit from living close to a productive location. Without
costly trade, all locations benefit equally from a productive location regardless of proximity.
Third, my work is related to the fast-growing quantitative spatial economics literature. I con-
tribute to this literature by expanding the results of Dingel and Tintelnot (2020) on how to estimate
these models without neglecting the sparsity of the data. Normally, quantitative spatial models are
composed of agents making discrete choices from a large set of alternatives. It is usual for those
models to assume a continuum of agents such that choice probabilities and the share of individuals
taking that choice are (almost surely) equivalent. When the number of choices is large, say, the
number of products or commuting patterns, these models encounter a ’many-zeros’ problem, i.e.,
the observed data has many choices with no individuals taking them. This creates a disconnect
between theory and data that is either ignored, or is addressed by ex-ante ’smoothing’ the data,
like in Almagro and Domınguez-Iino (2020).
In contrast to the previous literature, Dingel and Tintelnot (2020), propose a model with a dis-
crete number of agents, which can rationalize the zeros in the data. They show that the estimation
14Indonesia is an archipelago that consists of 17,508 islands and there are more than 300 different native languages. Bahasa Indonesia
is the official language, which is the mother tongue for only 7% of the population.
15Lagakos and Waugh (2013) and Young (2013) focus on the role of selection on unobservable skills to explain the rural-urban wage gap.
Adão (2015) and Galle et al. (2017) present trade models where heterogeneous workers select across sectors. They use such frameworks to
quantify the impact of trade on inequality and welfare. Young (2014) quantifies to what extent the differences in measured productivity
between the manufacturing and service sector are due to worker selection. Hsieh et al. (2019), using a model of occupational choice due
to heterogeneous skills, study how discrimination of minorities affected aggregate productivity in the U.S.
16For example, see Redding (2016), Diamond (2016), Monte et al. (2018), Caliendo et al. (2019), Caliendo et al. (2020), Schmutz and
Sidibé (2019) and Monras (2020).
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of such a model by means of maximum likelihood, which consists on estimating a non-linear
model with a large number of fixed effects, is computationally feasible. They rely on a result from
Guimaraes et al. (2003), who show that there is an equivalence relation between the likelihood func-
tion of the conditional logit and the Poisson regression.17 Given the identification strategy I follow
in my paper, I cannot exploit this result. Instead I show that the maximization of the conditional
logit likelihood with one dimension of fixed effects is equivalent to solving the ’source-country
effects’ of a balance-trade condition in a gravity-type model.
The closest precedent to my paper are the works of Heise and Porzio (2019) and Zabek (2020).
In addition to documenting a home bias effect when comparing East and West German workers,
Heise and Porzio develop a general equilibrium job-ladder spatial model, where workers of het-
erogeneous productivity select across locations given their observed wage offers. They distinguish
between traditional migration costs and the home bias. They calibrate and solve the model for two
regions: East and West Germany. They find that spatial frictions are relatively small compared to
other labor market frictions that prevent the reallocation of labor across firms. This creates modest
output gains from removing migration costs.
Similar to Heise and Porzio (2019), I allow for a labor market friction that prevents workers
to change jobs even within locations.18 Different from them though, I show how to incorporate
home bias and selection in an otherwise standard quantitative migration model which is suitable
for the analysis of a geography consisting of a much larger number of locations.19 In contrast
to their results, I find that migration costs are actually important and removing them increases
output by more than 30%, which dwarfs their change in output of 0.46%.20 In both models, the
wage premium to induce a worker to migrate must account for direct migration costs as well as
changes in the option value of future employment opportunities. In my model changes in future
employment opportunities are small relative to migration costs, since the probability of changing
jobs is independent of one’s birthplace and current residence. In their estimates, future wage offers
depend on a worker’s current residence and origin, suggesting that changes in future job prospects
may constitute an important hidden cost of migration.
As in both this paper and in Heise and Porzio (2019), Zabek (2020) recognizes the importance
of home bias to generate persistent differences in welfare across locations. He presents a Rosen-
Roback model where workers of identical skills have stochastic preferences for staying at their home
location. The distribution of these home preferences are the same conditional on birthplace, but
in equilibrium, depressed places are going to endogenously retain workers who value their home
17Currently, there are several statistical packages that can handle the estimation of Poisson regressions involving a large number of
fixed effects.
18In my model, I let migration to be a persistent choice, by understanding a movement across locations as a job-change, and assuming
that an exogenous process determines with some probability if a worker has to change jobs between periods. Therefore, when a
worker makes a migration decision, it takes into account that, whatever job she takes, it might last for long. Hence, initial differences
in idiosyncratic productivities are magnified by the exogenous persistence of jobs, increasing the perceived variation of jobs across
locations. This effect reduces the labor supply elasticity to a location.
19Furthermore, the French data that I use register birthplace, in contrast to Heise and Porzio, who assign a worker’s home location to
be the first location registered in the data. Also my data consists of more than 10 million observations per year which allows for a more
disaggregated analysis of the home bias and migration costs.
20See Table 5 in Heise and Porzio (2019).
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highly. This will generate lower real wages and smaller migration elasticities as the average inhabi-
tant of a depressed place is more reluctant to leave. In contrast, in my model I don’t have stochastic
preferences but rather the home bias enters as a location-pair-specific utility cost. Nevertheless, it
still generates smaller migration elasticities in depressed areas, as the proportion of natives would
be endogenously larger in such places, making the average inhabitant also reluctant to go.21 An-
other distinction is that the U.S. data he uses does not allow him to observe the place of previous
residence, so he can’t distinguish between home bias and standard migration costs. Finally, in
his model, he allows for an endogenous evolution of the population birthplaces. This generates a
spatial equilibirium force that would lead to eventual convergence in welfare, however it would be
very persistence as it takes generations to change the home bias of workers. Given this very slow
process of convergence, I abstract from such endogenous formation of workers’ birthplaces in my
model and focus on the evolution within a single generation.
1.2 Data
Most of my analysis relies on the Déclaration Annuelle des Données, fichier Postes (DADS Postes) data
set for the years 2002-2010 and 2012-2017, which contains information about all non-agricultural
workers in private and semi-public establishments in France. I don’t include the year 2011 in my
sample because there is no information about the birth department of workers for that year.22
Appendix 1.E contains the details on the sample selection.
The unit of observation is a job, which is defined as a worker-establishment pair in a given year.
This means that there might be more than one observation per worker every year. An establishment
is a combination of firm/location. Therefore, by definition, a worker who moves across locations
and does not commute to work in her old establishment would appear as having a new job.
The data have information on the workers’ age, gender, wage, place of birth, residence and
work. Starting in 2002, there is an indicator of which observation per worker is the main job (Poste
Principal). A main-job is defined as the job with longest duration that a worker has in a given year.
To keep one yearly observation per worker, I only use these main-job observations in the analysis.
There is also information on the starting and ending dates of the job. While not being a panel, the
data include information on the previous year’s values for almost all of the variables. This allows
me to recover migration patterns for people with different birthplace. It also allows me to identify
which individuals changed jobs, even if they did not move. In Appendix 1.E.1 I explain in more
detail how to identify these job switchers in the data.
The most disaggregated level of information for place of birth is the département. I constrain the
analysis to continental France which excludes all the territories outside Europe, i.e. the Départe-
ments et Régions d’Outre-Mer (DROM), and the island of Corsica. In continental France there are
94 departements, which vary very much in size and connectivity among each other. For example,
21This composition mechanism is also present in Zabek’s model. However, in his paper, he chooses to emphasize the mechanism that,
conditional on being native, the preference to stay at the home location is on average higher for depressed places.
22For the interested reader, a similar dataset, DADS Poste Principal which is a sub-sample of DADS Postes does have the information
for the year 2011. I currently don’t have access to these data.
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Figure 1 – Aggregation of départements. The locations that are aggregated are shaded in
blue, while the old departemental borders are shown within the shaded area. In total I
consider 73 locations for continental France.
there are 8 departements just in the super-dense region of Île-de-France, which has just about the
same surface as the departement of Gironde—where Bordeaux is located.23
To make the geographical unit of analysis comparable, instead of using directly the departe-
ments, I aggregate a few departements according to their commuting patterns. Given data on
departement of residence and of work for each worker, I can retrieve all the inter-departement
commuting flows. I group two departements if two conditions are satisfied: first, the number of
workers who commute from one departement to another is larger than 10% of the number of work-
ers from the origin departement; second, both departements belong to the same région before the
2015 territorial reform.24 After aggregating the different departements, I keep only the observations
of workers who live and work within that same location.
In total I end up with 73 locations for continental France. Figure 1 shows the different locations
I use in the analysis. The locations that are the union of different departements are shaded in
blue. Within aggregated locations, the departemental borders are visible with finer lines. Most
of the aggregated locations consist of two departements. The notable exceptions are the areas
surrounding the cities of Paris, Lyon and Toulouse, which are, respectively, the first, third and
fourth most populated cities of France.25 The departement that has Marseille, which ranks as
second in terms of populous cities, only aggregates with one neighboring departement.
My final sample consists of 202,521,533 job-worker observations distributed along 15 years and
the different 733 = 389, 017 origin-destination-birthplace combinations.
23The surface of Île-de-France is 12, 012.27 km2 while that of Gironde is 10, 000.14 km2.
24There are 21 old régions in continental France. These would be similar to a State in the United States. In 2015 there was a territorial
reform grouping some of these regions together. Currently there are 12 régions in continental France.
25The other exception would be the group formed by the Northeastern departements of Doubs, Haute Saône and Territoire de Belfort.
The latter is, outside Île-de-France, the smallest departement in whole France and includes the relatively large city of Belfort, whose
metropolitan area also includes a commune–Châllonvillars—that is in the departement of Haute Saône. Thus, the commuting flows
between the two are large.
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1.2.1 Basic terminology
Before describing the summary statistics let me introduce some terminology that I use in the rest
of the paper. I say that a worker is a native if she lives in the same location where she was born.
A migrant is a worker who just moved to a particular location in the current year, regardless of her
birthplace. If in the next year the migrant stays in her current location, then she would stop being
classified as a migrant. I call a birth cohort, or birthplace cohort, all the workers who were born
in the same location. A migration cohort corresponds to all the workers with the same birthplace
and with the same origin-destination locations in a given year. Thus, all those workers with the
same birthplace who stay in the same location from one year to the next would constitute as well a
migration cohort. Finally, I call a worker switcher if she changes jobs from one year to the next.
1.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents worker and location level summary statistics for the final sample. The left panel
shows some statistics about the number of workers per year/location in the sample. I observe
over 13 million workers per year, but naturally the data at end of the sample—in 2017—are larger.
The average number of workers per location-year is more than 180,000. However, as there are
locations that are much larger—like Île-de-France or Lyon—the standard deviation is almost twice
as large as the average number of workers per location. As the number of locations and birthplaces
is the same, the average number of workers per birthplace-year is the same as the average for
location-year. However, there is less heterogeneity across birth cohorts size than that of locations
as the standard deviation is 5% smaller. This probably reflects the fact that some workers move
out of their birthplace and concentrate in the most populous locations. There is a surprisingly high
persistence in the relative number of workers of either locations or birth cohorts. The correlation
between the number of workers in each location or with a particular birthplace for the first and last
year of my sample—the years 2002 and 2017— is greater than 0.99.
The top-right panel in the table describes some details about different sub-groups of workers in
the sample. The average proportion of workers who change jobs between years—or switchers—is
13 percent. Using the entire sample or only the switchers, I find that a similar proportion of around
65 percent of workers live within their birthplace. Only an average of 0.5 percent of the total
sample migrates from year to year. When considering only switchers, the proportion of migrants
increases to almost 4 percent. This is not surprising as each job is, by definition, linked to a
location, so workers who migrate are necessarily switchers. Nonetheless, even for those workers
who are changing jobs the proportion that migrate is still low. I also find that women have a smaller
propensity to migrate, but not by much.
Regarding the age composition of the different groups in my sample, I find that, in general,
switchers are younger, as shown in the bottom-right panel of the table. This can reflect that older
workers find better, more stable jobs. In general, natives, non-natives and non-migrants have similar
average age either for the whole sample or just focusing on switchers. Migrants have a similar age
as those that don’t migrate but change jobs. Finally, I find that those who return to their birthplace
are on average older than those who leave it. This can indeed reflect that most workers start their
11
Table 1 – Summary statistics
Value All Switchers
Number of workers Workers (%)
Per year 13,501,436 Switching jobs 13 –
Year 2002 11,052,111 Workers within birthplace 66 64
Year 2017 15,493,563 Workers Migrating 0.5 3.8
Women Migrating 0.4 3.1
Average per Location/Year 184,951.2
S.D. per Location/Year 339,745.6 Age (years) 40.58 35.04
S.D. per Birth Cohort/Year 325,787.1 Natives 40.07 34.06
Non-Natives 41.57 36.86
Correlations, 2002-2017 Non-Migrants 40.61 35.08
Workers per Location 0.996 Migrants – 34.25
Workers per Birthplace 0.998 Return Birthplace – 36.21
Leave Birthplace – 30.96
Note: The left panel shows summary statistics regarding the number of workers in the sample. Average number of workers
per location is the same as the average number of workers per birth cohort as the number of locations and birthplaces is
the same. The first correlation is between the population vector living in each location in the years 2002 and 2017. The
second correlation is the same but comparing size of birth cohorts. The right panel distinguishes, when possible, between the
whole sample and using just the subset of workers who switch jobs. The top-right panel has summary statistics about the
proportion of workers: (i) that change, or switch, jobs; (ii) that live within their birthplace; (iii) that migrate; and (iv) that are
women. The bottom-right panel shows average ages for different sub-groups of the sample.
work life in their birthplace, so their first migration move has to be out of their birthplace.
1.3 Empirical Evidence on Home Bias and Selection
Using the labor flows and average wages, I document four empirical facts about the French labor
market. These facts help to motivate the model I present in the next section.
Fact 1: Most workers live in their birthplace.
The average proportion of workers who live in their place of origin is 66%, as was already shown
in Table 1. This could reflect just that workers tend to start their work life in their home location
and later face strong migration costs. However, looking closer at the labor flows, systematic biases
can be found, as Fact 2 below shows.
Fact 2: Labor flows are biased towards birthplace.
To establish Fact 2, I first show that the share of workers who returns towards the birthplace is
larger, on average, than the share of workers migrating to any other location. Using workers with
the same birthplace, I compute the number of workers who migrated between any two locations
as a share of the total number of workers who migrated from the origin location. More formally, I
12








is the number of workers who were born in location b and that moved from location i to j at year t. Both
plots distinguish between the migration shares that returned to the workers birthplace versus all the other












where Li,jt,b is the labor flow, i.e., the number of workers who were born in location b and that moved
from location i to j at year t.
Using these migration shares, I find that the share of migrants who return to their birthplace is,
on average, almost twice as large as the share of migrants who go to any other particular location.
For example, consider workers from Toulouse who live in Paris. Of those who are moving away
from Paris, the share that moves back to Toulouse is, on average, twice as large as the share that
goes to, say, Lyon.
The bias of migration shares towards workers birthplace becomes more evident if I look at the
distributions instead of just the averages. I compare the distribution of migration shares s̃i,bt,b for
which b = j—where the destination is equal to the birthplace—with the distribution of all other
migration shares, for which b 6= j. Without home bias, a worker’s propensity to move to any other
location should be independent of their birthplace, hence the two distributions of migration shares
should look similar. The left panel of Figure 2 plots the densities of both distributions. The two
distributions are very different: the distribution of return migration has a larger mean, median
and mode, and is less skewed to the right. Moreover, as the right panel of Figure 2 shows, the
distribution of shares associated with workers returning to their birthplace first-order stochastically
dominates the distribution of migration shares going to alternative destinations.26
Although the share of workers who migrated back home is on average larger, this could just
reflect that the origin locations were close to their home to begin with. Thus, the distribution
26As both figures show, some of the migration shares are equal to one. This means that for a particular year, the group of workers with
the same birthplace that moved out of their current location all went to one particular destination. This is a reflection of the sparsity of
the data that arises from conditioning migration shares by birthplace.
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differences are only reflecting the effect of proximity, not home bias. To disentangle the effect of
proximity from home bias, I estimate a gravity-type model directly over the labor flows. I find that
labor flows are biased to the birthplace even if I control for traditional migration frictions, proxied






Dt,j + Ot,i + 1j 6=b(α1 + β1 log(d






where Li,jt,b is defined as above, the labor flow of workers born in b that move from location i to j
at time t. The fixed effects Ot,i and Dt,j are, respectively, origin/year and destination/year specific
and should control for any differences between the origin and destination that are constant across
migration cohorts. This would include differences in size, amenities, cost of living, etc. The variable
di,j denotes the distance between locations i and j, while 1j 6=i is an indicator function.
The model is in levels—instead of logs—to accommodate all the zero labor flows observed in
the data. These zero flows are pervasive as the number of options per year is quite large and the
percentage of people migrating every year is low.27 If I were to estimate the model on log terms
using only positive flows, I would lose a lot of information, potentially biasing the results. Thus, I
estimate the previous model doing a Poisson regression.28
The first three columns of Table 2 show the results using different variables for distance.29 As
the table shows, there is a statistically significant negative relation between moving away from
one’s birthplace, as reflected by the estimated coefficient β1. Both distance elasticities, β1 and β2 are
estimated of similar magnitude. Although for some specifications the constant term α1, associated
to the dummy of living outside one’s birthplace is estimated positive, this is only a reflection of
the choice of unit of measurement for distance. The overall effect on the labor flows is always
negative.30
What happens if, instead of using directly the labor flows, I use the workers who move as a
share of the origin population, i.e., Li,jt,b/ ∑k L
i,k
t,b? The last three columns of Table 2 show the results
of those regressions. With this specification, although the elasticity with respect to distance from
birthplace β1 is still negative, its magnitude is nowhere close to the elasticity of distance across
origin and destination β2. However, looking at the overall effect of living outside the birthplace, i.e.
considering α1, this is always negative and significant.31
The key takeaway from the gravity regressions is that, even after controlling for traditional mi-
gration frictions, the labor flows are negatively related to distance from the workers’ birthplace.
This result is robust to different specifications which are further explored in Appendix 1.H. I esti-
mate both models using département as locations instead of the aggregated regions I used here.
27Recall that the number of options per year is equal to 733 = 389, 017.
28See Silva and Tenreyro (2006) regarding the advantages of using the Poisson regression over OLS with log terms for the estimation
of gravity models.
29I use geodesic distance, driving distances and driving hours from Google Maps.
30In particular, the minimum value of log geodesic distance in kilometers in the sample is 3.82. The analogous for diving distance is
4.13. Thus, the maximum value of the total effect for a worker leaving her birthplace is always negative, i.e. i.e. maxb,j(α1 + β1 log(db,j)) <
0.
31The reason why the estimates between specifications differ so much is because using flows versus shares changes the relative weights
when solving for the score function of the Poisson likelihood. For more details, see Sotelo (2019).
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Table 2 – Gravity regression






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Geodesic (km) Driving (km) Driving (hours) Geodesic (km) Driving (km) Driving (hours)
1(j 6= b) 1.337∗∗∗ 1.947∗∗∗ −3.122∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.218) (0.059) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
1(j 6= b) log(db,j) −1.105∗∗∗ −1.157∗∗∗ −1.267∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.038) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1(j 6= n) 1.099∗∗∗ 1.859∗∗∗ −4.512∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗ 1.033∗∗∗ −6.578∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.204) (0.036) (0.130) (0.132) (0.025)
1(j 6= i) log(di,j) −1.908∗∗∗ −1.945∗∗∗ −2.242∗∗∗ −1.735∗∗∗ −1.752∗∗∗ −2.021∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.042) (0.049) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028)
Adj. Pseudo R2 0.964 0.965 0.948 0.789 0.789 0.789
Observations 5,835,255 5,835,255 5,835,255 5,835,255 5,835,255 5,835,255
Note: This table stores the results of two models, both estimated using Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML). The first
model uses the labor flows of workers with birthplace b that moved from location i to location j, Li,jb,t as a dependent variable.
The second model uses the migration shares Li,jt,b/ ∑k L
i,k
t,b. For each model I use three different distance measures: geodesic
distance in hundreds of kilometers, driving distance in hundreds of kilometers, and driving time between locations in hours. I
get driving distances and hours from Google Maps. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01
Fact 3: Workers select across locations via wages.
To establish Fact 3, I confront two different selection mechanisms across locations. Thus, I test
the predictions if workers move primarily because of pecuniary reasons or instead they move for
other reasons unrelated to income.
Consider a situation where there are costs of moving away from one’s birthplace, as the evidence
presented under Fact 2 suggests. Now, if selection is driven by differences in potential wages across
different locations, and leaving the birthplace is costly, then we should expect that workers who
move away from their birthplace to have, on average, higher wages than those workers who stayed
in their birth location. Therefore, this selection mechanism gives the following prediction
E [wage|No Native] > E [wage|Native] ,
meaning that the average wage of non-natives in a particular location should be larger than the
average wage of natives. In contrast, if selection is driven by other elements orthogonal to wages,
like, say, heterogeneous tastes for different locations, we should not observe a systematic difference
between the wages of natives and non-natives.32
Figure 3a shows a plot where the y-axis corresponds to the mean of (log) wages in a particular
location/period of natives after a normalization, whereas the x-axis does the same but for non-
natives.33 I include the 45 degree line to compare the relative magnitudes. Each of the blue circles
in the Figure correspond to a location/year and the diameter of each circle is a function of the
number of workers in such location. The graph shows that for almost all the locations/periods, the
32In reality, probably both mechanisms operate. However, using the prediction on average wages, I can see if the data rejects the
selection-on-wages mechanism.
33I subtract the average wage of the entire sample used to each observation. This leaves the relative magnitudes unchanged.
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(a) Selection Non-Natives (b) Selection Migrants
Figure 3 – Selection via wages. The left panel compares the average (log) wages of non-native workers vs
native workers. Wages from both groups are normalized by the average (log) wage of all the sample. The plot
distinguishes two cases: when using the sample consisting of all workers and using the sample of workers
who switched jobs. The plot in the right panel is analogous to the plot on the right, but compares (log) wages
of migrants vs non-migrants.
average (log) wage of natives is lower than that of non-natives, consistent with the hypothesis that
idiosyncratic differences in wages are an important driver of workers’ migration decisions. Instead,
if idiosyncratic differences not related to wages are the only thing that matters for migration, I
would expect the points to gravitate around the 45 degree line.
I can restrict the sample to those workers who switched jobs from one year to the next. Using
that sample, the selection mechanism appears to be stronger when comparing the wages of natives
versus non-natives using all the workers. The orange circles in Figure 3a show this. Compared to
the whole sample, the difference in the wages of non-natives versus natives is larger when using
only the switchers. This is evident as the bulk of orange circles corresponding to job switchers are
further down and to the right than the blue circles where I used all the workers.
If there are costs of migrating across locations, the same logic as above should apply with respect
to wages of migrant versus non-migrant workers. The prediction would be that the average wage
of migrants is larger than the average wage of those workers who stayed in the same location.
The blue circles in Figure 3b shows the average wage of migrant versus non-migrant workers for
every location/period after a normalization. The figure suggests that selection is less strong for
year-to-year migration than when comparing natives vs non-natives, especially for large locations.
The closer alignment to the 45 degree line can just reflect that some workers who were migrants in
previous years and kept the same job are now classified as non-migrants. For example, if a worker
migrated in a previous year because of a highly paid job and kept her job in subsequent years,
she would appear as a non-migrant in the data, even though she clearly selected herself to that
location via wages. On the other hand, migrant workers are, by definition, taking new jobs. Thus,
a fair comparison would be to use those workers who changed jobs but stayed in the same location
versus the workers who migrate into that location in the same year.
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The selection mechanism via wages appears stronger when using workers who switched jobs
from one year to another. Indeed, Figure 3b shows that the selection via wages appears to be
stronger than when using all the workers. And not only is it stronger, the magnitude of the dif-
ference is very large: the horizontal distance between most of the circles and the 45 degree line is
around 1. As I am comparing averages of log wages, this means that the wages of migrants are
twice as large as those of non-migrants.34
The key takeaway for Fact 3 is that idiosyncratic differences in wages across locations are an
important driver of workers’ migration decisions. Also, that this selection mechanism appears
stronger when using workers who change jobs between years, and that non-natives and migrants
have higher average wages than natives and non-migrants, respectively.
Fact 4: Workers who Live in their Birthplace accept a Wage Penalty.
Facts 2 and 3 above show evidence of potential mobility frictions between a worker’s birthplace
and other locations, and that workers select into locations mainly via wages. Taken together, this
suggests that workers who change jobs and move away from their birthplace should experience
wage gains. In contrast, workers who change jobs but decide to stay in their birthplace or return to
it, are likely to suffer a wage penalty.
To shed some light on these wage gains and penalties related to working within the birthplace,
I estimate the following linear regression
∆ log wi,jι;t,b = P
i,j
t + 1j=bβ In + 1i=b × 1j 6=bβOut + ε
i,j
ι;t,b,
where ∆ log wi,jι;t,b is the year-to-year change in the log wage of worker ι who was born in b that
moves from location i to j in t; P i,jt denotes an origin/destination pair fixed effect for year t that
should absorb any constant differences across the two locations, as well as the compensation the
worker needs for migrating; the dummy 1j=b indicates when a worker’s destination j is her birth-
place b; the interaction 1i=b × 1j 6=b indicates if a workers previous residence—or origin—i is the
same as her birthplace b and that the destination j is different than the birthplace. This interaction
captures all the workers who leave their birthplace in that period. The total gain from leaving the
birthplace would be the composite of both effects, one that is from moving out from the birthplace
plus not receiving the penalty of staying in the birthplace.
Table 3 shows the estimated wage gains of a worker who moves out of her birthplace and the
penalty she incurs for staying/returning to it. The specification in the second column includes
a quadratic polynomial in age and a gender dummy to account for possible differences in the
composition of those workers who move back—or from—their birthplace.
The estimated penalty that workers entail to live in their home is between 4 and 8 percent.
On the other hand, the expected wage gain a worker gets by moving away from her birthplace is
between 9 and 11 percent. These results do not mean that in order for a worker to be indifferent
between moving out of her birthplace, she needs to be compensated between 9 and 11 percent more
34In Appendix 1.H I make the same figures but using residual wages after running a regression for each year of log wages on a
quadratic polynomial in age and a gender dummy. This controls for the differences in gender and age compositions across groups.
Compared to the analysis using observed wages, the results are very similar and have the same implications. In particular, even after
controlling for age and gender, the average wages of migrants are twice as large as non-migrants who changed jobs.
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Table 3 – Birthplace penalty on wages
Dependent variable: ∆ log wt,ι
OLS
(1) (2)
Destination = Birthplace −0.042∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Leaving Birthplace 0.072∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Origin/Dest./Year FE X X
Age and Gender Controls X
R2 0.019 0.042
Observations 26,221,763 26,221,763
Note: The table shows the results of two linear regressions estimated using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The dependent variable is the time difference of
the logarithm of the wage of an individual who switch jobs across years. Column
2 adds as controls a quadratic polynomial in age and a gender dummy. Standard
errors in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
than her outside option. For this to be true, the outside option of the worker should be the wage
she received in the previous period. However, the true outside option is not observed in the data
as it will be the second best offer that a worker gets from a different location.
Taken together, Facts 1 to 4 suggest that workers prefer to live close to their home. This motivates
the migration model I present in the next section, which I use to estimate this home bias. I then use
the model to study the general equilibrium effects of the home bias in the aggregate economy and
on the welfare distribution across birthplace cohorts.
1.4 A Migration Model with Home Bias
In this section, I first present a dynamic migration model with a finite number of workers. This
assumption—which is not common in most macro-migration models—allows for a more transpar-
ent identification strategy later on. After this, I present the more standard steady-state continuous-
population version of the discrete model, which I use later on to analyze the general equilibrium
effects of the home bias.
My model is based on Caliendo et al. (2019) in that it combines a dynamic discrete choice
problem for workers’ migration decisions with a static trade equilibrium model determining output
at each location. I add these new elements to their model: (i) I include home bias in workers’
preferences; (ii) differences in idiosyncratic wages drive the migration decision of workers; and (iii)
an exogenous process determines if a worker changes jobs, and therefore, whether she may migrate
or not. As I show below, differences (ii) and (iii) combined have implications with respect to the
labor supply elasticity.
I consider a discrete-time, infinite-horizon economy that consists of I locations, indexed by i, j
and k. Each worker has a specific birthplace, indexed b. I assume there is a large, but discrete,
number of workers who were born in location b, which is denoted by Lb, and I assume that it is
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constant across time.
Workers get utility from consuming a final good, assembled locally from a housing and non-
housing good. Housing is in fixed supply. The non-housing good is assembled locally by a firm
that uses tradable inputs, which are produced by intermediate firms from different locations.
In each location there are a finite number of fixed intermediate good firms produce a continu-
ous mass of varieties, each of these produced according to a Cobb-Douglas technology that uses
efficiency units of labor and housing as inputs. I assume that each firm-variety has different pro-
ductivities and, following Eaton and Kortum (2002), I assume these are distributed Fréchet with a
dispersion parameter equal to ϕ.35 These firms trade across regions, subject to some iceberg costs,
and non-housing good producers use the intermediate inputs to assemble the non-housing local
good which is in turn used as an input by the final good producer.36 The joint demand for housing
by workers and firms generates a congestion force in the model: if a location attracts workers, this
raises the price of housing and lowers the real wage.
Workers are forward-looking and have rational expectations. In every period, two things can
happen: with some probability the worker keeps the same job and moves to the following period,
or it becomes a job switcher, in which case the worker has to look for another job. If this is the case,
then at the end of each period, workers observe a vector of location-specific idiosyncratic labor-
augmenting productivity shocks for the next period. Given this information, workers optimally
decide where to move in the following period subject to some migration costs. In addition to the
migration costs, workers also pay a cost, in utility terms, from moving away from their birthplace.
Admittedly, the exogenous process that determines whether a worker has an opportunity to
change jobs, and therefore migrate, is very simplistic. It can reflect several aspects of the labor
market: separation rates and job finding rates, as well as on-the-job search. Regardless of how
we interpret this exogenous process, it mainly captures that most workers do not take a migration
decision in every period, and indeed just keep the same job.
Appendix 1.A contains the detailed derivations of the expressions in this section.
1.4.1 Workers
In period t, there is a discrete number Lit,b of workers with birthplace b that live in each location
i ∈ I . Each worker ι supplies her efficiency units of labor, exp(θit−1,ι) inelastically and receives a
competitive efficiency wage wit.
The worker uses her labor income to purchase and consume a local final good Cit,ι whose price








The final good is a composite of housing Hit and non-housing good Q
i
t which is assembled locally
35This assumption on the discrete number of firms allows me to accommodate a discrete number of workers and to keep the tractability
that comes from assuming a Fréchet productivity distribution over a continuum of goods.
36The input output relation is as follows: Intermediate good→ non-housing good→ final good.
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Denote the housing and non-housing good prices as PiH,t and P
i
Q,t. Then, the price index for the
















where Bi is a location specific amenity; κib ≥ 0 is the utility cost of living away from one’s birthplace,
which I call the home bias: the larger κib is, the larger the preference of workers with birthplace b to
stay home vis-a-vis location i. The home bias is common for all workers with birthplace b that live
in location i.
At the beginning of each period, workers produce in their current location. Each of them then
receives an independent shock that determines their immediate working situation: with probability
ρ they stay in the same job and keep their same location-specific efficiency unit, and with probability
1− ρ they have to change jobs. If a worker has to change jobs, then she observes a vector of location
specific idiosyncratic efficiency unit shocks Θt,ι ≡ {θkt,ι}k∈I . After observing the shocks, the worker
optimally decides where to move, subject to some migration costs τi,kt ≥ 0 measured in utility
terms.
Workers discount the future at rate β. Given the assumptions on workers’ behavior, I can write























The sources of uncertainty in the model can be grouped in two: first, there is idiosyncratic
uncertainty, i.e. the future realizations of the location specific efficiency unit shocks. Second, there
is aggregate uncertainty. The sources of aggregate uncertainty can, in turn, be also grouped in
two. First, location productivities might change from period to period given a known distribution.
Second, given the discrete number of workers, labor supply at each location is stochastic. This last
aspect differs from several macro-migration models with a continuum of agents. In such cases, this
particular source of uncertainty would not be present. I summarize all the sources of aggregate
uncertainty in a variable Zt, which evolves according to the conditional distribution F(Zt+1|Zt).
Keep in mind though that in the steady-state continuous-population version of the model Zt = Z,
so the further characterization of its evolution is not necessary when solving that version of the
model. I only include it to make clear that the identification strategy later on will not depend on
the dynamics of Zt.
I assume that the idiosyncratic efficiency shocks are distributed Gumbel with zero mean and
variance equal to π
2
6 δ
2. This assumption, ubiquitous in the discrete choice literature, allows for
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be the expected lifetime utility net of current discounted efficiency
shocks θit−1,ι/(1− βρ), conditional on the aggregate shock vector Zt. Then, given the assumption
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Vkb (Zt+1)dF(Zt+1|Zt) is the expected lifetime utility of moving to location k at
period t + 1. The scaled-up shock
θkt,ι












− κib + βρV
i












The assumption on the distribution of the efficiency shocks allows me to compute a closed formed
expression for the conditional migration probabilities. Conditional on changing jobs, the probability















The parameter λ ≡ δ/(1− βρ), which appears in expressions (1.4) and (1.5), represents the disper-
sion of the efficiency shocks after taking into account the probability of getting the same efficiency
unit in the next period with probability ρ. Given the expression for the conditional probability of
migrating (1.5), I interpret λ as the inverse labor supply elasticity. If the dispersion of shocks is
smaller, jobs across locations are more alike, i.e. easier to substitute, which turns the labor supply
more elastic.
When there is no persistence in the model, i.e. ρ = 0, the inverse supply elasticity is just
the dispersion of the original efficiency shocks δ < λ. But then, why is the persistence in the
model making the labor supply more inelastic? When a worker is comparing different jobs across
locations, she understands that with probability ρ she will keep the same job in the following
period. Therefore, initial differences in efficiency units are magnified and their perceived variance
increases. So the worker behaves as if the shocks she observes are distributed Gumbel with scale
parameter λ > δ. While other papers have considered exogenous persistence in the decision of
workers, whether to migrate or change sector of employment, to the best of my knowledge, I am
the first to link it to the (extensive margin) labor supply elasticity.37 This is a consequence of workers
selecting across locations via different job opportunities, as reflected in their efficiency shocks θ j.
As there is a discrete number of workers in each location, the movement of labor from one
location to another is a stochastic process governed by the above migration probabilities. Denote
37See section 5.3.2 in Caliendo et al. (2019) for an extension of their model where they add exogenous persistence in the migration
decision. Also, Appendix 3 in the Online Appendix of Artuç et al. (2010) adds an extension to their sectoral choice model where some
type of workers can’t change sectors while others can. However, every worker has a probability to change type, so it is similar to a model




t,b as the number of workers who migrate from i to j with birthplace b at the end of period t. Then,








To conclude the characterization of the dynamic sub-problem of the model, I show how the
efficiency units per location evolve. The assumption on the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks
allows me to characterize analytically the expected amount of (idiosyncratic) efficiency units of a








where Γ(·) denotes the Gamma function and γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant. The previous
expression is intuitive: given the selection of individuals across locations, all infra-marginal work-
ers have higher efficiency units than the marginal worker. Then, the more workers move into a
particular location, the lower the average efficiency unit of that particular migration cohort.
Denote hi,jt,b as the total amount of efficiency units of workers who have the opportunity to















where χi,jt+1,b is a zero mean expectation shock that captures deviations between the expected and
realized efficiency units. Thus, the total amount of efficiency units per migration cohort is also a
random variable as the labor flow Li,jt+1,b and the expectation shock χ
i,j
t+1,b are stochastic variables.
Define the sum of total efficiency units of workers who did not switch jobs from one period
to the next as Ñ jt,b. Then, the evolution of the total amount of efficiency units of workers from



















The previous equations characterize the evolution of the total efficiency units supplied to each
location j at every period t. Conditional on these allocations, I can now specify the static sub-
problem of the model, and solve for the equilibrium efficiency wages at each time t such that labor
markets clear in each location.
1.4.2 Production
The production side of the model is very similar to the one presented in the one-sector model of
Caliendo et al. (2019) with the difference that the labor input is efficiency units. Another difference
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is that I assume balanced trade. This is because I lack data on trade flows across locations within
France.38
In each location j I assume that there is a finite number of perfectly competitive intermediate
firms each producing a continuum of varieties of intermediate goods. In order to produce a vari-
ety, the intermediate good firms use as inputs the total amount of efficiency units h̃ and housing
H̃.39 The total factor productivity is composed of two terms: a time-varying location specific com-
ponent Ajt, which is common for all varieties produced within the same location, and a variety
specific component zj, which is specific to variety z. This idiosyncratic productivity zj is distributed



















Intermediate firms pay the efficiency wage wjt for each effective unit of labor. The price of housing




















Trade costs are represented by ψj,i. These are ’iceberg costs’, meaning that, for one unit of any
variety shipped from region i to j, it requires producing ψj,i ≥ 1 units in location i. I assume
that these costs are constant across periods. Competition in turn implies that the price paid for a






Local manufacturing goods in location j are produced by aggregating intermediate inputs from
all the different locations in N . Let Qjt be the quantity produced of local manufacturing goods in j
and q̃jt(z
j) the quantity demanded of an intermediate good of a given variety from the lowest-cost





















is the joint distribution over the vector z = (z1, z2, ..., zI). Using















38This flows would have allowed me to compute the trade deficits for each location.
39I assume that the firm can split the efficiency units of a worker across the production of any variety
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where Γ is just a constant term equal to (Γ (1 + (1− σ)/ϕ))1/(1−σ) and, as it is standard, I assume
that 1 + ϕ > σ.













Housing, as mentioned before is supplied inelastically, and is rented by both workers and in-
termediate firms in a perfect competition environment. I assume that owners of the housing stock
consume just the local non-housing good Qjt.
1.4.3 Market clearing
In equilibrium, the sum of efficiency units and housing across all firms must be equal to the total
supply in each location.
Let PjT,tE
j




























































































1.4.4 Static equilibrium under symmetric costs




T,t be the the efficiency wage deflated by the price of the local non-housing good in




as a composite of both productivity and housing supply
in location j. Then, if the trade costs are symmetric, i.e. ψi,j = ψj,i, the static equilibrium conditions




















where ϕ̃ = 1/(1 + 2ϕ). Appendix 1.A.3 contains the detailed derivations to get the expression
above.
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1.4.5 Steady-State continuous-population case
The model presented above with a finite number of workers per birthplace will guide the identi-
fication strategy in the next section. Solving such a model, however, is extremely challenging. To
solve for the model, I consider a version of it where the economy fundamentals do not change and
each birthplace cohort consists of a mass Lb of workers. These two assumptions render the model
deterministic, in particular Vit,b = V
i


























I can now summarize the steady-state continuous-population model. The static part of the



























The rest of the equations characterize the total efficiency units in a location i per birthplace cohort








































The previous equation is scale invariant in {Lib}. The sum of total number of workers of a particular



















Appendix 1.A.5 provides a detailed derivation of these expressions.
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Table 4 – Parameter values
Parameter Description Value Source
β Discount factor 0.96 –
α Share of housing consumption 0.3 Friggit (2013)
ϕ Dispersion productivities 4.14 Simonovska and Waugh (2014)




Trade Costs — Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005)
ρ Prob of keeping job 0.867 (s.e. 2.4e−5) 1 - Proportion of Switchers
Definition 1 (Steady-State continuous-population competitive equilibrium). Given a distribution of
birthplace cohorts {Lb}b∈I , the competitive equilibrium for the steady-state continuous-population econ-
omy is a vector of deflated wages, {Wi}i inI , total efficiency units per location {Ni}i inI , lifetime utilities
{Uib}b,i∈I , option values {Ωib}b,i∈I , labor flows {Lib}b,i∈I and efficiency units per birthplace cohort/location
{Nib}b,i∈I , such that equations (1.7)-(1.13) are satisfied for all i, b ∈ I .
1.5 Identification and Estimation
The model presented in the previous section, entails a large number of parameters, as well as
distributions of fundamentals, which need to be estimated or calibrated. In this section I explain
how to identify and estimate the key parameters and the distributions of fundamentals.
Given that the static part of the equilibrium is fairly standard, I calibrate externally the param-
eters governing that part of the model, the trade costs and the discount factor, β. I choose values
to match moments from other studies. For the discount factor β, I choose a value of 0.96 which
is standard in the literature for annual frequencies. The trade elasticity ϕ is set to 4.14 which is
the value proposed by Simonovska and Waugh (2014). The consumption elasticity with respect
to housing α is set to 0.3, which is in line with survey studies on workers expenditures in France
(Friggit (2013)). The output elasticity η is set to 0.1, in line with the profit share reported for France




are taken from Combes et al. (2005) who
use data on commodity flows to estimate trade costs at the département level. Given that some of
my locations are aggregates of different departements, I need to do some adjustments. I first com-
pute all the trade costs across departements and then compute a population weighted average of
these departemental trade costs to get the aggregate location trade cost. Regarding the persistence
parameter ρ, in the data I can identify which workers changed main jobs between years. Appendix
1.E.1 explains how I do this. I estimate ρ using the average across years of the proportion of work-
ers who stay in the same job between years. Table 4 summarizes the information of the parameters
mentioned so far.
40The profit share is defined as total value added of non-financial corporations minus payments to labor and capital. As I don’t have
capital in the model, and given the Cobb-Douglass and perfect competition assumptions, the profit share would correspond to η in my
model.
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I use the structure of the model to identify the remaining parameters: the dispersion parameter δ,
the mobility costs, {τi,j, κ jb}, and the distribution of composite productivities and amenities {Ãj,B j}.
I follow a sequential identification strategy which is inspired by Bryan and Morten (2019), Dingel
and Tintelnot (2020) and Artuç et al. (2010). The merit of any identification strategy is related to its
practical implementation. Thus, the steps in the identification sequence are not arbitrary, but are
chosen such that the estimation procedure that follows is computationally feasible.
The main identification steps are as follows. First, I show how to use observed labor flows
to identify the migration costs. I show how to relax the identification conditions provided by
Bryan and Morten (2019), which in turn relaxes the data requirements. As I show later on, this
will be important in the context of my application. Second, I show how to recover the dispersion
parameter δ from the effect of migration costs on migrants’ wages. Third, using the migration costs
and labor flows, I show how to identify the underlying distribution of migration probabilities by
means of maximum likelihood. I show that the maximization of such likelihood corresponds to
solving a system of equations characterizing the balanced trade condition present in most gravity
trade models. Trade economists have shown the existence and uniqueness of the solution of such
systems and provided fast and efficient algorithms to find it.41 Fourth, I show that efficiency wages
are identified using average wages and the estimated migration probabilities. Fifth, I use average
wage differentials across locations of the different migration cohorts to identify the home bias. The
idea is that the wage of a worker outside home should be larger, all else equal, than the wage at
home. I show how to control for all the other factors influencing the wage differential to isolate
the effect of the home bias. Sixth, as in the trade literature, I show how to invert the static part of
the model using observed wages to recover the underlying productivity distribution. Finally, as is
standard in the urban economics literature, I identify the amenities as a residual that explains the
remaining variation in labor flows.42
In what follows I explain with more detail each of the steps to identify the relevant parameters
of the model.
1.5.1 (Scaled) Migration Costs τi,j/λ
Given the logit structure of the migration probability, the conditional expectation of the labor flow




















+ log Lit,b. Then, conditioning
on origin, destination and the location pair fixed effects, the conditional expectation of the labor
flow is equal to the right hand side of (1.14). This moment condition is equivalent to the first order
condition of a Poisson regression (or Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood).
41For the existence and uniqueness results, see for example Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) and Allen et al. (2020a). For the algorithm, see
Pérez-Cervantes (2014).
42For a discussion of the inversion of the model to recover fundamentals, as well as the identification of amenities as residuals, see
Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017).
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Identification of the migration costs by running a Poisson regression with fixed effects is not a
priori obvious. For example, suppose there is an origin destination i with flows going to several
destinations. Now, assume there is only one labor flow going to location j. Then, I could not
separately identify, the destination fixed effect Djt,b from the migration cost τ
i,j.43 In this section I
show sufficient conditions for the identification of the migration costs when running a regression
with fixed effects. First, I make the following assumption,
Assumption 1. The migration costs are symmetric τi,j = τ j,i for all i, j in I . Also, the cost of staying in
the same location is zero, i.e. τi,i = 0 for all i in I .






















Notice that I have used both the normalization and symmetry assumption to form this expression.
The expression above means that if the data for a particular birthplace/year contains positive flows
of workers going from i to j, workers going in the reverse direction, j to i, and workers staying
within those two locations, then the (scaled) migration cost τi,j/λ is identified.
There is a simple intuition for why the product of these probability ratios identify the migration
cost. First, the ratio pi,jt,b/p
i,i
t,b controls for origin specific differences. The remaining variation is
explained by the migration cost and differences in destination fixed effects. To control for the latter,
I can use the same ratio but for the reversed flow pj,it,b/p
j,j
t,b. Indeed, the variation in the reversed
ratio accounts for the reversed difference of destination fixed effects and the migration cost. In the
end, the larger the gross migration flow is, the smaller the migration cost. These are the conditions
pointed out by Bryan and Morten (2019) which are summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 1. Bryan and Morten (2019). The (scaled) migration cost τi,j/λ < ∞ is identified if Li,jt,b >
0, Lj,it,b > 0 and L
i,i
t,b > 0, L
j,j
t,b > 0, for some birth cohort b and period t.
Proof. It follows from (1.14) and (1.15).
These sufficient conditions for identification of the migration cost might be difficult to fulfill in
my context. For example, I would need to observe, for a particular year, someone born in Toulouse
migrating from Paris to Lyon, and someone born in Toulouse migrating from Lyon to Paris. In
addition, I would need to observe, for the same year, someone from Toulouse staying in both Paris
and Lyon. Maybe for this particular example, the data would easily fulfill the requirements for
above’s identification conditions, but these become increasingly hard to satisfy when comparing
scarcely populated locations. Only 69.3% of the bilateral connections satisfy the conditions of
Proposition 1. Thus, for 30.7% of the connections I would not be sure if I am actually identifying
the migration costs when running a Poisson regression.
My objective is to relax the restrictions imposed by Proposition 1 to find a larger number of
bilateral connections that are identified. In the rest of this subsection I provide an informal discus-












Figure 4 – Identification of Migration Costs in a Three Locations Example. The three locations are Toulouse
(T), Paris (P) and Lyon (L). The left and right panel plot the graph representation of data where each (solid)
edge represents some positive worker flow. The middle panel is an undirected graph where each (dashed)
edge represents that the migration cost between the locations are directly identified (see main text).
sion of how to relax the data requirements for the identification of the migration costs and leave for
Appendix 1.C.1 a more formal discussion of the details.
To keep things simple, suppose that there are only three locations in the data: Toulouse, Paris
and Lyon. Suppose that for a particular period t and birth cohort b, I observe positive flows
of migrants from Toulouse to Paris, and vice-versa, as well as workers who just stayed in each
location. There are no outflows of workers from Lyon. The graph representation of such data is
found in Figure 4a. From such data I can identify the (scaled) migration cost between Toulouse and
Paris τT,P/λ. Then I would say that the migration cost is directly identified from data for period t
and birth cohort b.
I can do the same graph representation for different periods and birth cohorts. Suppose that for
one of these periods and birth cohorts I can directly identify the migration cost from Paris to Lyon,
τP,L/λ. So using two different pairs of periods/birthplace I would have identified the migration
costs between Toulouse to Paris and Lyon to Paris. This is represented in the graph in Figure 4b,
where the edges as dashed lines represent that the migration costs between the connected locations
are directly identified.
Now suppose there is a third pair of period/birth cohort data, t′, b′. The following proposition
summarizes sufficient conditions for identification of the migration cost from Toulouse to Lyon for
the three location example, when the migration costs from Paris to Lyon and to Toulouse were
already identified.
Proposition 2. Three locations. Suppose that τP,L/λ and τP,T/λ are identified. Then, the (scaled)
migration cost from Toulouse to Lyon τT,L/λ < ∞ is identified from the labor flow data {Ln,mt,b }n,m∈{T,P,L}
if, for some birth cohort b and period t
1. There is a positive flow from Toulouse to Lyon, or viceversa.
2. There is an undirected path of labor flows from Toulouse to Lyon via Paris.
3. In all three locations there is a flow that stays.
Proof. See Appendix 1.C.1
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An example of period/birth cohort data fulfilling the identification conditions of Proposition 2,
but not of Proposition 1, is represented in Figure 4c. The Figure also includes the dashed edges
which represent the previously identified migration costs with data for other periods/birth cohorts.
Differently from Figure 4a, there is only one flow going from Toulouse to Lyon, so the direct
identification argument—the one from Proposition 1—is no longer valid to identify the migration
cost between these two locations. The issue is that after normalizing the flow from Toulouse to





DLt′,b′ −DTt′,b′ − τT,L/λ
)
still contains the aggregate destination differences between the two locations. However, as Propo-
sition 2 tells us that the data should be sufficient to identify the migration cost between Toulouse
and Lyon. To see this, note that the destination dependent differences can be controlled by pivot-
ing via Paris: use the difference between the probability of going to Toulouse from Paris and the





= exp(−τT,L/λ− τP,T/λ + τP,L/λ). (1.16)
The ratio of labor flows going from Paris to Toulouse and to Lyon has information in the relative
attractiveness of Toulouse versus Lyon, as well as the relative differences in migration costs. As
both the migration costs of going from Paris to Toulouse and Lyon were already identified using
data for other period/birth cohorts, then the migration cost between Toulouse and Lyon is also
identified.
The example above is just one particular situation where the data fulfills the conditions of Propo-
sition 2. However, note that in this example I identify the migration cost from Toulouse to Lyon
under weaker conditions than those stated in Proposition 2, in particular the third condition: in
equation (1.16) I did not use the labor flows that stayed in Lyon and in Paris. Similar case-by-case
scenarios can be analyzed, but this becomes exponentially harder when the number of locations
grows.44 Therefore, for my context, I need identification conditions that are simple and easy to
verify. Proposition 7 in Appendix 1.C.1 generalizes Proposition 2 and gives sufficient conditions for
identification of a migration cost beyond the three location example.
As with Proposition 2, the more general Proposition 7 uses as a starting point some previously
identified connections. It does not say how these have to be identified, though. Therefore, the
identification argument is recursive: I can start with the directly identified migration costs and
check which extra connections are identified. Then, I can use these new set of identified migration
costs to find new ones, and so on. This recursive algorithm is explained with more detail in
Appendix 1.C.1.
Although I can relax the data requirements for identification of the migration costs, the non-
linear procedure that I use to estimate them might introduce some small-sample bias. I correct for
44Strictly speaking, the conditions are not weaker. I don’t have to fulfill all the restrictions stated by the third condition of Proposition 3
because of the out-flows from Paris. This imposes a restriction in the direction of flows. However, the second condition of the Proposition
says nothing about the direction of flows.
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the bias by applying the split/panel jackknife estimation proposed by Dhaene and Jochmans (2015).






















is a bias-corrected estimate of the migration cost, where τ̂
i,j
λ correspond to the estimate with the







λ correspond to the estimates for each half of the panel.
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Relaxing the data requirements for identification is even more important when doing the split-
jacknife bias correction: compared to using the whole sample—where 69.3% of the connections
satisfy the identification conditions of Proposition 1—only 47.9% satisfy the conditions for both
sub-samples. In contrast, the connections satisfying the weaker conditions of Proposition 7 are
98.9% when using the entire sample, while 93.4% are satisfied in both sub-samples.
I parameterize those migration costs that are not identified in both sub-samples as a function
of distance. Using the identified migration costs, I fit a linear model that depends on distance. I
then use these estimates to impute the missing migration cost values. The function that parame-
terizes the (scaled) migration costs needs to fulfill an important property, besides the identification
assumptions of normalization and symmetry. This property is that the change in a possible coun-
terfactual scenario that corresponds to bringing all costs equal to zero should be invariant to the






0 if i = j
Cτ + ντ log(di,j) otherwise,
where di,j is the distance between locations i and j, so ντ is just an elasticity. Cτ is a constant that can
be interpreted as a fixed cost of migrating, but that is linked with the choice of unit of measurement
of distance. I choose geodesic distance in kilometers for parameterization of the migration costs,
in order to fulfill the symmetry identification assumption. Figure 5 shows the estimated migration
costs and the estimated values of Cτ and ντ are, respectively, −0.474 (s.e. 0.319) and 1.427 (s.e.
0.054). As expected, the migration costs increase with distance. I leave their interpretation for
section 1.6.2.
1.5.2 Wage dispersion parameter δ
In Appendix 1.A.2, I show that the expected log wage of a worker with birthplace b conditional on







= log(wjt)− δ log(p
i,j
t−1,b). (1.17)
Because of selection, the average wage of workers of a particular migration cohort is negatively
related to the size of the migration cohort—which is related to the migration probability. When
45In a very simplified manner, what the correction is doing is to subtract an estimate of the bias. The idea is that the difference between
the average of the difference between the estimates from one half of the sample and the entire sample is an estimate of the bias. By
plugging in the negative of this average one can get the expression above.
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Figure 5 – Migration Costs vs Distance. The graph plots the migration costs vs (log)
geodesic distance. Each point corresponds to a mobility cost and (log) geodesic distance of
a pair of locations. The lines correspond to fitted a linear model. The slope corresponding
is 1.43, s.e. 0.05 and the R2 is 0.22.
more workers migrate, the efficiency of the marginal worker is smaller, reducing the average wage.
The elasticity of average wage with respect to the migration probability is thus equal to −δ.46
Variation in migration costs imply variation in migration probabilities, which ultimately identifies













where Õit,b and D̃
j
t,b are origin/birthplace/period and destination/birthplace/period fixed effects.
Note that the efficiency wage of the destination location is absorbed within the destination fixed
effect. This expression reveals that the average compensation a worker needs in order to be willing
to move from i to j is δ τ
i,j
λ . Then, I can run a regression with origin/birthplace and destina-
tion/birthplace fixed effects of individual (log) wages on the previously identified (scaled) migra-
tion costs to identify δ.47
I can control for differences in age and gender characteristics of individuals that should not
46The intuition of this elasticity is as follows: if efficiency shocks are more dispersed, i.e. higher δ, the gap in efficiency between
marginal and average worker increases. Then, the average wage falls faster with the increase in cohort size, as the efficiency of the
marginal migrant falls also at a faster rate.
47The idea of using the average wages to identify the dispersion parameter δ is similar in spirit to what Donaldson (2018) does to
identify the trade elasticity. Donaldson collects data on different prices for a commodity, salt, as well as where production took place.
Because of perfect competition and non-arbitrage, differences in prices between origin and destination should reflect the cost of trading
across locations. Thus, high trade costs imply high prices. Donaldson uses the effect of trade costs on trade to recover the trade elasticity,
which, in the context of his trade model à la Eaton and Kortum (2002) has a structural interpretation. In his model, buyers select
where to import given differences in prices. The strength of this selection effect is driven by the trade elasticity, whose absolute value
is negatively related to the dispersion of firms’ efficiencies in each location. Higher values of the trade elasticity means that the relative
efficiencies are more similar across goods, thus weakening the force of comparative advantage. Then, the effect of changes in trade
costs over total imports is stronger when the comparative advantage motive is weaker. Similarly, in my model, migration locations are
selected via wages, so high migration costs would imply high wages. I do the reverse as Donaldson as I use the labor flows—which
would correspond to trade flows in his case—to infer (scaled) migration costs. Then I use the effect of migration costs on wages to
infer the dispersion parameter of efficiency units. Analogous to his case, the dispersion parameter governs the strength of how workers
pursue their comparative advantage in selecting migration destinations.
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affect the migration decision, but might affect the wages in dimensions not captured by the model.
Thus, before running the regression of migration costs on individual wages, for every year in my
sample, I first run a regression of all wages on a quadratic polynomial in age and a gender dummy.
I then take the residuals of those regressions as the main input for the remaining estimation steps.
Given the sequential identification strategy, the migration costs that I use to identify the disper-
sion parameter are measured with error. Even more so after the bias correction procedure, as it
adds some variance as a cost for correcting the bias. This measurement error creates an attenuation
bias on δ. To control for the bias, I instrument the migration costs. The estimated migration costs
have a high correlation with geodesic distance, where pairs of locations that are further apart have
on average a larger migration cost. For this reason, I instrument migration costs using geodesic
distance and correct for the attenuation bias. 48 Details of the first stage regression are in Appendix
1.D.
After instrumenting, the estimated value of δ is 0.145 (s.e. 2e−4), while the OLS estimate is lower,
with an estimated value of 0.126 (s.e. 2e−4).49 My estimate is larger than the estimates found by
Bryan and Morten (2019) for the U.S, 0.035, and Indonesia, 0.077, although their methodology only
compares flows of natives versus non-natives.50 Taking their estimate as a benchmark, this means
that, in absence of a persistence force, i.e. ρ = 0, the migration elasticity in France 1/0.126 ≈ 8 is
three and a half times smaller than that found for the U.S, 1/0.035 ≈ 28. This is in line with the
idea that the U.S. has a much more mobile and dynamic labor market, although given the different
models and identification steps, this should be taken with a grain of salt.
1.5.3 Conditional migration probabilities
Using the expression for the migration probabilities and the count data from workers migration






















where D jt+1,b ≡ V
j
t+1,b/λ are destination/birthplace/period specific fixed effects; and ℓ
i,j
t,b is the
number of workers who changed jobs and moved from i to j with birthplace b at end of period
t. It turns out that the direct maximization of the conditional (log) likelihood when the (scaled)
migration costs are fixed is a highly tractable problem.
Proposition 3. The values of the fixed effects D jt+1,b, for all j, b and t that maximize the conditional (log)


















t,b, ∀i, j ∈ I . (1.19)
48I consider as an instrument 1(i 6= j) log(di,j), so that the instrument is equal to zero for observations of workers who do not migrate.
The correlation between the instrument and the migration costs is 0.93.
49Table 11 in Appendix 1.H contains the regression table of both the IV and OLS regressions.
50Bryan and Morten (2019) estimate the dispersion parameter by running a regression of average log wages against the (log) migration
probabilities corresponding to equation (1.17).
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Proof. See Appendix 1.C.2.
The proof boils down to manipulating the first-order conditions of the maximization of the (log)
likelihood.




t,b , where the inward labor
flow is Lj,destt,b = ∑i ℓ
i,j
t,b and the outward labor flow is L
i,orig
t,b = ∑h ℓ
i,h
t,b for all locations i, j in I . In
other words, each of these expressions are just equal to a labor movement equation, where the sum
of all the labor flows from a particular origin, pi,jt,bL
i,orig
t,b , have to be equal to the total labor observed
in that destination, Lj,destt,b . Therefore the maximization of the likelihood corresponds to finding
the fixed effects such that the migration probabilities satisfy such labor movement equations. The
system is analogous to a balanced-trade equation that arises from gravity type-models. Trade
economists have established the existence and uniqueness of the solution as well as developed
efficient algorithms for computing it.51
The connection between the maximization of the conditional (log) likelihood and the labor flow
equilibrium equation comes from relating two results: (i) there is a close relation between the
maximization of the log likelihood and the PPML; (ii) estimation of gravity equations using PPML
automatically satisfy the structural restrictions of gravity models.
Previous literature has pointed out, separately, these two connections. First, Guimaraes et al.
(2003) show that solving jointly for the fixed effects D jt+1,b and migration costs τi,j/λ to maxi-
mize the conditional likelihood (1.18) is equivalent to doing a Poisson-Pseudo-Maximum Likeli-
hood (PPML) estimation adding origin fixed effects, whose moment condition is equal to equation
(1.14).52 This moment condition is derived from the equilibrium expression of labor flows, which
corresponds to a ’general gravity’ framework.53 Second, Fally (2015) shows that in a trade model
where output and expenditures are consistent with the sum of outward and inward trade flows—
which in my migration context is analogous to a consistent definition of inward and outward labor
flows—the estimation of a ’general gravity’ equation with origin and destination fixed effects using
PPML automatically satisfies the structural restrictions imposed by the model.54 Given that the
maximization of the (log) likelihood and the PPML are closely related, it is therefore not surprising
that the first order conditions of the maximization of the likelihood are as well closely related to
the structural equations of a gravity model.
So why not estimate together the destination fixed effects and the (scaled) migration costs doing
PPML? In doing so I would estimate, in one single step, the (scaled) migration costs and the
underlying conditional migration probabilities. As pointed out by Dingel and Tintelnot (2020),
doing the PPML instead of the maximization of the multinomial logistic log-likelihood is much
more tractable as there are widely available algorithms which are extremely efficient, especially for
high dimensional models like the one I consider here. The reason is that not all of the migration
51In Appendix 1.C.2 I use a general result from Allen et al. (2020a) and provide a simple proof for existence and uniqueness (up to a
constant). I also describe the algorithm proposed by Pérez-Cervantes (2014) to find the solution.
52For a derivation of this result, see Appendix 1.G.
53Head and Mayer (2014) define as ’general gravity’ for trade models when the trade flows can be written as Xi,j = exp(Oi + Dj −
ϑ log(d̂i,j)) where Oi and Dj are origin and destination specific fixed effects and ϑ is the trade elasticity.
54These restrictions are dubbed ’multilateral resistance’ indexes by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003).
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costs are actually identified. Primarily because there are pairs of locations where no worker in the
data migrated between the two in any year.
If the problem are the missing migration values I could, in principle, reverse the order of the
identification steps I have followed so far. I could use the relationship between wages and migration
costs to estimate them and impute values related to distance to those few that are missing. A slight
difference is that the identified migration costs would have a different scaling factor. In particular
the migration costs identified from the wages would be δλ τ
i,j. Using the migration costs estimates I
could then estimate the underlying migration probability distribution and the dispersion parameter
δ by doing a PPML estimation with origin and fixed effects.55 A drawback of such an alternative is
that the correction from the possible bias in the estimation of δ introduced by using the migration
costs with measurement error is not trivial, especially from a computational point of view.
When taking the (scaled) migration costs τi,j/λ as given, I cannot benefit anymore from the
computational advantages of the PPML estimation procedure when maximizing the conditional
likelihood. In contrast to linear models, I cannot just re-define the endogenous variable of the
Poisson regression and do the same estimation algorithm.56 For example, when running a Pois-




i,j/λ), the estimated destination fixed effects would differ from those estimated by directly
maximizing the conditional likelihood (1.18).
I use the fitted values that come from the maximization of the likelihood to compute estimates
of the conditional migration probabilities. I use them in the next steps of my estimation strategy.
1.5.4 Efficiency wages w
j
t
Having identified both the dispersion parameter δ and the migration probabilities, I can identify
the efficiency wage using the expression for the expected log wage of a worker (1.17). Passing
δ log(pi,jt−1,b) to the left-hand-side, a simple average across migration cohorts with same destination
would identify the efficiency wage.
1.5.5 Home Bias κ
j
b
To identify the home bias κ jb, I exploit the information contained in the expected log wages of the
different migration cohorts. To ease notation, define the the expected log wage of a worker with










55Such an alternative identification strategy is developed formally in Appendix 1.G.
56Consider a linear model y = X1β1 + X2β2 + ε to be estimated via Ordinary Least Squares. If X2β2 is fixed, I can redefine the
endogenous variable as y− X2β2 and follow the same least squares algorithm to get an estimate of β1.
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The difference between the expected log wages of workers who move to j from location i with





















t,b − (τi,j − τi,b)
)






t,b −Vbt,b − (τi,j − τi,b)
)
+ exp. error.
The last step exploits the rational expectations assumption: the migration decision at the end of
period t− 1 depends on the workers’ expectation of the state of the world in period t, as reflected
by the expected lifetime utility V
j
t,b. Then, rational expectations imply that the difference between




t,b, which is the utility conditional on the realization of aggregate
uncertainty in period t, is a mean zero expectation error.
The wage differentials reflect more than just aggregate differences between locations and migra-
tion costs. The utility differentials V jt,b − Vbt,b capture as well the effect of the home bias κ
j
b. I now
show how to control for all the things that are not the home bias driving the wage differentials.
The lifetime utility V jt,b of a location j is a function of: (i) a flow utility term that is constant
across birthplace cohorts; (ii) the discounted expected utility of next period; and (iii), a birthplace




























Given that I have values for the discount factor β and the persistence parameter ρ, I can construct
the sample analog of ζ i,jt,b using average wages for periods t and t + 1. Substituting the equations for
expected log wages (1.17), conditional migration probabilities (1.5), and lifetime utility (1.4), after














b + exp. error, (1.20)
where C jt captures all the terms related to location j that are independent of birthplace.57
The expression above shows that the collection of wage differentials ζ i,jt,b depends only in aggre-
gate differences across the two locations, relative differences in migration costs, and the home bias.
The next-period wage differential ωi,jt+1,b − ω
i,b
t+1,b controls for differences in next-period expected
utilities. The third term in ζ i,jt,b, the difference in average wages of the reverse migration cohorts for
the next period, ω j,it+1,b − ω
b,i
t+1,b, controls for differences in option values. The idea is that average
wages of a migration cohort from a particular origin are informative about the option value of that
origin location. The intuition is as follows. First, given selection of workers, the average log wage
of a migration cohort is negatively related to their migration probability, as shown in equation
(1.17). Now, consider the migration probability of going, lets say, from Toulouse to Paris versus
the migration probability of going from Lyon to Paris. Assume, for the sake of the argument, that
migration costs are the same. Then, as in both cases the destination is the same, the differences






t , where U
j
t is the flow utility for living in location j net
of the home bias.
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in probabilities should reflect origin specific differences. If the probability of going to Paris from
Toulouse is smaller than the probability of going to Paris from Lyon, it means that the alternative
migration options attainable from Toulouse are relatively more attractive than those alternative op-
tions attainable from Lyon. In other words, the option value of being in Toulouse is higher than
that of Lyon. Therefore, the difference between these two probabilities—and thus, of wages—are
informative about the relative difference of option values between Toulouse and Lyon.58
The only thing left to control for are the aggregate differences C jt − Cbt . So, similarly to the
migration costs, to get rid of the aggregate differences I make the following symmetry assumption




j for all b, j in I . Also, the cost of staying in the same
location is zero, i.e. κbb = 0 for all b in I .
Proposition 4 below shows that this assumption allows me to identify the home bias.
















b + exp. error. (1.21)
Proof. It follows from equation (1.20).
The Proposition shows how to exploit the wage information of workers with birthplace j, who
mirror the behavior of those workers with birthplace b to identify the home bias. This means to
use the information from the wage differentials by just interchanging the destination location with
the birthplace location, i.e., to use the information in ζ i,bt,j to control for the remaining aggregate







2δ would identify the home bias scaled by 1/λ.
I use the estimates of efficiency wages, the dispersion parameter δ, and the migration probabili-
ties to complete the sample of average wages for those combinations that do not appear in the data.
I impute values according to expression (1.17). If I were to impute all the average wages—instead
of those that are just missing—it would be equivalent to use only the information contained in the
estimated migration probabilities. I find the completion method a simple compromise to use both
sources of information.59
Figure 6 plots the estimated home bias κ jb against distance. As it is clear, the relation is clearly
positive, although it increases the variance the further the distance.60 At first glance the birthplace
costs are in general smaller than the migration costs. But keep in mind that the migration costs are
paid only once, while home bias is present year after year. Thus, in present value the differences
are less stark. I leave the discussion on how to interpret the migration costs and home bias costs
for the next section.
58Similar to what I do with the next-period wages, Artuç et al. (2010) and Caliendo et al. (2019) use the next-period migration
probabilities to control for the option value component of the expected utility. A slight difference is that in my case I also need to control
for the persistence component in the expected utility.
59I could use both sources of information, the migration probabilities and the average wages and have an overidentified model and
estimate it with GMM. I plan to do this in the future.
60Some of the estimated home bias are actually small and negative. These generally correspond to neighboring locations, like Deux-
Sevres and Charente Maritime or Gironde and Pyrénées Atlantiques.
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Figure 6 – Home Bias vs Distance. The graph plots the home bias vs (log) geodesic
distance. Each point corresponds to a mobility cost and (log) geodesic distance of a pair of
locations. The lines correspond to fitted a linear model. The slope corresponding is 0.14
s.e. 0.006 and the R2 is 0.18.
At this stage I can perform a simple statistical test of the presence of home bias. Consider the null
hypothesis H0 : κ jb = 0 for all b, j ∈ I . The model with home bias nests the model without them,
and then—under the null—all migration probabilities and lifetime utilities per location/period are
the same across birthplaces. Under the null, the endogenous variables in equation (1.21) should all
be equal to zero. Then, I can do all the previous steps of the estimation and do a joint significance
test when estimating the home bias effects. The null hypothesis is rejected as the p-value associated
to the F-stat is numerically indistinguishable from zero.61 Therefore, I reject the hypothesis that
there is no home bias.
I can also test whether I am overly complicating the model by estimating a home bias term for
every location/birthplace combination instead of just a dummy that indicates whether a worker is
outside her birthplace. In other words, I can test the null hypothesis H0 : κ jb = κ for b 6= j. Again, I
reject the null that home bias is constant across locations.62
1.5.6 Productivities A
j
t and Prices of Non-Housing Goods P
j
Q,t
In this section I explain how to invert the static part of the model to recover the underlying produc-
tivities that are consistent with the observed data. This will also allow me to recover price indices
of non-housing goods, up to a constant.

























. Notice that these source effects also appear
61The F-stat is 8.03 with 2,628 and 2,560,620 degrees of freedom. The number 2,628 comes from the squared number of locations
732 = 2, 701 minus 73, as the constant term forces the normalization of a fixed effect per birth cohort.
62The associated p-value is again numerically indistinguishable from zero. The F-stat is 6.79 with degrees of freedom equal to 2,627
and 2,560,620.
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(a) Productivities (b) Amenities
Figure 7 – Estimated composite productivities and amenities. Both figures plot a composite value that in-
cludes also housing supply (see Section 1.5). The values of productivities are with respect to the national
average. The values for amenities are with respect to the amenity in Île-de-France. The values for productiv-
ities correspond to the year 2017.
in the equation for the price index of the non-housing good PjQ,t.
As shown in Appendix 1.C.3, given the trade costs ψ̃i,j and the observed wage bills in the data,
there is a unique solution, up to a constant, of the source effects. Using these soure effects along
with the trade elasticity ϕ, I can identify the distribution of prices of non-housing goods (up to a
constant).




be a composite of productivity and housing supply. It summarizes how
cheap is to produce something in location j by using an additional efficiency unit of labor. Substi-











This means that given the estimated efficiency wages, the observed wage bills and the trade and
output elasticities, along with the source effects, I can identify the distribution of the composite
productivity/housing term Ãj, up to a constant, which is all I need to solve the model. Figure 7a
shows the map of composite productivities, where I have normalized the mean to be equal to one.
As expected, the more productive regions are the most populated ones like Île-de-France, Lyon,
Marseille, Toulouse, and Lille.
1.5.7 Amenities Bj
I conclude the identification section by explaining how I get the overall amenities from the residual
variation in identified migration probabilities.
The Cobb-Douglas assumption on the technology of the final good plus market clearing imply







. Substituting into the final good price index and
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where B̃j ∝ Bj + α log H j is a composite of overall amenities and housing supply. As is clear from
the expression above, the introduction of housing into the model works as a congestion force: the
more efficiency units are in one location, the less attractive it becomes as the real wage decreases
when the price of housing increases.
So I identify the composite amenity by exploiting the variation across migration probabilities,
similar to what I did to identify the home bias. As will become clear, I can only identify the compos-
ite amenity up to a normalization, for which I pick a reference location x and put its corresponding


































































b − κxb ) + exp. error.
Arranging all the terms to the left except for B̃j, taking the averages for each location across the
different periods would identify the composite of amenities and housing for each location.
Figure 7b show the map with the spatial distribution of the estimated composite amenities,
where I have chosen Île-de-France as the reference location. To make it comparable to that of
productivities—where all values are positive— I use the exponent of estimated amenities, exp(B̃j).
The map of amenities shows a similar pattern to the one of productivities: urban centers are more
attractive. However, locations that are close to the coast, especially in the Southeast, close to the fa-
mous touristic regions of the Côte d’Azur, also have high values of amenities. Also the dispersion of
productivities is almost twice that of amenities: the variance of the log of composite productivities
Ãj is 0.13, while that of composite amenities B̃j is 0.07.
1.6 Model Solution and Counterfactual Analysis
I solve for the model in a steady-state and a continuous-population limit. As mentioned before,
this renders the model deterministic and eases its solution. I choose a baseline year and solve for
the model as if the productivities in the steady state are the same as those on the baseline year. I
pick the year 2017 as the baseline.
With the solution of the model I first compute the birthplace premium: how much more
welfare—in consumption terms—each birthplace cohort has compared to the national average. I
then assess the importance of welfare differences due to birthplace in shaping overall welfare in-
equality. After, I compare the differences between the migration costs and the home bias. I show
40
there is a direct correspondence between wage differentials of natives versus non-natives and the
compensating variation in consumption a non-native needs to have the same utility as a native. This
allows me to compare the steady-state of the model with the data. Finally, I compare my model to
a model without home bias. I explore the implications of ignoring home bias for the response of
real wages to a local productivity shock, and the costs associated with place-based policies.
Although solving this version of the model is computationally feasible, it is still challenging.
To solve for the model I need to find the solution of a large system of non-linear equations. For
example, there are 732 lifetime utilities to solve, one per each location/birthplace combination.
However, by taking the total labor supply at each location as given, there is a sequential strategy
to solve the rest of the variables very efficiently. I can show that part of the system are either
contractions or can be represented as eigensystems with an eigenvalue equal to one. Solving these
reduces to either iterating or finding the eigenvector associated with the unit eigenvalue. Both
of these methods are computationally efficient. I explain the details of the solution algorithm in
Appendix 1.B.
1.6.1 The Birthplace Premium and Decomposition of Welfare Inequality
I use the model in steady state to compute the differences in welfare across birthplace cohorts. This
allows me to determine which workers are better off on average by the mere fact of being born in
the right location.
Recall that the term Vib is equal to the expected utility of workers with birthplace b that live
in location i net of current efficiency units. To recover the lifetime utility I need to sum again the
current efficiency units and integrate across all the worker with birthplace b that live in i. Let the
lifetime utility of an individual ι born in b, living in i, that migrated from j, and that has (log)

























The second term to the right corresponds to an average selection term for workers living in i born in
b. Appendix 1.A.7 contains the derivation of the expression above. Using these lifetime utilities per











Definition 2. The birthplace premium for birth cohort b, denoted εb, is defined as the average excess utility
a worker born in b has compared to the national average, measured in consumption terms.64
Ṽb +
1




When the birthplace premium is positive for a particular birth cohort b, it means that the welfare
of that cohort is higher than the average French worker. Figure 8 shows the birthplace premium εb
63This expression comes from combining equations (1.1) and (1.3).
64Appendix 1.A.7 shows the detailed derivations to get the expression for the birthplace premium.
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Figure 8 – Birthplace Premium. The map shows the different birthplace premia ζb for
the different birth cohorts. The birthplace premium is the excess welfare, in consumption
terms, that each birth cohort has on excess to the national average.
for the different cohorts. A location in the map represents a birth location and the color within a
location represents the birthplace premium of the cohort born in such location. In absence of the
home bias, these premia should all be equal to zero.
As is clear from the Figure, the inhabitants from the Île-de-France (Paris) region have a higher
welfare, in consumption terms, compared to the national average. This is almost 5% larger than
the national average real wage. In general, individuals born in locations that are overall attractive,
as those in the South, or close to large agglomerations seem to be better off. The big winners are
those born close to Toulouse in the South-West, or along the Côte d’Azur in the South-East, with a
birthplace premium a little more than 7%. Some birth cohorts are doing very poorly in comparison.
In the North-East, the cluster formed by Ardennes, Meuse, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Haute Marne,
and Moselle have birthplace premia ranging from minus 10 to 20 percent. Another small cluster,
towards the South-West in the Massif Central region, formed by the locations of Cantal and Lozère
have birthplace premia of minus 17 and 10 percent, respectively.
Almost all of the locations between the North-East and South-West clusters have negative birth-
place premia. This region is known in France as the Empty Diagonal, which according to Wikipedia
’is a band of low-density population that stretches from the French department of the Landes in
the southwest to the Meuse in the northeast.’65 Looking back to the estimated amenities and pro-
ductivities in Figures 7a and 7b, the locations in the Empty Diagonal are not attractive overall. The
correlation between the birthplace premium and log composite productivities Ãi and amenities B̃i
is 0.47 and 0.48, respectively. Thus, it is not surprising that the Empty Diagonal groups the big
losers in terms of birthplace premium.
In the South, overall amenities are higher than in the North, and the productive and large
population centers are more evenly distributed across space. Thus, even if someone born outside
an attractive location within the South, it is probable that she lives in a productive location close to
her birthplace, making her, on average better off. In addition, there are more options for relatively
close, productive locations, for a worker born in the South than in the North. For those born in
65❤tt♣s✿✴✴❡♥✳✇✐❦✐♣❡❞✐❛✳♦r❣✴✇✐❦✐✴❊♠♣t②❴❞✐❛❣♦♥❛❧
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(a) Workers Born in Toulouse (b) Workers Born in Haute-Marne
Figure 9 – Excess utility Across Residence Location, Different Birthplace. The left panel shows the excess
utility (compared to the national average) of the workers born in Toulouse that live in the different locations,
measured in consumption terms. The right panel does the same but for workers born in Haute-Marne.
the North, Île-de-France is the only option if they want to live in a close-by productive location,
while in the South and South East there is Lyon, Marseille and Toulouse that are relatively close to
one another.66 Therefore, the option value of being born in an unproductive region in the South is
larger than in the North.
That a location b in the map shows a large birthplace premium does not mean that the inhab-
itants of region b have higher utility. Instead it means that those who were born in b have higher
utility. Some of the workers might be living outside their birth location. However, those who are
born in an attractive location would only move if the migration opportunity gives them more utility
than in their birthplace. Thus, the average utility of a worker in any location is influenced by the
workers outside option, which is their home location.
The influence of birthplace on average utility of workers regardless of residence location is
illustrated in Figures 9a and 9b. The left panel shows the excess utility, measured in consumption
terms, of the workers born in Toulouse, a location with high birthplace premium living in all the
different locations. The right panel does the same but for workers born in Haute-Marne, which
has a low birthplace premium. For both cohorts, there is heterogeneity in average utility across
locations for workers with the same birthplace. However, the place of birth influences largely a
workers’ relative position with respect to the national average as the workers of Toulouse are better
off relatively than those born in Haute-Marne, regardless of their residence location. Moreover,
fixing residence location, the distribution of welfare across birth cohorts is very similar than the
one portrait by Figure 8. For example, the correlation of excess utility for Toulouse residents with
different birthplace, with the birthplace premium is 0.84; for the residents of Haute Marne the
correlation is 0.92.
Welfare Decomposition. I now explore the relative importance of between-birthplace versus across-
locations differences in shaping overall welfare inequality. I find that birthplace is a main driver
66There is also, Montpellier, Bordeaux and Nice for example.
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of welfare inequality, and is almost as important as idiosyncratic differences and sorting across
locations.






, where the variance is taken over all workers, who are

























































The first term is the variance across the average utility of workers born in b living in location j.
The second term corresponds to the weighted average of the variance within each birthplace cohort





































Conditional on a residence location j and birthplace b the only heterogeneity in utility comes from
dispersion in the discounted (log) efficiency shocks θiι/(1− βρ). Conditional on a migration cohort

































The first term to the right is the variance across origins i of expected efficiency conditional on
a birthplace b and residence j. It reflects the dispersion in average selection patterns for workers
with different origin locations. The second term comes from the fact that conditional on a migration
cohort, i.e. the conditioning on origin, destination and birthplace, the variance of efficiency wages is
equal to the variance of the different (discounted) efficiency shocks, which are distributed Gumbel
with scale parameter λ. The contribution of this term to total variance is fixed across different
scenarios. Therefore, it constitutes a lower bound on overall welfare inequality.





















The first term to the right is the between-birthplace dispersion of average utilities per birth cohort
Ṽb. This corresponds to the average differences between Figures 9a and 9b. The second term is the
within-birthplace dispersion of utilities, weighted by the size of the birth cohort. This corresponds
to the within heterogeneity across locations in Figures 9a and 9b.
Table 5 presents the results of the decomposition. I find for the baseline scenario that the
between-birthplace component explains 43.2% of the dispersion in average location/specific wel-
fare. The within-birthplace variation, that corresponds to differences across locations explains only
44
Table 5 – Decomposition of Welfare Inequality
Between BP/Location (% Total Var) Within BP/Location (% Total Var)
Total Var (/Baseline) Between-BP Within-BP Selection Idiosyncratic Migration Rate (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline 1 43.5 3.5 17 36 1.2
No Mig. Costs 1.61 78 0 0 22 11.8
High Home Bias 1.7 79 0 0 21 11.6
No Home Bias ≈1 0 8 56 36 3.2
High Mig. Costs 0.96 0 10 52 38 1.9
No Both 0.36 0 0 0 100 12.4
Without Geography 0.46 6 4 11 79 0.3
No Mig. Costs ≈1 64 0 0 36 12.2
High Home Bias 0.81 55 0 0 45 11.6
No Home Bias 0.91 0 3 58 39 1.6
High Mig. Costs 0.76 0 3 50 47 0.9
No Both 0.36 0 0 0 100 12.9
Note: The table shows the decomposition of variance of individual welfare for different scenarios. The different indentation means that
some elements are changed in comparison to the immediate, less indented scenario. For example, the second row refers to the baseline
scenario with no migration costs. The third row refers to the baseline scenario, no migration costs and high home bias. "Without Geography"
means that all (composite) productivities and amenities are constant, trade costs are the same across locations and birthplace cohort sizes are
equalized. The first column represents the total variance as a fraction of the variance in the baseline scenario. The second and third columns
correspond to the percentage of total variance explained by the variance of average utility per birthplace/location Ṽ jb , while the fourth and
fifth columns correspond to the within component. The fourth column explains how selection within a migration cohort drives inequality.
The fifth column corresponds to idiosyncratic differences within each migration cohort.
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3.4% of the total inequality. The within-birthplace/location explains most of the variation with
53.4% where selection contributes with 17% and the idiosyncratic component—conditional on a
migration cohort—contributes with 36%.
The "Without Geography" row corresponds to a counterfactual scenario where I I shut down dif-
ferences in (composite) productivities and amenities, as well as making trade costs the same across
regions and equalizing the size of the birthplace cohorts.67 When locations are more, the overall
variance decreases by more than 50% and the fraction of total variance explained by the between-
birthplace component is reduced from 43 to just 6 percent. The remaining differences are explained
by the heterogeneity of the home bias of the different cohorts.68 The within-birthplace/location
selection term, which corresponds to column (4) is reduced from 17 to 11 percent. Homogeneous
locations together with migration costs give little reason for workers to move around, as reflected
by the migration rate, and therefore reducing the importance of selection.
Reducing migration costs but keeping the home bias increases the variance of welfare. As work-
ers move more, but with different patterns across birthplace cohorts, then the average selection
effects differences are magnified.69 When increasing the home bias, the mobility patterns differ
more, causing inequality to increase as well as the importance of the between-birthplace compo-
nent.70 Without home bias, the within-birthplace component explains only 8% of the total variance.
Most of the variance is explained by the within-birthplace/location selection component: with the
reduction in home bias, workers move more according to their comparative advantage, increasing
welfare inequality. Increasing the migration costs mitigates this selection channel and increases the
importance o heterogeneity across locations, as reflected by the increase from 8 to 10 percent in
column (3).
Finally, when removing both the home bias and the migration costs, overall variance is explained
entirely by the idiosyncratic shocks. In equilibrium, average welfare should be equal across all
birthplace/locations. Without impediments to move around, the location decision is not determined
by the origin location or birthplace of a worker. Then, workers would only choose where to live
according to their idiosyncratic productivity. And while they indeed select across locations, the
probability of going to any location is the same. Thus, the variance from the selection term is zero,
leaving only the idiosyncratic component to explain the overall dispersion in welfare.
The small percentage of total dispersion explained by the within-birthplace component in the
baseline scenario does not mean that heterogeneity of locations is unimportant in explaining welfare
inequality. On the contrary, heterogeneity of locations is reflected in the between-birthplace com-
ponent as illustrated by the "Without Geography" scenario, as it is the heterogeneity in locations—
67I allow for costly trade still. I take the average trade cost off the diagonal as a measure of cost between any two locations. For trade
within each location I take the average of within diagonal trade costs. For the construction of trade costs in the baseline see Appendix
1.D
68The heterogeneity across birthplace cohorts of home bias itself increases the variance. However, it also changes the population
composition across cities, even if they have the same fundamentals. This creates heterogeneity in real wages across locations which,
combined with differences in employment distribution across the birthplace cohorts, adds to the heterogeneity.
69Also, there is more concentration towards productive areas, and while the differences in utility coming from differences in place of
residence can be muted, the differences stemming from heterogeneous home bias can be magnified.
70To increase home bias in the third row, or migration costs in the fifth row, I take the off-diagonal value of the cost that enters the
migration decision, which is an exponential function, and divide it by two.
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along with the home bias—that determines the outside option of workers and influence their loca-
tion decisions.
Home bias amplifies the role of geography in the long run welfare dispersion by making workers
gravitate around their home location, preventing them from arbitraging away aggregate differences
across locations. In contrast, migration costs prevent the short-run adjustment of labor and do not
seem to matter much for the long run distribution of employment. Thus, geographic differences are
better arbitraged away and dispersion is driven by the within-location, across-origin component.
1.6.2 Comparison of migration costs and home bias
In the model sketched in Section 1.4, both migration costs and home bias enter as utility costs. It is
therefore tempting to compare their magnitudes for each location pair to determine their relative
importance. Doing so requires adjusting the estimated magnitudes for the fact that migration costs
are paid one time and home bias is a recurring cost.
I use a compensating variation argument to make both mobility costs comparable. First, for the
migration costs, I look at how much larger the wage of a migrating individual needs to be in order
to have the same utility as an individual that did not move. Similarly, I compute the compensating
variation in wages such that a non-native individual has the same utility as a native.
If I compare two workers from the same birth cohort, one migrating from i to j and the other
staying in j, then the wage of the migrating individual has to be larger for them to have the same
utility. As shown in Appendix 1.A.6, this extra wage compensation in percentage terms is equal to
ξ
i,j





The compensating variation, being a function of the migration cost is symmetrical. Because
of this symmetry and the extreme value (Gumbel) assumption on the efficiency shocks, there is
a simple correspondence with the data from observed wage differentials and the compensating
differentials for migrants in the model.
Proposition 5. For workers with same birthplace b, the compensating variation in wages a migrant needs
to have the same utility as a non-migrant is identified from the following difference-in-differences in wages





























Proof. It follows from substituting the average utility (1.4) and the migration probability equation
(1.5) into the expected wage equation (1.17).
The Proposition follows the same logic as the identification of (scaled) migration costs when
observing bilateral labor flows coming in both directions as stated by Proposition 1. It tells us that
by comparing the wages of migrants versus those who stay in the same location we can back out
the compensation.
In a similar way as with migrants, the extra wage compensation, in percentage terms, that a



























The second term in the right hand side of the expression above correspond to a difference in the
option values of living in location j between natives and non-natives. In the steady state, the






















In contrast to the compensation to migrants, the compensation to non-natives is not symmetric.
Because of the differences in option values changing the indices (b, j) would give different values.
Thus, there is no direct correspondence of a compensating differential for an ordered pair (b, j) in
the model and wage data. However, as Proposition 6 below shows, there is a correspondence for
the compensating differentials that belong to the unordered pair (b, j).
Proposition 6. For workers with same origin location i, the geometric average of the compensating differen-









































Proof. Same as in Proposition 5.
Proposition 6 tell us that the wages can reveal a measure of compensation to non-natives for ev-
ery pair of locations. The wages can give the average compensation for a non-native from Toulouse
living in Lyon and the compensation to a non-native from Lyon living in Toulouse. To make it
comparable to the previous compensating measures I say that the (geometric) average of the com-





log(1 + ξ jt,b(κ)) log(1 + ξ
b
t,j(κ))− 1,
which is symmetrical. The right-hand side of (1.25) is then equal to log(1 + ξ̃ jt,b(κ)).
Using the results of both Propositions, I compare the compensating differentials in the steady-
state of the model with those observed in the data. An attractive feature of both Propositions is that
they show there is a structural interpretation of the wage differentials without relying on any of the
estimated parameters. In the model I can compute ξ jt,b(κ) and ξ
b
t,j(κ) without taking the geometric
average. But to make it comparable with the compensations found in the data, I also compute the
average compensation ξ̃ jt,b(κ) in the model.
In the model, I first compute the compensating differentials for every pair—either origin/destination
or birthplace/destination. To compute the average compensating differential for migrants, I take
a weighted average of each pair of compensating differentials, using the total migration flows be-
tween every pair as weights.71 Similarly, for the average compensating differential of non-natives,
I compute a weighted average using the birth cohort population in each location Ljb as weights.
When computing the compensating differential of migrants I exclude from the computation those
71In more detail, I compute Li,j = ∑b L
i,j
b for weighting the migration compensating differential.
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flows that remain in the same location. Similarly, I exclude the fraction of workers who stay in their
birth location when computing the average compensating differential for non-natives.
In the data, using the results from Proposition 5, I first compute the compensating differentials
for every pair using the difference in average log wages. I can either used just the observed wages
or, similarly to when estimating the home bias, I can impute the model consistent average wage
for those combinations that are missing by using the estimated efficiency wages and migration
probabilities. Given that the compensating differentials for migrants (non-natives) are constant




























is the sample average of log wages. I do the same for the compensating
differential of non-natives. As in the model, to compute the average compensating differential, I
compute a weighted average either using the total migration flow or the number of workers who
live outside their birthplace. When using the sample with imputed wages, the number of workers
correspond to the fitted values from the maximization of the likelihood function (1.18).72
The first column of Table 6 shows the results for the model. The average compensation that a
non-native needs in order to have the same utility as a native is 18%. using the geometric average—
which is comparable with the data— I found that is 12%. The average compensation for a migrant
to have the same utility as a non-migrant is larger and equal to 55%. Compared to what I found
using the data—that correspond to the second to fourth column in the table—, the compensating
differential for migrants is smaller in the model, but is larger for the compensation to non-natives.
By using the observed sample, the compensation for non-natives is 15%. However this is small
when compared to the compensation for migrants which is more than 100%. This is similar when
using the Observed + Imputed sample with observed and imputed wages. If I use only the imputed
wages—as shown in the fourth column—the steady state model value and the data are more alike.
This is expected as the migration costs were identified using information on the labor flows—which
are related to the migration probabilities, which are then used to impute the model consistent
wages. I conjecture that the estimated migration costs and the associated compensating differential
in the model would be larger if I were to use the information in wages to estimate the migration
costs. However, the compensations of non-natives are more alike in the model and the data when
using only observed wages.
Compensating differentials for migrants are similar in magnitude to those previously estimated
in the literature. For example, Kennan and Walker (2011) find that the average migration costs
would correspond to an annual increase in the wage of between 36 to 76 percent.73 Such migration
costs might look implausible a priori, but when interpreted as average wage differences between
72If a wage is imputed for a combination it means that the associated observed labor flow is zero. Thus, I can’t use them as weights
as it will not change the outcome from a weighted average using only observed wages. That is why I use fitted values for labor flows
instead, which are positive.
73In Kennan and Walker (2011), the estimated migration cost for the average mover is equal to 312, 146 dollars. Using a discount factor
of 0.96, this corresponds to an increase of 15, 500 dollars per year for forty years. Given an estimated average wage of individuals in the
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Table 6 – Compensating variation in wages
Model Data
Ordered pairs Geometric Average Observed Observed + Imputed Just Imputed
Non-Natives (%) 18.6 12 15 22 33
Migrants (%) 55.6 107 104 63
Note: The first row of table shows the average compensating variation in wages a non-native needs to have the same
utility as a native. For the model I consider two cases: when using ordered and when using the geometric average.
The second row shows the same but for a migrants to have the same utility as non-migrants. The first two columns
show the values in the steady state of the model. The third to fifth columns show the values using different versions
of the data. The third column, Observed, uses the direct observed wage differentials. The fourth column, Observed +
Imputed completes the missing average wages in the original sample by imputing wages according to expression (1.17).
The fifth column, Just Imputed only uses imputed wages.
migrants and non-migrants, these large costs should actually be expected. From Figure 3b, the
difference between average log wages of migrants and non-migrants is around 1, i.e. wages of
migrants are more than double that of non-migrants. Large migration costs are consistent with large
observed wage differences between migrants and non-migrant workers.
The average compensating differentials computed above depend on the equilibrium allocation.
First, they are weighted averages, thus they depend on how the labor flows—which are equilibrium
objects—are determined. Second, for the compensation of non-natives, the differences in option
values—also equilibrium objects—need to be taken into account. Thus, to make a comparison
between the migration costs and the home bias that is invariant to the equilibrium allocation, I take







across every pair of locations where b 6= j. The numerator is the compensation for a non-native as
if the option values between natives and non-natives are equal. The denominator corresponds to
the migrant’s compensation, which is already invariant to the equilibrium.
I find that the average of the ratio (1.26) is 0.26. Therefore, for the average pair of locations, the
magnitude of the home bias is 26% that of migration costs, measured in compensating differentials.
Even though home bias has a smaller magnitude than migration costs, it has a large impact on
shaping the overall employment distribution. The reason is that home bias ties workers permanently
to their preferred location.
1.6.3 The Effect on Output of Removing Home Bias vs Migration Costs
The main difference between the effect of migration costs and home bias on output is that, while
both prevent workers from pursuing their comparative advantage, home bias affects the long run
50 percentile and with age 30 (42, 850 dollars), this corresponds to an annual increase in the wage of 36%. Using the estimated average
wage for individuals in the 50 percentile but of age 20 (20, 166 dollars), this would correspond to an increase of 76%. There are similar
estimates in the literature for changing sectors. For example, Artuç et al. (2010) estimate that the cost of changing sector is about ten
times the average wage, which corresponds to an annual increase of 49% for forty years.
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distribution of employment. The population size of a location is not only related to economic
fundamentals—like productivity and amenities—but also to the size of the different birth cohorts.
Moreover, home bias makes workers gravitate around their birthplace over time. In contrast, mi-
gration costs limit short run movements from the current location, so workers can do staggered
movement towards the most productive areas.
I solve the model by shutting down the effect of each of the mobility costs. By easing the
movement of workers, output can increase from two main factors. First, a selection effect: workers
are able to select themselves to locations where they are relatively more productive. Second, a
composition effect: if workers concentrate more in productive regions, then overall output increases.
I distinguish between the selection and composition effects as follows. Define total manufactur-
ing output, Y as the sum of all real outputs per location, Yi. Each of these local outputs can in turn
be defined as Yi = AiLL
i, where AiL is the labor productivity in location i. Labor productivity A
i
L is
an endogenous object as it depends on the average efficiency units per location, which reflects how
workers select into locations. Thus, total output can be though as a function of the distribution of
labor productivities and workers






where AL and L are vectors containing, respectively, all the labor productivities and the number of
workers in each location. The sum of workers is normalized to 1, i.e., ∑i L
i = 1. Thus, I can make
the following decomposition
Y(AL, L) = AL + ∑
i
(Li − L)(AiL − AL) = AL + c̃ov(AL, L).
The covariance term c̃ov(·) gives a measure of how concentrated is the population in the most
productive locations.74
In models where labor productivity is exogenous, changes in aggregate output are driven en-
tirely by the composition effect, i.e., by changes in the covariance term. However, as in my model
labor productivities are endogenous, I will do something slightly different. For a given variable X
in the baseline economy, define its value in the counterfactual as X ′. Then, the difference in total
output between a counterfactual scenario and the baseline economy is
Y(A′L, L′)−Y(AL, L) = Y(A′L, L′)−
(








c̃ov(AL, L′)− c̃ov(AL, L)
)









The first term in equation (1.27) corresponds to the selection effect as it leaves the allocation of labor
across locations constant and changes the vector of labor productivities from AL to A′L. The second
74Olley and Pakes (1996) propose this decomposition and use the change in the covariance term to evaluate the reallocation effect
towards more productive plants following a deregulation reform in the telecommunication sector in the U.S.
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Table 7 – Effects of Home Bias and Migration Costs on Output
Remove ∆ Output (%) ∆ Selection (%∆Y) ∆ Composition (%∆Y)
Home Bias 11 88 12
Migration Costs 35 106 -6
Both 37 115 -15
Note: The table shows the differences in output between the baseline economy and differ-
ent counterfactuals, as well as its decomposition in selection and composition gains as a
percentage of the change in output. First row, corresponds to a counterfactual where the
home bias is removed. The second row corresponds to the case without migration costs.
The third row removes both the home bias and the migration costs.
term captures the composition effect: how much of the output change be explained by changes
in the labor allocation towards productive locations, while keeping productivities in each location
constant.
Table 7 shows the decomposition of the output gains in the selection and composition terms.
The left panel corresponds to the baseline model, estimated with home bias. The first row shows
that output increases by 11% in the counterfactual where I remove the home bias. Of those output
gains, the majority comes from selection with 88% and 12% from the composition effect. When I
remove only migration costs, as represented in the second row, output increases more, with a gain
of 35%. Moreover, the decomposition of the gains are very different from that where I remove the
home bias. All of the gains come from better selection as they account for 106% of the gains in
output. The third row of the table reports the output gains and its decomposition when removing
both migration costs and the home bias. In that case output increases by 37% with all of the gains
coming from selection. Therefore, the lion’s share in output gains of removing both mobility costs
comes from removing the migration costs.
What explains this difference in the source of output gains between removing either the home
bias ot the migration costs? First, when there is no home bias, but workers still face the migration
costs, workers can slowly reallocate towards more productive regions. Thus, in the new steady-
state, more workers would end up in more productive areas. In contrast, when I only remove
the migration costs, workers tend to gravitate around their birthplace, as changing locations do
not affect the underlying mobility costs. Sure, workers would have more profitable opportunities
close to their home location, which leads to a great increase in the selection component, but they
would remain close to their birthplace. Thus, the reallocation of labor towards the most productive
locations is limited.75
To sum up, removing the home bias or the migration costs has different long-run implications
for the allocation of labor. In both cases, the main output gains come from the selection effect:
by removing a mobility cost, workers can better pursue their comparative advantage. However,
75Additionally, because the birth cohort size is positively related to location attractiveness, then those born in attractive locations go to
neighboring locations, which are, on average, less productive. In turn, this leads to less concentration of population in large productive
areas as reflected by the negative covariance term.
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removing home bias can lead to large reallocation of labor towards more productive regions, but
the removal of migration costs allows people to sort better but mostly close to their home location.
1.6.4 How much do workers value living in their Home Location?
The model allows to compute how much consumption workers are willing to sacrifice in order to
live in their home location. Consider a worker with birthplace b living away from her home in
location i. Then, the difference in log efficiency units such that the worker is indifferent between









where ui collects all the terms in the lifetime utility that depend only on location i and are inde-
pendent of birthplace. The expression shows that in order to be indifferent, the worker needs to be
compensated by the differences in aggregate utility and option values between the two locations,
as well as the cost of migrating. In addition, the worker is also willing to forego some log efficiency
units—to go back home, represented in the home bias term κib.
My objective is to compute how much of a pay cut workers are willing to accept to go back home,
controlling for non-birthplace specific factors. The first column of Table 8 shows the average page
cut a non-native needs to be indifferent about returning home when considering only the effect of
κ
j
b. This is equal to 3.8%. When considering the differences in option values, which corresponds to
the second column of the table, the pay cut decreases to 2.8%.
Even after imputing the adjustment for option values, there are non-birthplace specific factors
affecting the number. For example, if a location has low migration costs towards all the other
locations, which would be reflected in a high option value for all the birth cohorts. To control for
these common differences in option values across birth cohorts, I compute









where log(Ωi) is the across-birthplace average of option values for location i.76 The idea of adding
these average terms is that, without home bias, the birthplace specific option value Ωib is equal to
the average. In such case, the birthplace specific term in the expression above would be equal to
zero. The third column of the Table shows that, after the adjustment for average differences in
option values, the average pay cut non-natives are willing to take to go back home is 5.2%.
In similar lines, I can compute what is the pay raise a worker would need to be indifferent
between leaving her birthplace or staying. The results are in the second row of Table 8. For my
preferred specification, shown in the third column, the average wage gain that would have left
indifferent the worker leaving outside her birthplace is 10.9%.
Thus, I can conclude that the average French worker who lives away from her birthplace is
willing to accept a pay cut between 3 and 5 percent on her annual salary in order to get back home
or needs a pay raise of at least 5 to 10 percent to leave it.
76I take a weighted average given the population of the different birth cohorts in each location. For each average, I exclude the
corresponding migration cohort whose origin and destination is the same as their birthplace. That is, the average is log(Ωi) =







Table 8 – Wage cut/raise to return/leave home
Home Bias κ jb Home Bias + ∆ Opt. values Home Bias + ∆ Opt. values - Adjustment
Return (%) −3.8 −2.8 −5.2
Leave (%) 4.5 7.3 10.9
Note: The first row shows the pay cut that the average worker who lives outside her home location is willing to take in
order to go back to work at her home location. The first column refers to the pay cut when only the home bias terms
κ
j
b are considered. The second column, in addition to the home bias, considers the changes in option values between
the two locations. The third columns considers as well the differences in option values, but it makes an adjustment by
subtracting the average difference on option values, as specified in equation (1.28). The second row does the analogous
for the wage gain the average worker needs to remain indifferent between staying in her home and leaving.
1.6.5 Home Bias, Labor Mobility and the Pass Through of Productivity to Wages
In this section, I compare the general equilibrium outcomes of a more standard migration model
without home bias with my model. I show that a model without home bias overstates the migration
response to changes in the economy.
I first estimate the model without home bias. This means that I estimate the migration costs
without conditioning on birthplace and I follow the same estimation steps thereafter.77 Appendix
1.H shows a scatter plot comparing the migration costs of baseline versus the no-home-bias model.
In general, the estimates for migration costs without the home bias are larger than in the baseline
model. The estimated dispersion parameter is slightly smaller than in the baseline model, with a
value of 0.135 (s.e. 1.8e-4) compared to 0.145 (s.e. 2e-4). The estimated distribution of composite
amenities and productivities are very similar to the ones estimated for the baseline model. In
particular, the correlation between the two estimates of amenities is 0.95 and of productivities 0.99.
In a model without home bias, the elasticity of the labor flow going from location i to j to a
























where Li,j = ∑b L
i,j
b . Thus, the elasticity in the baseline model with home bias is a weighted average







Figure 10a compares the different elasticities for the models with and without home bias in the
steady state. Each dot corresponds to the migration elasticity for a pair of locations i, j. In almost all
of the cases the elasticities are larger in the model without home bias. Thus, the predicted migration
response to a change in any particular location would be higher, under-stating the long-term effect
of a change in productivity on real wages.
In equilibrium, the pass-through of local productivity changes to real wages is counteracted by
an increase in the price of housing, whose strength is governed mainly by two factors. First, by
77I estimate the migration costs doing the same Poisson regression as in section 1.5.1 but the dependent variable is the total flow from
i to j, i.e. Li,j and the origin and destination fixed effects do not depend on birthplace.
54
(a) Comparison Migration Elasticities (b) Pass-Through to Efficiency Wages
(c) Pass-Through to Average Wages
Figure 10 – Comparison Model with and w/out Home Bias. The solid line in all three plots represents the
45◦ line. The top-left figure compares the migration elasticities in both models, and each dot represents a pair
of locations i, j. The top-right panel compares the pass-through elasticity of productivity on real efficiency
wages and each dot represents a location. The bottom panel compares the effect of pass-thorugh on real
average wages.
55
how easy workers can substitute between housing and non-housing goods. Because of the Cobb-
Douglas assumption, the elasticity of substitution between housing and non-housing is equal to
one. Thus, in contrast, to the classic Rosen (1979)-Roback (1982) framework the local productivity
gains are not fully appropriated by the land-owners as workers can substitute between housing and
non-housing goods.78 Second, the price of housing is affected by the mobility response of workers.
If more workers go to a location after a productivity shock, then the price of housing increases.
Figure 10b compares the pass-through elasticity of local real efficiency wages from a local pro-
ductivity shock for the models estimated with and without home-bias, where each dot represents
a location. As expected the, pass-through is larger in the model with home-bias. The ratio of the
average pass-through elasticity for the model with home bias over the same average for the model
without home bias is 1.5. Thus the pass-through elasticity is on average 50% larger in a model with
home bias, as the labor response is smaller.79 However, the value of pass-trough is small, with an
elasticity of 0.11. This is a consequence of the fixed housing supply. Although the housing supply
elasticity appears to be very low for France (see Fack (2006)), including an elastic housing supply
can be an interesting extension.
Figure 10c compares the pass-through elasticity of productivity shocks on average real wages.
In contrast to the efficiency wages, the pass-through can be negative as an increase in productivity
drives in less productive individuals lowering the average wage. However, in the model with home
bias the majority of the pass-throughs are positive, in contrast to the mode without home bias,
where almost all of the pass-throughs are negative. The average pass-through though, is negative
in both models. In the model with home bias, the elasticity is -0.08, and the model without home
bias the elasticity is -0.6.
A model without home bias overestimates the total migration response to changes in produc-
tivities across locations. Also, it would overstate the indirect effect on real wages to those locations
non-affected by the productivity shock. These are indirectly affected by: (i) the out-migration of
those locations towards the more productive region, and (ii) the decrease in the overall price of trad-
ables.80 Neglecting the home bias might lead to wrong conclusions when analyzing counterfactual
scenarios.
1.6.6 The Effect of Home Bias in Place-Based Policies
The previous section shows that home bias matters for the mobility response of workers and the
general equilibrium effects of productivity on real wages. Similarly, policy evaluations that neglect
the home bias effect might give very different answers compared to an evaluation where home bias
is taken into account.
78In the classic Rosen-Roback framework—at least the one presented in Moretti (2011)—workers are homogenous, housing is in fixed
supply and there are no migration costs. The indirect utility of workers in location i is equal to wi − PiH . This corresponds to a linear
utility function in non-housing consumption where workers have to consume one unit of housing. In equilibrium, workers are indifferent
between locations. Then, an increase in productivity in location i would increase the nominal wage wi but also would increase in a same
amount the price of housing PiH . Thus, the increase in productivity is fully capitalized by land owners.
79Appendix 1.H shows a plot comparing the employment response between the two models. The average employment elasticity to a
local productivity shock is 30% less in a model with home bias versus a model without it.
80For an estimate of the indirect effects of productivity shocks in other locations for the U.S. see Hornbeck and Moretti (2020)
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One of such policies are place-based policies: a subsidy to the inhabitants of a particular location
financed by general taxes. In absence of productivity or amenity spillovers, such policies can be
justified as a way to redistribute income across space. Because of the concavity in the flow utility of
consumption, the total effect on overall social welfare—which is the sum of the utilities across all
locations—might increase if redistribution reduces inequality. However, a common concern with
such place-based policies is that, while aiming at some spatial redistribution of income, it also
distorts the location decisions of workers of non-targeted locations. Thus, it can drive workers
away from productive locations to poor locations, resulting in efficiency losses. Thus, the increase
on social welfare that comes from redistribution might be trumped by the efficiency losses and a
revenue neutral placed-based policy might reduce social welfare.
Which effects dominates in determining social welfare—redistribution or efficiency—depends
ultimately in how strong is the migration response of workers. Therefore, a model without home
bias—which overstates the mobility response of workers—would overstate as well the costs of a
placed based policy.
I compare the effects on social welfare of a 10% place-based labor subsidy between the model
estimated with and without home bias.81 In the exercise, I subsidize each location, one-by-one,
in both models and compare the changes in social welfare. I find that the model without home
bias—where the efficiency costs are more prevalent—finds almost always a negative effect in social
welfare. In contrast, the model with home bias finds that in the majority of the cases, a placed
based policy increases social welfare.82
Figure 11a plots, for every time I subsidize a location, the relation between the change in social
welfare when there is a home bias and when there is not. I normalize each change in social welfare
by the total subsidies spend as a proportion of output. Each dot corresponds to a subsidized
location, with the x-axis measuring the percentage change in social welfare with home bias and the
y-axis doing the same but for the scenario without home bias. The solid diagonal line corresponds
to the 45 degree line. The Figure shows that for the majority of situations, social welfare is greater
in the case with home bias. This indicates that the costs of placed-based policies are overstated in a
model without home bias.
The Figure is also divided in four quadrants by a vertical and horizontal line at zero. This divide
the situations when a policy increases welfare for both models. In the model without home bias
only in 16% of the cases social welfare increases, while in the model with home bias this is 55%. The
South-East quadrant is interesting as it collects 45% of the cases. This quadrant corresponds to the
case where the policy increases welfare in the baseline scenario but the model without home bias
predicts a reduction. The North-West quadrant shows the locations that a model without home
bias predicts that social welfare increases if subsidizing those locations in contrast to the model
with home bias, which predicts a reduction in social welfare.
81The introduction of tax policies affects the environment of the economy in two important ways. First, by collecting taxes and
distributing subsidies from a centralized position, there would be locations that are net receivers of government transfers while other
locations are net payers of taxes. In contrast to the baseline economy without policies, in the new situation trade is necessarily unbal-
anced.
82I am not taking a stance on whether these policies are the best for redistributing income. The aim of this section is to rather evaluate
the costs.
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(a) Comparison Between Models
(b) (∆ Social Welfare)/(Subsidies/Output)
Figure 11 – Response to Place-Based Subsidies. The left panel compares the social welfare gains between the
baseline economy with home bias and a a model estimated without home bias, normalized by the subsidies
as a proportion of output. Each dot corresponds to a subsidized location. The right panel presents a map
shows the change in overall social welfare by subsidizing each location, normalized by the subsidies as a
proportion of output. Locations in red mean that when subsidizing such locations, overall social welfare
decreased.
The number of dots in both the North-West and South-East represent a measure of diagnosis of
the model without home bias: it either wrongly predicts that social welfare increases—the North-
West—or that social welfare is reduced–the South-East. In 52% of the cases, the diagnostic with a
model without home bias is wrong.
The map on Figure 11b shows in red the locations where social welfare is reduced whenever
they are subsidized in the model with home bias. It shows that subsidizing attractive and populous
regions decreases overall social welfare. Although the output of manufacturing can increase by
moving people to more productive regions, the regressive redistributive nature of subsidizing rich
locations dominates, thus reducing the social welfare. Appendix 1.H plots the map of locations
that reduce social welfare in a situation without home bias. As already implied by the South-West
quadrant of Figure 11a, there is little intersection on which location reduces welfare between the
baseline and counterfactual scenario.
The previous exercise shows that the negative effects of place based policies might not be that
strong. While in the comparison I do not compute the combination of place-based policies that
maximize social welfare, it can still be informative on the consequences of place-based policies in
general.
The limited migration responses to the different policies in the presence of home bias should
extend to more general settings. A proper analysis of how these preferences affect the design of
optimal spatial tax policies, as in Gaubert et al. (2020), can be important to not overestimate, either
the effects, or the costs, of implementing such policies.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper I study the aggregate consequences of workers having a preference to live close to
their home. To do so, I first show that the data support the presence of a home bias in workers
migration decisions. I find that the labor flows are biased towards workers’ birthplaces. I also find,
via a gravity regression, that distance from one’s birthplace is negatively related to the labor flow
to a particular location. Additionally, I find that workers accept a wage discount for living in their
home location.
After documenting the biased labor flows, I propose a framework to accommodate my empirical
findings. I build a quantitative dynamic migration model embedded with home bias, understood
as a cost from living away from one’s home. I use data on wages and labor flows, along with the
structure of the model, to identify and estimate the different parameters of the model. Among
those, I show how to separately identify the migration costs and the home bias. I find that in the
steady state of the model, the compensation a non-native needs in order to have the same welfare
as a native is between 10 to 30 percent the compensation a migrant needs to have the same welfare
as non-migrant.
Using the estimated model I solve for the steady state and compute the average welfare per
birthplace cohort. I find that workers born within the attractive areas of Paris, Nice, or Toulouse,
have 5 to 7 percent higher welfare, in consumption terms, than the average French worker.
The fact that the home bias effect is strong should affect how economists think about public
policy programs that encourage mobility across regions by alleviating the pecuniary cost of moving.
These types of policy can include subsidizing movers, making social security rights transferable
(like in the European Union), etc. Policy makers should be cautious with the expectations on such
programs, as the mere presence of ties to one’s home could mitigate their effects. Understanding
the precise nature of these preferences is important, in order to inform policy makers about the best
policies to boost mobility and help people from economically distressed areas. Also, the presence
of the home bias might help rationalize the existence of place-based policies.
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1.A Derivations
In this appendix I derive the main equations of the model. I start by deriving the lifetime expected utility and
the conditional migration probabilities. After that, I derive the expected wage per migration cohort. Then,
I derive the expressions for comparing both the migration and home bias in terms of consumption terms to
equalize the utility to a worker who did not move. Finally, I derive the welfare equations.
1.A.1 Lifetime Utility
A worker ι with birthplace b at location i with current efficiency of θi might change jobs with probability 1− ρ.
If it changes jobs, the worker observes a single offer per location. This translate into the worker observing a
vector of log efficiency shocks Θ for the next period if it has the opportunity of changing jobs. If the worker
does not change jobs it goes into the next period with the same efficiency unit. Without loss of generality,
assume that the worker migrated to location i in the current period t. Then, the lifetime utility of worker ι is
vit,b(θ
i
t−1,ι, Θt,ι) = B


















subject to the per period/state budget constraint






































Define as ṽit,b(Θt,ι) ≡ vit,b(θit−1,ι, Θt,ι)−
θit−1,ι
1−βρ as the lifetime utility of individual ι net of the present discounted
value of efficiency units. Note that by subtracting θit−1,ι/(1− βρ), the net lifetime utility ṽit,b(Θt,ι) is not longer
























There are two independent sources of uncertainty for individual ι: one concerns the idiosyncratic effi-
ciency shocks, summarized at each period t in the vector Θt,ι). The second source is aggregate uncertainty,
related to possible changes in local productivity levels, and, because of the discrete nature of the model, un-
certainty in the distribution of the aggregate labor supply even after conditioning on productivity levels. As
in the main text, I summarize all of the aggregate uncertainty in the vector Zt with a conditional distribution
F(Zt|Zt−1). I assume that the vector of idiosyncratic shocks Θt,ι) is independent of Zs, for all s = 1, 2, .., t.




be the expected net lifetime utility conditional on the aggregate state Zt, i.e. just





is the expected lifetime utility of living in location i at period t + 1. Then, taking expectations over the vector
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I assume the idiosyncratic log efficiency shock θi is i.i.d over time and is distributed Gumbel (Type-I
Extreme Value) with zero mean and variance equal to π
2δ2
6 . Then, θ
i/(1− βρ) is also distributed Gumbel
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with zero mean and variance π
2λ2
6 , where λ ≡ δ/(1− βρ). So this means that by adding persistence to the
model and letting agents to keep their efficiency shocks it is as if workers have realizations of shocks from a
distribution with larger dispersion. Intuitively, what this is doing is that smaller differences on efficiency unit
shocks across locations are magnified by the possibility, with probability ρ of keeping that same efficiency
shock in the future. This make locations that a priori offer similar wages to be more differentiated in net
present value. Therefore, the total labor supply response to differences in wages across locations is dampened.










and obtain the migration prob-






























where the second equality comes from the Gumbel distributional assumption on θ and γ is the Euler-
Mascheroni constant.
To ease notation, define ui,jt,b ≡ V
j
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Similarly, the probability of a worker of having at most utility v, conditional on having the possibility of














































































































− γ + Λit,b
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− κib + βρV
i












1.A.2 Expected efficiency units per migration cohort
To obtain the expected value of the efficiency unit of a worker, conditional on a particular migration decision,
we first obtain the following probability function
Pr
(
exp(θ jt,ι) < v
∣∣∣∣ u
i,j






























































Note that the probability in the denominator is equal to the migration probability pi,jt,b. Then, above’s expres-
sion is equal to
Pr
(
exp(θ jt,ι) < v
∣∣∣∣ u
i,j




































































































Then the distribution of efficiency units of workers who migrated from location i to j is distributed Fréchet






. 83 Given this distribution, the expected






























































Naturally, the log efficiency units conditional on a migration decision is now distributed Gumbel with scale
parameter δ and location parameter −δ(log(pi,jt,b + γ)).84 The expected value of the log efficiency unit, condi-













I use this result later for the identification strategy, as the expected log wage of an individual with birthplace



















= log(wjt)− δ log(p
i,j
t−1,b).
1.A.3 Static equilibrium under symmetric trade costs and balanced trade
In what follows I will derive the system of equations that will solve for the vector of efficiency wages deflated
by the price of tradables in each location given the labor supply distribution. As shown by Allen et al. (2020b),
83That the efficiency units is distributed Fréchet is expected as the underlying distribution of the log efficiency units was distributed
Gumbel.
84Just note that the name for scale and location parameters in the Gumbel distribution will correspond to the shape and scale parameter,
respectively, in the Fréchet distribution.
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all the results follow under quasi-symmetric trade shocks. In the application trade costs are symmetric, so I
don’t do it under quasi-symmetric costs to ease notation.
First, given the Cobb-Douglas assumption on the production technology of the tradable good, the share
of expenditure on each input is constant and equal to the output elasticity with respect to each input. This


















Similarly, given the assumption on the utility of workers, the share of expenditures in housing as con-
sumption is constant. Summing the expenditures from workers and firms we have that total expenditures on
housing is equal to
PiH H
i =
η + α(1− η)
(1− η) w
i Ni.














Now passing to the trade part of the model. I assume that the housing owners in i, live in i and spend all
their income on tradable goods. Given all the Cobb-Douglas assumptions, the total expenditures of people
residing in location i is proportional to the total wage bill.











































as a composite of both productivity and housing supply on location i. What this
is saying is that, given the cost on efficiency units of labor wi, the marginal cost can be reduced by having




. Substituting (30) into the










































































































Then we can rewrite the balance trade condition as
∑
j






Under the assumption that trade costs are symmetric, i.e. ψ̃j,i = ψ̃i,j, Allen et al. (2020b), using the Perron-
Frobenius theorem, show that the previous expression implies that the destination and origin fixed effects
are equal up to a constant, meaning



















Substituting the expression for the deflated wage into (31) and rearranging, we get an expression of the wage










where ϕ̃ ≡ 11+2ϕ and I used the fact that Yi ∝ wi Ni.
Coming back to the good markets clearing condition, and using the fact that total income is proportional
to the wage bill, we get




















































where we have abstracted from the constant term C−ϕ, as we only care about the relative levels of the deflated
wages Wi.85 This is the expression in the main text.
85Alternatively, we can think we are solving for scaled wages W iC
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1.A.4 Lifetime utility as a function of wages deflated by price of tradables
Given the assumption on the utility function we have that the price of the final good in location i is
Pi =
(









Substituting into (29) we get
Vit,b = B













− κib + βρV
i





















ϕ log (C) we get the expression in the main text
Vit,b = B̃








− κib + βρV
i













1.A.5 Steady-state continuous-population economy
In the steady state, productivity levels stay constant. This, in addition to assuming a continuous population
mass for each birthplace cohort yields the model deterministic. In particular, we have Vit,b = V
i
t,b and the
share of workers migrating is equal to the probability. This implies as well that the total amount of efficiency































Before setting the whole system of equations that describes the steady state equilibrium, let me define the







































































































Notice that I have not included the constant for average efficiency units Γ(1−δ)exp(γδ) as this will only affect the
level of the deflated wages Wi and this won’t affect neither the migration decisions, and therefore, the total
supply of efficiency units per location.
1.A.6 Comparison of migration and home bias
In this section I derive the compensating variation in consumption such that migration and home bias would
be canceled. This allows me to compare them.
First I derive the compensating variation in consumption a migrating worker needs to have to have the
same utility as an individual that stayed in the same location. Consider two individuals, indexed 1, 2, with
birthplace b. One just moved to location j from location i while the other remained in the same location. We
can then ask how much is the average difference in log efficiency units such that the migrating individual




















− τi,j = 0 ⇐⇒ θ j1,t−1 − θ
j
2,t−1 = (1− βρ)τi,j,
where all the location aggregate variables cancel each other and the difference in efficiency units are scaled
up by 1/(1− βρ) because there is the possibility for the worker of not changing jobs. Given the assumption
of log utility in each period, the migrating worker needs to consume ξ i,jτ = exp
(
τi,j
)(1−βρ) − 1 percentage
more than the staying worker in order to have the same utility.
Looking at the home bias, I can do a similar exercise by comparing two staying individuals, where the
difference is that one is native to the location they are living, while the other was born somewhere else. There
is a caveat, though. While the two individuals live in the same location, when comparing the differences in
86Recall that at the time of the migration decision, workers don’t know the realization of efficiency units for the subsequent period
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utility, all location specific terms will cancel. However, the option value for residing in a particular location is
different for individuals with different birthplaces, so we need to adjust for that difference in option values.
Consider then, two individuals, again indexed 1, 2 with birthplace j and b, respectively. Both individuals
stayed in their current location b. Assume they have the same utility and that the economy is in the steady

























Similarly, the excess consumption, in percentage, that a non-native individual needs to have in order to
have the same utility as a native would be given by
ξbκ,j = exp
(





I can also consider a lower bound of excess consumption by not adjusting the differences in option values,




− 1. It is a lower bound as the option value of the native is, in general, larger than the
non-native.87 The benefit of this approach is that I do not require to assume the economy is in steady state.
Additionally, I do not require to solve for the model in order to compute the lower bound as it is only a
function of the estimated home bias.
1.A.7 Welfare derivations and Birthplace Premium
In this section I derive the expressions to compare welfare along the different counterfactual scenarios. I will
assume only the steady state/continuous population case. This section follows closely Caliendo et al. (2019).
















where Ci is the real consumption that can be obtained with a unit of efficiency wage. Recall that the proba-

















Vkb −Vib − τi,k
)1/λ
)
= −λ log pi,ib .









− κib − β(1− ρ)λ log pi,ib
)
.
However, Vib is the average lifetime-utility net of current efficiency units. To get the actual average welfare
we need to take into account the heterogeneity in efficiency units. Recall that the migration decision is made
at the end of every period and efficiency shocks are independent across period. Thus, I abstract from the
vector of location specific efficiency shocks that govern the migration decision of the subsequent period.
87Exceptions might occur if for some combinations of locations the home bias is actually negative. This would mean that some natives
have utility from leaving their birthplace. This would be extremely rare in the data.
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In other words, I will look at the expected lifetime utility after a migration decision is made, but before the
realization of the next period shocks. With some abuse of notation we can rewrite the expected lifetime utility
of an individual with log efficiency θi that just decided to move from location j to i as
vib(θ

















The previous expression adjusts the expected net lifetime utility Vib with two terms. The first one
θi
1−βρ
corresponds to the net present value of log efficiency unit that a worker can get by moving to the current
location. the second term just adds the migration cost as I am looking at the utility at the moment of the
migration decision. The current workers who moved to location i from any other location constitute a fraction
(1− ρ) of the total workers with birthplace b that live in i. Now consider the workers who move to location i













b − λ log p
j,i
b .
So the average utility is larger the smaller the migration flow pj,ib as this would indicate only individuals with
high efficiency units moved to i.
From the fraction of workers ρ that could not moved, there is a fraction (1− ρ) that moved to i from j two
periods ago. So their expected utility is the same as above. We can do the same reasoning for the previous























































































































In this section I explain with more detail the algorithm to solve the model. Before doing so, I will present the
following theorem, which is a special case of Theorem 1 in Allen et al. (2020a).
























are positive kernels related to bilateral frictions. Let B ≡ [βkh]
and Γ ≡ [γkh] be the K × K matrices of the known elasticities. Define A ≡ ΓB−1 and the absolute value (element by
element) of A as Ap. If the spectral radius of Ap (i.e. the absolute value of the largest eigenvalue, denoted ρ̃(·)) is strictly
smaller than one, i.e. ρ̃ (Ap) < 1, there exists a unique strictly positive solution to the above’s system. Moreover, the
unique solution can be computed by a simple iterative procedure. If ρ̃ (Ap) = 1, then the solution is unique up to a
constant.
Theorem 1 gives us the conditions to apply a multidimensional contraction mapping to solve the model.
I use this result to solve efficiently parts of the model and for parts of the identification, as detailed in section
1.C.2. Note than in the case of K = 1 the result is just an application of a standard contraction mapping.
I will describe how the sequence of the algorithm goes. Lets first assume a vector of total efficiency units
per location {Ni,(0)}i∈I . Then, using Theorem 1, we can use the system of equations characterized by (35) to
solve for the vector of deflated wages {Wi}i∈I , conditional on a vector of efficiency units supply per location
{Ni}i∈I using an iterative method as88
∣∣∣∣

























Similarly, conditioning on wages and total efficiency units per location, we can use Theorem 1 to find the
vector of option values {Ωib}i∈I that solve the system above using an iterative method as




1− βρ < 1.
Now, given a vector of total efficiency units per location, deflated wages and option values, we can
characterize the overall welfare {Uib}i∈I . This in turn let us characterize all the migration probabilities (and
thus shares as there is a continuum of workers) pi,jb . Define the migration matrix for workers with birthplace b
as Pb, where (Pb)(i,j) = p
i,j
b . Note that Pb is a stochastic matrix (i.e. the sum of each row is equal to 1). Define
Lb as the vector of length I where the ith element is equal to Lib. Then, the system of equations characterized




Note that system of equations (42) is an eigensystem and the vector Lb is equal, up to a constant, to the
eigenvector associated to the unit eigenvalue. As Pb is a stochastic matrix, then the largest eigenvalue of P′b
is equal to one. By the Perron-Frobenius theorem, this eigenvalue is unique and there is a unique positive
88Recall ϕ̃ = 1/(1 + 2ϕ).
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eigenvector that is associated to that eigenvalue. So to solve the previous system I find the eigenvector
associated to the largest eigenvalue, which is a very fast procedure.89 In order to pin down the level of
employment for each birthplace, I use equation (41).
Finally, given the vector of labor allocation and the migration probabilities pi,jb , I can compute the total
efficiency units per location {Ni,(1)}i∈I using equations (36), (39) and (40). The solution is found when
{Ni,(0)}i∈I = {Ni,(1)}i∈I .
The strategy to solve for the model is summarized in the algorithm below.
Algorithm 1 Model Solution
1: Initiate with a guess {Ni,(0)}i∈I .
2: Initiate {Wi,(0)}i∈I and dW > tolW .
3: while dW > tolW do



































8: for b ∈ I do
9: Initiate {Ωi,(0)b }i∈I and dΩ > tolΩ.
10: while dΩ > tolΩ do





































15: Form matrix Pb with (Pb)(i,j) = p
i,j
b .
16: Find eigenvector vb associated with the unit eigenvalue of P′b










20: Get Ni,(1) = ∑b N
i
b for all i ∈ I .
21: Check if {Ni,(1)}i∈I ≃ {Ni,(0)}i∈I . If not, go back to step 1 and update {Ni,(0)}i∈I
89Borrowed this idea from Eckert (2019).
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1.C Identification details
In this section I discuss some of the details of the identification strategy. Some of the parameters I calibrate
them externally, so in this section I take them as given. In particular these are the parameters concerning the
static equilibrium part of the model plus the discount factor.
The observed migration share is the frequency estimator of the conditional migration probability. It is
an unbiased estimator, so I can exploit this fact plus the closed form expression of the conditional migrating
probabilities to form some moment conditions. These moment conditions would correspond to the first order
conditions of a Poisson regression, or Poisson PseudoMaximum Likelihood (PPML).
The conditional migration probability can be rewritten as an expression that depends on a destina-
tion/period/birthplace and origin/period/birthplace specific fixed effects as well as the migration cost.
In this Appendix I provide sufficient conditions for identification of these migration costs. In the main
text I give an intuitive explanation with an example. Here I give a more formal treatment on the matter.
I don’t enter into details about the identification of the migration elasticity as it is already treated in the
main text.
Using the closed form expression of the conditional migration probabilities to form the conditional like-
lihood function of observing the labor flows in the data. Taking the identified migration costs as given, I
can estimate the location/birthplace/period specific expected utilities by treating them as fixed effects of the
likelihood function. This allows me to obtain estimates of the conditional migration probabilities to be used
later on the identification of the home bias.
In this Appendix I also show the details to obtain expression (1.19) of Proposition 3 from the first order
conditions of the maximum likelihood problem. I prove that the solution for such system of equations is
unique. While this system of equations is ubiquitous in the migration and trade literature and the uniqueness
of the solution has been proved, at least from Ahlfeldt et al. (2015), I show the flexibility of Theorem 1 by
offering and alternative and shorter proof. The details on the computational algorithm to solve for the system
are left for Appendix 1.D.
I will abstract from the discussion of the persistence parameter and the distribution of fundamentals as
they are already explained in the main text. I give more details on the identification of the migration costs,
the migration elasticity and the home bias.
1.C.1 Migration Costs
Using labor flows ℓi,jt,b or migration shares s
i,j
t,b does not matter for the identification arguments. Then, I present
the results of this section using the migration shares as there is less notation.
The following defines the graph for a particular year/birthplace
Definition 3. Let I denote the set of all locations. Then, the graph for year t and birthplace b is an ordered pair
Gt,b = (I , Et,b), where Et,b = {(i, j)|(i, j) ∈ I2 and si,jt,b > 0}.
Note that in the above definition, I am allowing for the graph to have loops, meaning I allow for edges
to have the same destination as the origin. Also note that Gt,b is defined as a directed graph, which means
that each edge has an orientation. This is in contrast to undirected graphs where edges only show association
between nodes.
It is useful to have a formal definition of the location pairs who fulfill the conditions of Proposition 1.
Definition 4. For birthplace cohort b and period t, let data of labor flows from an unordered pair of locations (i, j) in














Figure 12 – Different cases for weakly connectivity between T and L through P.
I can define a graph collecting all the directly identified pairs for each birthplace cohort and year
Definition 5. Denote all the set of directly identified pairs on Gt,b as E dt,b. Then, the graph of directly identified pairs is
the sub-graph Gdt,b ⊆ Gt,b, Gdt,b = (I , E dt,b).
In contrast to the graph Gt,b, the sub-graph of directly identified pairs Gdt,b is an undirected graph, i.e., edges
have no orientation. Also it has no loops.
I can collect all the different directly identified pairs for every birthplace and year on a single graph.
Definition 6. The graph of directly identified pairs is defined as Gd = ⋃t,b Gdt,b.
This graph summarizes all the pair combinations where, for some birthplace/year, the data satisfies the
conditions of Proposition 1.
A path from i1 to iN on a graph is a sequence of nodes (i1, i2, ..., iN) where an edge connects every
subsequent pair of nodes (in, in+1) and all nodes are distinct. Two nodes are weakly connected in Gt,b if there
exists a path connecting i and j. Denote the set of all paths from i to j on graph Gt,b as P(i, j). Similarly, the
set of all the paths from i to j on the graph of directly identified pairs Gd is defined as Pd(i, j). Now I can
state the following result, which gives sufficient conditions for identification of the migration cost between
two pairs of locations that are not directly identified.
Proposition 7. The migration cost τi,j/λ < ∞ is identified if, for some graph Gt,b
1. s
i,j
t,b > 0 or s
j,i
t,b > 0, i.e. there is an edge connecting i and j in Gt,b.
2. i and j are weakly connected in Gt,b ∩ Gd, i.e. Pt,b(i, j) ∩ Pd(i, j) 6= ∅.
3. For some Pdt,b ∈ {Pt,b(i, j) ∩ Pd(i, j)}, s
k,k
t,b > 0 for all k in Pdt,b.
Proof. I restrict the proof to the three location example as it is without loss of generality. The proof proceeds by
looking at all the possible cases of directed graphs for three locations that fulfill the proposition’s conditions.
Consider then three locations, which are T, P and L. Let T-P and P-L be directly identified. Fixing the flow
from T to L, there are four possible cases where T and L are weakly connected through P. There are all
73
represented in Figures 12a to 12d. The reasoning when the flow is from L to T is symmetrical. I then check
how each of the four cases identifies the migration cost between T and L. I abstract from period and birthplace
subindices to keep notation simple.





= exp(−τT,L/λ− τP,T/λ + τP,Lλ).





= exp(−τT,L/λ + τP,T/λ + τP,Lλ).







= exp(−τT,L/λ− τP,T/λ− τP,Lλ).





= exp(−τT,L/λ + τP,T/λ− τP,Lλ).
As the migration costs from P to T and P to L are identified, then in each of the previous cases, the migration
cost from T to L is also identified. For the case where the flow is from L to T, is just the same four cases
above, just interchanging L for T and viceversa.
The argument for identification contained in Proposition 7 is recursive. Starting from the directly identi-
fied pairs, I can do one iteration with above’s argument and check which pairs are identified. I can then use
all the pairs that are identified and do another iteration to check with new pairs are identified and so on, and
so on.
Algorithm to find identified pairs
Whether a particular graph fulfills the conditions spelled out in Proposition 7 is conceptually simple, the
development of a recursive algorithm that uses the previously identified migration costs to show identification
of other pairs might be somehow trickier–although not very difficult.
Before jumping into the description of the algorithm, let me present some basic concepts on graph theory
and some notation. For any graph with N nodes, re-brand each node such that it corresponds to an integer
from 1 to N. An adjacency matrix of a graph, is a matrix where the entry (i, j) = 1 if there is an edge
connecting i to j. Undirected graphs have corresponding symmetric adjacency matrices. Normally, graphs
have no loops, so the diagonal entries on the adjacency matrix are zero. For my context, I allow the graphs
to have loops, so some diagonal entries would be equal to one. Also, denote as ” ∗ ” the element-wise
multiplication operator. Algorithm 2 presents the steps for finding recursively which pairs are identified
according to Proposition 7. It consists of two parts. First, it finds all the directly identified pairs. Then, it
proposes a recursive algorithm to find the identified pairs given the information of previously found pairs.
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Algorithm 2 Find pairs that fulfill Identification Conditions
1: Let At,b be the corresponding adjacency matrix of graph Gt,b.
2: Adt,b ← At,b, for all t, b.


















= 0 for all j.
7: end if
8: end for




, for all t, b.
10: M̃0 ← ∑t,b Bdt,b.
11: M̃0 ← M̃0 > 0.
12: M0 ← M̃0. diff= 1
13: while diff 6= 0 do
14: for all t, b do





16: Awct,b ← Awct,b > 0.
17: Aauxt,b ← Awct,b ∗M0.
18: Form the path matrix of Aauxt,b , denoted P auxt,b , where entry (i, j) = 1 if there is a path between i and
j; equal to zero otherwise.
19: M1 ← P auxt,b ∗ At,b + M0.
20: M1 ← M1 > 0.
21: M0 ← M1.
22: end for






25: M̃0 ← M̃1.
26: end while
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1.C.2 Conditional migration probabilities
The first part of this section I give the proof for Proposition 3. From the maximization of the log-likelihood






∑k exp(Dkt+1,b − τi,k/λ)
exp(D jt+1,b − τi,j/λ)
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Note that the expression above depends on the fixed effects of a particular period and birthplace class.
Identification boils down to prove uniqueness of the system formed by the first order conditions of the fixed
effects of particular year and birth cohort. To do so, I introduce the following useful Lemma





Bm ∀n ∈ N .
For any strictly positive vectors {An} {Bn}, where ∑n An = ∑n Bn and any strictly positive matrix K, where entries
(K)(m,n) = Km,n, there exists a unique (to scale), strictly positive vector {ωn}.
Proof. The proof for the Lemma is just a corollary of the proofs of Lemmas A.6 and A.7 in the appendix of
Ahlfeldt et al. (2015). However, to show the flexibility of Theorem 1, I propose an alternative, and I think

















Then, the spectral radius of Ap is ρ̃(Ap) = 1. Thus, by Theorem 1, there exists a unique up to scale solution
to the system above.
The system of equations formed by the first order conditions falls into the class of systems where Lemma
1 applies. Thus, the fixed effects are identified up to a constant.
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1.C.3 Prices of non-housing goods and Productivities/Housing






The system formed by equalizing total expenditures with total income takes the form of the equation in
Lemma 1. Therefore, given the efficiency wages, the observed wage bill, the trade elasticity ϕ, the trade costs
ψj,k and the output elasticity η, I can identify, up to a constant, the source effects.














where C is a constant. The fact that the price of non-housing goods can be expressed directly as a function of
the source effects is a consequence that the price (and the source effects) are directly a function of the price of
an input bundle. This means that we could extend the model adding an arbitrary number of flexible inputs,
like, say, capital, and the identified source effect would not change. However, the identified underlying
fundamentals would differ.
Having identified the source effects, I can use the identified efficiency wage plus the observed wage bill to
































so the measure of competitiveness Ãi is identified up to a constant.
1.D Estimation details
1.D.1 Wage dispersion parameter δ
The wage of a worker can be influenced by idiosyncratic factors that are constant across locations. To control
for these, I first run a regression, for each year, of the logarithm of wage on a quadratic polynomial on age and
a gender dummy, for the entire sample –switchers and non-switchers alike. From this regression, I collect the
residuals and keep only those of the workers who switch jobs across two subsequent years. I use the residual
for the job switchers as my dependent variable to estimate δ.
Table 11, contains the estimates for both the OLS and IV estimates.
1.D.2 Conditional migration probabilities
Estimating via maximum likelihood the destination fixed effects on (1.18) boils down to solving different





exp(D jt+1,b − τi,j/λ)
∑k exp(Dkt+1,b − τi,k/λ)
L
i,orig
t,b , for all i, j, h ∈ I . (43)
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Each of the systems correspond to 73 non-linear equations. While each of these non-linear systems are fairly
large, the main complication is that the total number of systems to solve is way larger. In total there are
14× 73 = 1022 systems to solve.
Although the separability of the problem is an advantage in computational terms, as it allows to easily
parallelize the algorithm, the number of systems is still too large for traditional algorithms to be a feasible
option. Trade economists have encountered this type of systems on gravity-type models, especially when
they want to invert the model: compute fundamentals such that the observed data matches the equilibrium
behavior of the model. Luckily, they have also developed tools for the quick and efficient solution of this
type of systems. In particular, Pérez-Cervantes (2014) develops a stable and fast algorithm that deals with
this type of systems. While each of the systems in my application is not very large, with only 73 unknowns,
his algorithm is also well suited for high-dimensional systems of equations.90
Before, jumping to the description of the algorithm, note that (43) implies that, as long as there is some-
one in the destination location the estimated fixed effect has to be strictly positive. This would mean that
the estimated conditional probability is also positive. To avoid problems with zeros in the estimated prob-
abilities in the next steps of the estimation procedure, I impute a value of one worker, which stayed in the
same location, for all those locations that did not have a worker of a particular birthplace in a given pe-
riod. The number of observations modified corresponds to a little more than the 1% of the total number of
locations/birthplace/periods.
Algorithm 3 describes the steps to solve for each system of equations for a particular birthplace b and
period t. I don’t include the time and birthplace subscripts to ease notation.
Algorithm 3 Pérez-Cervantes (2014) Solution Algorithm




2: Pick adjustment parameter ηadj < 1.
3: Initiate dD > tolD.
4: while dD > tolD do










where D(iter) = [D1,(iter), ..., DI,(iter)]′, iter ∈ {0, 1}; Ldest = [L1,dest, ..., LI,dest]′ and Lorig =
[L1,orig, ..., LI,orig]′.
7: if mini D(1) < 0 then
8: Adjust ηadj ← c× ηadj, c < 1.







12: Di,(1) → Di,(0).
13: end while
90In his application, Pérez-Cervantes (2014) computes the source effects, as in (1.22), for a single system with more than 3,000 equations.
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1.D.3 Trade costs
















log Xi,j = Oit +D jt − ϕ log(ψj,i), (45)
where the first two terms are origin and destination fixed effects per period. Thus, it is a linear expression
that relates (log) bilateral trade with the trade costs. I can assume the iceberg costs are a function of some
observables. A popular choice is distance between i and j and a dummy for contiguity
ψj,i = β11 ({i, j} are neighbors) + β2 log(di,j).
Notice that running the regression of bilateral trade on a dummy of contiguity and (log) distance does not
identify separately ϕ from β1 and β2. However, to get an estimate of the trade costs across locations is not
important.
Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005), use data on commodity flows across départements and exactly this
specification to estimate trade costs. See in particular the first column of Table 3 in their paper. They use
great circle distance, which for the scale of France is almost identical to geodesic distance that I use in other
parts of the paper. The only issue is how to compute distance within the departements. This is obtained by
approximating each region as a disk upon all production is concentrated at the center and consumers are
proportionally distributed throughout a given proportion of the total land-area of the region. They choose
the proportion to be equal to 1/16, which they claim is a reasonable approximation of the concentration of





where the Area of each departement is measured in squared kilometers.,
They estimate an elasticity with respect to distance −ϕβ2 of -1.76 and the dummy of contiguity −ϕβ1
equal to 0.98.
While they are measuring trade flows across departements, here I am using a more aggregated location
definition. To make the trade costs comparable at the location level I am using, I first obtain all the trade costs
at the departement level and then take the population weighted average for each location. I use the year 2002
as it is the closest to their sample.
1.E Details on sample selection
In the data I have information for every job that a worker had. This means that if a worker had more than
one job per year, there are more than one observations recorded for that single worker.
For every year, there is a variable that indicates if the job is the "main job" of the year or poste principale in
French. Thus, from the dataset DADS Postes I select those jobs that:
1. Have a positive before tax wage, calculated from variable sbrut.
2. The job is the main job of the worker, indicated by the variable pps.
3. There are no missing values on current location of residence (depr), previous location of residence
(depr_1) or birth departement (dep_naiss).
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4. Neither selection of departement is outside of continental France. This means that neither the current
and previous residence or individuals born outside continental France are considered. So I filter out all
the observations where any of the three departement codes is higher than 95.
5. After 2010, domestic workers were included in the sample. I remove them from that year onward
(industry code ape_4 970) to keep the different data comparable across years.
With these data, every year I run a regression of log wages on a quadratic polynomial in age and a gender
dummy, whose variable is sexe. For future users of the dataset, is important to note that the variable is not
encoded as a dummy as those individuals identified as women have a value equal to 2, and those identified
as men a value equal to 1. I then store the residuals from such regressions and use them for the estimation of
the model.
1.E.1 Identification of job switchers
The dataset also includes information on the job the worker had in the previous year. This includes date of
termination and status as "main job" for the previous year. If a worker relation is not "terminated" then the
dataset reports the value equivalent to the maximum number of working days.91 Also the worker who enters
the year with the same job (main job or not) as in the previous year would have the start date of current job
equal to the minimum. I can use this information to identify those workers who changed "main jobs" across
two years.
For a worker with a main job on a given year three options are possible
1. The job is the same main job as in the previous year.
2. The job started after January 1st.
3. The job started before January 1st but in the previous year.
For example, consider a worker who had a job from February to November of 2003. This job would be the
"main job" for that worker in year 2003. Then the same worker starts a job in December 2003. When looking
at this worker in the year 2004, we observe that the job he had on the previous year, which will correspond
to the job she started in December 2003, was not the main job. So we can conclude that the worker changed
"main jobs" from one year to the next.
If the worker started their current main job after January 1st of the current year, then we conclude she
changed jobs. A job is linked to a location, therefore all the people that changed locations are classified as
switchers as well.
Then, to identify those people that do not change "main jobs" across years they have to fulfill four condi-
tions
1. Date of termination of main job in previous period is equal to the maximum.
2. The start date of current main job is equal to the minimum.
3. The previous year job is classified as that year’s main job.
4. The worker stayed in the same location.
91The data stores dat in terms of number of days working from January 1st. The maximum number is set to be 360.
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If the worker fulfills above’s conditions, then it is classified as it she did not switch jobs.
There is a small risk of classifying incorrectly some of the workers. These would be the cases where
workers indeed finished their previous job in the last date of the previous year and started their next job
immediately after. Also notice that with this classification, some of the observations that are identified as job
switchers could just be workers re-entering the labor force and who were not working in the previous year.
This is would be the case if the tax authority has information in the departement of residence of the previous
year. This is not a problem in the eyes of the model, as these workers can be thought of newcomers that
have an opportunity to move after observing shocks for the different locations. They will affect very little
the estimation of the persistence parameter ρ that tries to capture the strength of keeping one job rather than
changes in the extensive margin of the total labor force.
1.F Birthplace as Proxy for Home
I use the birthplace as a proxy for the home location of individuals. This home location can be understood
as a location where the workers grew up, made childhood friends etcetera. For those that moved at a very
young age, the birthplace will be a wrong proxy for home.
Of course, there is no variable where individuals report which location they perceive as their home loca-
tion so we have to rely on proxies. Another proxy for home could be the location where workers first appear
in the sample, or the workers first job location. Unfortunately, the main data set is not a panel that would
allow me to get the location of workers’ first job. However, I can rely on a subsample of the data, the Panel
DADS which is 1/12th of the original DADS data that I use in the main analysis.
Using the panel data, I can get the location of the first job of each worker in this subsample. I find that
66% of the workers first appear to work in their birthplace. So for those workers the proxy location for home
would be the same.
Now, for workers that have a first location different than birthplace, it is not a priori obvious which one
should be the proxy for home, as workers entering late into the job market won’t necessary feel attached to
that location if they just moved there. Thus, I look at those workers whose first job location is different than
their birthplace and they got their first job when they were 18 years old or less. The idea is that those workers
likely grew up in their first job locations, so by considering the birthplace as their home location I would be
classifying wrongly their home location. The fraction of workers with age less or equal than 18 when having
their first job that is not in their birthplace is only 21%.
To understand to what extent birthplace is a good proxy for home location, I compare where workers live
given that they moved from their first job location. I focus, as I mentioned, on workers that had different first
job location than birthplace at age 18 or younger.
Table 9 shows, of those workers whose first job location is different than their birthplace and moved
from their first location job, the percentage that lives back in their first location job and in their birthplace at
different ages. The first row shows that only 16% lives back in their first job location before turning 20. While
this fraction is large, considering that there are 73 alternatives, it is still small compared with the fraction that
works in their birthplace. Although the small fraction living back in their home location might just reflect the
fact that workers only just moved out from the first job location to being with. What is surprising is that a
large fraction goes to their birth location. Looking at older age groups, the percentage of workers that return
to their first job location increases, although the fraction of birthplace is also large. All together what the table
shows is that for some workers, the first job location is probably the best proxy for home location. However,
even for some workers where a priori the first job location looks like the natural candidate to be the home
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Table 9 – Location of workers: First job 6= Birthplace at Age ≤ 18
% of workers living in
Age First job location Birthplace
< 20 16 45
20− 25 31 35
26− 30 28 28
31− 35 26 25
36 25 22
Note: The data comes from the Panel DADS which is a 1/12th subsample
of the DADS data used in the main analysis. I consider workers whose
first job location was different than their birthplace when they were 18 or
younger and that moved from their first job location. Each row corresponds
to the percentage of workers that live either back again in their first job
location or in their birthplace at different ages.
location, the birthplace is still attracting a large fraction. Thus, birthplace looks as good as a proxy as first
job location for workers with different first job location than bithplace at age 18 or younger. Combined with
the fact that a large fraction of workers, regardless of age, have their first job in their birthplace, males the
birthplace a good proxy for home location, at least qhen considering the alternative proxies.
1.G Alternative Identification Strategy
In this section, I spell an alternative identification strategy for both the migration and home bias, as well as
the dispersion parameter. The main difference with the identification strategy from the text is that I take
a reverse approach. First, I use the average wages to identify the compensation workers need in order to
migrate. These are related to the migration costs. Then I use these compensations along with the observed
labor flows to identify the migration elasticity.92
I exploit the closed form expression of the conditional migrating probabilities to form the conditional
likelihood function of observing the labor flows in the data. I estimate the migration elasticity via maximum
likelihood using the previously identified migration costs. In order to control for the unobserved expected
lifetime utility in the expression, I include birthplace/destination/time fixed effects in the maximum likeli-
hood. Identification follows as the maximization of such likelihood is equivalent to estimate it via Poisson
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML), i.e. a Poisson regression with the labor flows as dependent variables,
as shown by Guimaraes, Figueirdo, and Woodward (2003). It is well known that the solution of the necessary
first order conditions of the maximization problem of PPML is unique. The idea of using the PPML to esti-
mate the original parameters from the multinomial likelihood function in the context of spatial models was
introduced recently Dingel and Tintelnot (2020).
The main drawback from this strategy is that using previously estimated migration costs to identify the
migration elasticity might introduce a bias. And in the case of the maximum likelihood, this bias is not easy
to solve. In contrast, the identification of the migration elasticity in the main text corresponds to a linear
92This strategy is more closely related to that of Donaldson (2018) where he first use price differences to identify the trade costs.
Second, he uses the variation on those trade costs and observed trade flows to identify the trade elasticity.
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regression. The attenuation bias from using a regressor with measurement error is easy to solve, theoretically
and computationally, with an instrument.
Estimating the migration elasticity via maximum likelihood allows me to use the observed zero migration
flows in the data. On top of that, with the same estimation I can consistently estimate the underlying
probabilities.93 Then, I can use the probability estimates to identify the home bias. Using these estimates, I
identify the home bias just as in the main text.
1.G.1 Migration costs
With a little abuse of notation, recall that the expected log wage of an individual with birthplace b that moved







= log(wjt)− δ log(p
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t−1,b).



























where I have used the assumption that τi,i = 0. The expression above is intuitive. The differences between
the average log wages of people that moved away from i to location j and the people that stayed in location
i reflects overall differences in wage differences that are independent of mobility patterns, plus a component
that reflects the compensation migrating individuals need to have to justify such a decision.
Assuming that migration costs are symmetric, i.e. τi,j = τ j,i, I can use the reverse migration flow to
control for overall differences on wages in the two locations that are independent to the migration costs. This























Therefore, the expression above identifies non-parametrically the migration costs. The only dropback is the
data requirements. We need simultaneously people from a particular birthplace doing a migrating pattern
plus the reverse. That is why I assume that (1− βρ)τi,j is a linear function of distance.
1.G.2 Wage dispersion parameter
Recall the expression for the probability of a worker with birthplace b of moving from location i to j for a




















































93Even with the inclusion of fixed effects, consistency follows as the number of fixed effects to be estimated grows at a rate of I2 =
location × birthplace, while the number of observations grow at rate I3 = origin × destination × birthplace.
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where D jt+1,b ≡ V
j
t+1,b/λ are destination/birthplace/period specific fixed effects; and ℓ
i,j
t,b is the number of
workers who move from i to j with birthplace b at period t, conditional on changing jobs.
By using the identified scaled up migration costs (1− βρ)τi,j and controlling for the destination/period/birthplace
fixed effects I can identify the migration elasticity δ.
The conditional log-likelihood is a highly non-linear object and the identification and consistency esti-
mation of δ might be concerned. However, I can show, just as Guimaraes et al. (2003), that the conditional
likelihood and a Poisson regression extended with origin fixed effects would imply solving for the same opti-
mization problem. Identification follows because a Poisson regression has a unique solution, if such solution
exists.94





























































































where ℓit,b = ∑j ℓ
i,j








































t,b + CLP ,
where CLP is a constant that does not depend on the parameters. Therefore, the concentrated log-likelihood
of the Poisson regression is equal, up to a constant to the original likelihood. Hence, the maximization
problem will yield the exactly same estimate. There are currently very efficient packages that allow for a fast
estimation of a Poisson regression with a large number of fixed effects.95
Consistency of the estimators follows from results on consistency on non-linear panels with two way
fixed effects, as explained by Weidner and Zylkin (2020). Moreover, the fixed effects are also consistently
estimated. Heuristically, the reason for this is that, while increasing the sample size by increasing the number
of locations increases the number of origin and destination fixed effects to be estimated at a rate I2 (location
94In principle the inly risk of identification here would be that the solution does not exists. This can happen if all the observations with
zero observations, i.e. ℓi,jt,b = 0 are collinear. For example, if for a certain year there are zero workers from a particular birthplace/origin
in a destination. This entails less than 1 % of the combinations in my sample. In order to avoid such problems I would just assume there
is one worker who just stayed within the same destination when I have zero workers.
95I use the package fixest for R.
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× birthplace), the sample size grows at rate N3. This also means that we could consistently estimate the
migration elasticity using a single birthplace cohort. Additionally, this also means that I can obtain consistent
estimates of the underlying distribution of migration probabilities {pi,jt,b}, which I can then use to identify the
home bias.
1.H Additional Figures and Tables
Table 10 – Gravity regression using départements









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Geodesic (km) Driving (km) Driving (hours) Geodesic (km) Driving (km) Driving (hours)
1(j 6= b) 2.318∗∗∗ 2.921∗∗∗ −2.625∗∗∗ -0.127∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.179) (0.031) (0.003) (0.218) (0.059)
1(j 6= b) log(db,j) −1.289∗∗∗ −1.323∗∗∗ −1.687∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.033) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1(j 6= n) −2.554∗∗∗ −2.052∗∗∗ −7.452∗∗∗ -1.871∗∗∗ -1.353∗∗∗ −7.050∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.137) (0.029) (0.128) (0.139) (0.03)
1(j 6= i) log(di,j) −1.299∗∗∗ −1.320∗∗∗ −1.837∗∗∗ −1.349∗∗∗ −1.368∗∗∗ −1.773∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
Adj. Pseudo R2 0.963 0.964 0.963 0.798 0.798 0.798
Observations 12,458,760 12,458,760 12,458,760 12,458,760 12,458,760 12,458,760
Note: This table stores the results of two models, both estimated using Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML). The first model uses
the labor flows of workers with birthplace b that moved from location i to location j, Li,jb,t as a dependent variable. The second model uses the
migration shares Li,jt,b/ ∑k L
i,k
t,b. For each model I use three different distance measures: geodesic distance in hundreds of kilometers, driving
distance in hundreds of kilometers, and driving time between locations in hours. I get driving distances and hours from Google Maps.
Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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(a) Selection Non-Natives (b) Selection Migrants
Figure 13 – Selection via wages after controlling for age and gender. I first run a regression in each year
of the logarithm of the wage on a quadratic polynomial of age and a gender dummy for all the workforce
and collect the residuals. The left panel compares the average residual (log) wages of non-native workers vs
native workers. Wages from both groups are normalized by the average residual (log) wage of all the sample.
The plot distinguishes two cases: when using the sample consisting of all workers and using the sample of
workers who switched jobs. The plot in the right panel is analogous to the plot in the right, but compares
residual (log) wages of migrants vs non-migrants.
Table 11 – Estimates scale parameter δ





Origin/Dest./Year FE X X
Adj. R2 0.056 0.056
Observations 26,237,598 26,237,598
Note: The table shows the results of two linear regressions estimated us-
ing Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Instrumental Variables (IV). I first
run a regression in each year of the logarithm of the wage on a quadratic
polynomial of age and a gender dummy for all the workforce and collect
the residuals. The dependent variable is the residual of an individual who
switch jobs across years. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 12 – First stage regression τi,j/λ
Dependent variable: log τi,j/λ
OLS
(1)






Note: The table shows the results of the first stage re-
gression when instrumenting (scaled) migration costs
τi,j/λ. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗p<0.1;
∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Figure 14 – Comparison Migration Costs. The plot compares the migration costs estimated
in a model with home bias and a model without.
Figure 15 – Local Employment Response to a Productivity Shock. The plot compares the
local employment elasticities to a productivity shock for a model estimated with home bias
and a model without.
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Figure 16 – Response to Place Based Policies, no Home Bias. The map shows the change
in overall social welfare by subsidizing each location, normalized by the subsidies as a
proportion of output, in an economy without home bias. Locations in red mean that when
subsidizing such locations, overall social welfare decreased.
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Chapter 2
The Aggregate Effects of Labor Market
Concentration
Miren Azkarate-Askasua and Miguel Zerecero1
Abstract
What are the efficiency and welfare effects of employer and union labor market power? We use data of French
manufacturing firms to first document a negative relationship between employment concentration and wages
and labor shares. At the micro-level, we identify a negative effect of employment concentration on wages
thanks to mass layoff shocks to competitors. Second, we develop a multi-sector bargaining model in general
equilibrium that incorporates employer and union labor market power. The model features structural labor
wedges that are heterogeneous across firms and potentially generate misallocation of resources. We propose
an estimation strategy that separately identifies the structural parameters determining both sources of labor
market power. We show that observing wage and employment data is enough to compute counterfactuals.
Third, we evaluate the efficiency and welfare losses from labor market distortions. Eliminating employer and
union labor market power increases output by 1.6 percent and the labor share by 21 percentage points trans-
lating into significant welfare gains for workers. Workers’ geographic mobility is key to realize the output
gains from competition.
JEL Codes: J2, J42, D24
Keywords: Labor markets, Wage setting, Misallocation
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2.1 Introduction
There is growing evidence, especially for the United States, linking lower wages to labor mar-
ket concentration.2 Indeed, if this concentration reflects monopsony power in the labor market,
standard theory predicts that establishments mark down wages by paying workers less than their
marginal revenue product of labor. On the other hand, if labor market institutions enable workers
to organize and have a say over the wage setting process, bargaining can mitigate, or even reverse,
the effect of establishments’ market power on wages.
In this paper we quantify the efficiency and welfare losses from labor market power in the French
manufacturing sector. The French case stands out over other developed countries, especially with
respect to the U.S., for having regulations that significantly empower workers over employers.3 We
therefore provide a framework that incorporates both, employer and union labor market power.
Our main result is that, holding the total labor supply constant, removing employer and workers’
labor market power increases French manufacturing output by 1.6 percent. Even if productivity and
output gains are relatively small, distributional effects are important as the labor share increases by
21 percentage points and the average wage rises by 45 percent. This wage increase translates into
median expected welfare gains of 42 percent for workers.
We proceed in three steps. First, we establish empirically that, within a same firm, establish-
ments with higher local employment shares pay lower wages for same occupations. We identify this
effect by using a competitors national mass layoff shock as an external source of variation to an
establishment’s local employment share. Second, in line with the previous empirical result and the
French labor institutional setting, we build and estimate a model where labor market power arises
from: (i) employers that face upward sloping inverse labor supplies, and (ii) workers that bargain
over the wages. Third, we use the model to quantify the efficiency and welfare consequences of
employers and workers’ labor market power.
We start by documenting the link between concentration and wages/labor shares. We use data
on French manufacturing firms from 1994 to 2007. Employer labor market power is related to the
notion of local labor markets. We define those as a combination of commuting zone, industry,
and occupation, and measure concentration at the local labor market level using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index.4 We find that concentrated industries have on average lower labor shares. Pass-
ing from the first to the third quartile of local labor market concentration, the labor share is reduced
by 1 percentage point.
At the establishment-occupation level, our proxy for the strength of labor market power is the
employment share within the local labor market. To explore a link between concentration and labor
payments, we need to overcome the potential endogeneity of the employment share and the wages.
Therefore, we instrument employment shares with negative employment shocks or mass layoffs to
competitors. Identification comes from residual within firm-occupation-year variation across local
2See for example Berger et al. (2019), Jarosch et al. (2019), Benmelech et al. (2018) among others.
3The French labor market is characterized by having low unionization rates but high coverage of collective agreements. This is due
to the institutional setting of the labor market that empowers union representation depending on the firm size. Section 2.3.4 provides
more detail on the French institutional setting.
4The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is defined as the sum of the squares of employment shares.
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labor markets. Depending on the specification, the estimated elasticity ranges from −0.17 to −0.04.
That is, a 1 percentage point increase of employment share lowers the establishment wage by up to
0.17 percent.5
After presenting the reduced form evidence, we build a general equilibrium model that incorpo-
rates two elements: employer and union labor market power. First, we borrow from the trade and
urban economics literature (e.g. Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Ahlfeldt et al., 2015) and assume work-
ers have stochastic preferences to work at different workplaces. Heterogeneity of workers’ tastes
implies individual establishment-occupations face an upward sloping inverse labor supply curve
which potentially gives rise to employer labor market power. In the absence of bargaining, as there
is a discrete set of establishment-occupations per local labor market, employers act strategically
and compete for workers in an oligopsonistic fashion. Wages are therefore paid with a mark-
down which is a function of the perceived labor supply elasticity. Similarly to Atkeson and Burstein
(2008), this elasticity in turn depends on the employment share within the local labor market. The
framework without bargaining is similar to Berger et al. (2019) under Bertrand competition. The
second important element of the model is collective wage bargaining. We assume wages are set at
the establishment-occupation level between establishments and unions acting symmetrically. Both
sides internalize how rents are generated and bargain with zero as outside option.
This wage-setting process leads to a distortion that is reflected in a wedge between the equilib-
rium negotiated wage and the marginal revenue product of labor. This wedge summarizes both
sides of market power as it is a combination of both, a markdown due to the oligopsony power, and
a markup due to wage bargaining. The smaller this wedge is, the larger the market power of em-
ployers relative to workers and vice-versa. Heterogeneity of the labor wedge across establishments
distorts relative wages and potentially generates misallocation of resources that decrease aggregate
output. Heterogeneity comes from two sources: (i) the dependence of the markdown on industry
specific labor supply elasticities and employment shares; and (ii) the across industry differences in
the markup due to diversity of bargaining powers. Our model nests as special cases both, a full
bargaining setting or a model with oligopsonistic competition only.
Our framework features a large number of different prices, the establishment-occupation wages
plus the product prices. We show how to solve the general equilibrium of the model in two steps.
We solve first for wages in each local labor market normalizing aggregate prices. Second, we
show how to build industry level fundamentals and solve for aggregate prices. This two-step
procedure eases the solution because the model can be rewritten at the industry level.6 We provide
an analytical characterization of the equilibrium at the industry level and along the way prove
the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. This allows us to use the model to back out
fundamentals that rationalize the observed data and perform counterfactuals on actual data without
worrying about multiple equilibria.
After the model set-up, we discuss how to identify and estimate the model parameters. We have
5This corresponds to a reduction of roughly 1000 euros (at 2015 prices) per year if we pass from the first to the third quartile of the
employment share distribution.
6The intuition behind this is that after solving for wages for given industry and economy-wide constants, we can fully characterize the
allocation of labor and capital within each industry. This fact, combined with the information about the establishment-level fundamentals,
allows us to aggregate the model at the industry level with corresponding industry-level fundamentals.
91
two types of parameters: the ones related to the labor supply and bargaining, and the ones related
to technology. Regarding the labor supply, we assume that workers face a sequential decision: in
a first stage, they observe their preferences for different local labor markets and choose the one
that maximizes their expected utility; in a second stage, they observe their preferences to work for
different employers and choose the establishment. Therefore, these labor supplies depend on two
key parameters that jointly determine the magnitude of employers’ labor market power: a within
local labor market elasticity and an across local labor market elasticity. They govern, respectively,
the intensity of how workers respond to changes in establishment wages within a local labor market,
and how workers react to changes in average utilities (which are in turn a function of establishment
wages) across local labor markets.
The main challenge is to separately identify the union bargaining powers from the within and
across local market labor supply elasticities. We propose a strategy to estimate the labor supply
elasticities that is independent from the underlying wage setting process. Therefore, our identi-
fication strategy is readily applicable to set-ups with or without bargaining. In the first step, we
estimate the across local labor market elasticity and the inverse labor demand elasticity adapting
the identification through heteroskedasticity of Rigobon (2003). We use the insight that the across
local labor market elasticity is the only relevant elasticity for the establishments that are alone
in their local labor markets. We call these establishments full monopsonists. Their local labor
market equilibrium boils down to a standard system representing the labor supply and demand
equations. Ordinary least squares estimates present the traditional problem of other price-quantity
systems as the estimated elasticities are biased towards zero. Rather than instrumenting to get ex-
ogenous variation in the labor supply and demand, we identify the elasticities using a restriction
on the variance-covariance of structural shocks across occupations and their heteroskedasticity.7
The identifying assumption is that the covariances between the labor demand and supply shifters,
productivities and amenities respectively, are the same across occupations but not the variances.
In a second step we estimate the within local labor market labor supply elasticities by directly
estimating the labor supply for each establishment. We instrument for the wages by using revenue
productivities as labor demand shifters and estimate by conditioning on within local labor market
variation. This requires the inverse labor demand elasticity estimated in the first step. Finally, we
calibrate the industry specific technology parameters (capital and labor elasticities) and bargaining
powers to match the industry capital and labor shares.
Once the parameters are identified, we back out model primitives to perform counterfactuals.
Ideally, we would like to have the distribution of fundamentals, productivities and amenities, at
the establishment-occupation level that rationalizes the observed data on wages and employment.
Using establishment wages, we back out amenities to match employment shares. However, given
that we do not observe physical output, we can only identify the revenue productivity, which is a
7To see the notion behind Identification through Heteroskedasticity, consider the following system: y = αx + u and x = βy + v, with
var(ǫ) ≡ σǫ and cov(u, v) = 0. The system is under-identified as the variance-covariance matrix of (x, y) yields three moments (σx , σy
and cov(x, y)) while we have to solve for four unknowns: (α, β, σu, σv). Now suppose we can split the data into two sub-samples with
the same parameters (α, β) but different variances. Now the two sub-samples give us 3+3=6 data moments with only six unknowns:
the two parameters (α, β) and the four variances of structural errors. This system is identified under the additional assumption that the
variances σu, σv are different across sub-samples.
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function of two objects: the physical productivity and the price of the good. These unobserved
prices are equilibrium objects and the inability to identify the non-parametric distribution of pro-
ductivities separately from these prices has prevented most studies (e.g. Hsieh and Klenow, 2009)
from conducting full blown general equilibrium counterfactuals.
We show that the general equilibrium counterfactual can be computed using only revenue pro-
ductivities. We do that by writing the model in terms of relative changes with respect to the current
equilibrium. This approach, borrowed from the trade literature, allows us to solve for changes of
equilibrium variables relative to a baseline scenario.8 We are able to do that because changes in
revenue productivities are completely driven by changes in prices and not the individual physical
productivity part which is assumed fixed in the counterfactuals.
We quantify the efficiency losses of employers and workers’ labor market power by removing
those distortions in a counterfactual economy while keeping workers’ preferences fixed. This is a
counterfactual scenario where employers are competitive and workers have no bargaining power
leading to wages that are equal to the marginal revenue product of labor. We find that output
increases by 1.6 percent while the labor share rises by 21 percentage points. This increased labor
share goes together with wage gains that in turn translate into 42 percent median expected welfare
gains for workers. Removing the heterogeneity of wedges improves the allocation of labor by
increasing the employment of more productive establishments. The counterfactual gains in the
labor share suggest that employer labor market power is stronger than the one of the unions.
This is a consequence of the estimated low labor supply elasticities that are in the range but a bit
lower than the estimates of Berger et al. (2019) for the U.S. Interestingly, we find that removing
the bargaining process would marginally reduce output compare to the baseline. Thus, given the
presence of employers labor market power, unions seem to have no negative efficiency effects. They
do, however, have a large redistributional effect as the labor share without unions is reduced by
almost 10 percentage points.
Additionally, we find that geographic mobility is the key margin of adjustment to achieve the
baseline counterfactual productivity gains, rather than within local labor market or within industry
mobility. The intuition behind this is that there are a handful of concentrated and productive
firms in the rural areas and removing labor market power increases their wage and employment
more relative to the urban areas. We find that labor market distortions account for 13 percentage
points – about a third – of the urban/rural wage gap. Consequently, in the counterfactual with no
distortions, the total employment decreases in urban areas relative to the baseline, which changes
the geographical composition of manufacturing employment in France.
Finally, we incorporate two extensions to the model. First, we introduce an endogenous labor
force participation decision by assuming that workers may voluntarily stay out of the labor force.
Output gains in this case are slightly higher than in the baseline because wage gains increase the
labor force participation. Second, we allow for agglomeration forces within the local labor market
that also improve the output gains from the baseline counterfactual.
8Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) refer to this method as "exact hat algebra". They use this approach to compute welfare effects
of trade liberalizations using easily accessible macroeconomic data.
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Literature. This paper speaks to several strands of the literature. First, and most closely related,
is the literature on employer labor market power. Several empirical papers have documented the
importance of labor market concentration on wages, employment and vacancies (Azar et al., 2017;
Benmelech et al., 2018; Azar et al., 2018; Schubert et al., 2020; Dodini et al., 2020; Marinescu et al.,
2020). The concentration critically relates to the definition of a local labor market which most of the
papers consider as rigid entities based on combinations of location-industry or location-geography
identifiers. There have been some advances in considering the endogeneity of local labor markets
either based on labor flows (Nimczik, 2017), on commuting (Manning and Petrongolo, 2017), on
skill composition (Macaluso, 2017; Dodini et al., 2020) or broadly on workers’ outside options
(Schubert et al., 2020) inferred from labor flows. Contrary to Schubert et al. (2020) and Dodini et al.
(2020) who study the effects of market concentration incorporating outside options to the notion
of local labor markets, we take a more traditional approach and define them based on location-
industry-occupation identifiers.
The cited empirical papers focus on aggregate measures of concentration as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index. Our contribution to this empirical literature is to focus on establishment level
concentration and use exogenous variations to show the existence of employer labor market power
in France. We argue that firms having mass layoffs constitute a quasi-natural variation on the
employment shares of the non-affected establishments. This allows us to identify the effect of the
employment share at the local labor market, our proxy of the strength of employer labor market
power, on wages. Recently and independently to our work, Dodini et al. (2020) use involuntary
displacements such as mass layoffs and plant closures in an event study of individual labor market
outcomes. They compare differential labor market outcomes of displaced workers depending on
the concentration in their geographical area. The main difference is that in our reduced form we use
competitors’ mass layoff shocks as exogenous variation to the structure of the local labor markets
and measure the differential wages of establishments within a firm in affected and non-affected
local labor markets.
Dodini et al. (2020) study how outside options shape labor market concentration but there is
mixed recent evidence on the effects of outside options on wages. Jäger et al. (2020) find that
wages do not respond to the outside option of unemployment in Austria while recently Caldwell
and Danieli (2018) and Caldwell and Harmon (2019) find employment outside options do influence
wages, and Hafner (2020) finds wage and employment effects on French local labor markets opening
to cross border commuting. We view our work as complement to these empirical papers as our
structural model neatly incorporates the effect of outside options within the local labor market into
wages while allowing for labor market power from unions.
This paper also contributes to structural work on employer labor market power. We depart
from the traditional monopsony power framework (e.g. Manning, 2011; Card et al., 2018; Lamadon
et al., 2018) by having heterogeneous markdowns arising from market structure and by extending
it to allow for wage bargaining. The paper is complementary to Jarosch et al. (2019) in the sense
that they consider employer labor market power in a search framework. We contribute to those
papers by incorporating unions. Marinescu et al. (2020) find negative effects of local labor market
concentration on wages for new hires in France that are mitigated in more unionized industries
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like Benmelech et al. (2018) for the U.S. These findings are in line with our structural model and we
find that allowing for collective bargaining is key to match certain empirical regularities.
In contemporaneous and independent work, Berger et al. (2019) build a structural model with
oligopsonistic competition in local labor markets. We share the objective of measuring the efficiency
effects of labor market distortions and reach similar quantitative conclusions, but our contribution
differs from theirs in several dimensions: (i) our framework nests theirs as an special case without
bargaining; (ii) we incorporate occupations and use them for the identification of the structural
parameters; (iii) we allow for differences in structural parameters across industries. In particular,
within local labor market elasticities and bargaining powers are diverse across industries. Im-
portantly, this adds heterogeneity to the labor wedges and employment misallocation; (iv) on the
empirical evidence, they instrument with tax changes across states in the U.S. whereas we use labor
shocks to competitors; (v) we show that counterfactuals can be computed without the need to back
out underlying productivities and we perform the counterfactuals using actual establishment data.
This paper is related to the literature on Nash bargaining. We take the axiomatic approach
(Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990) rather than the sequential or strategic approach (Binmore et al.,
1986; Stole and Zwiebel, 1996; Brügemann et al., 2018) with offers and counter-offers. In our frame-
work, collective bargaining happens at the establishment-occupation level and the employer cannot
discriminate against different workers. Therefore, collective bargaining applies universally even if
only a subset of workers is unionized. Regarding the union bargaining power, our estimates relate
to the estimates for manufacturing from Cahuc et al. (2006) in a framework with on the job search.
The paper relates to the literature on imperfect competition in general. Our approach is similar
to Edmond et al. (2018) and Morlacco (2018) in trying to quantify the effect of heterogeneous market
power on aggregate output. They study, output and intermediate input market powers respectively
while we focus on the effects of labor market power. Recently Hershbein et al. (2020) and Wong
(2019) disentangle between output and labor market power using, respectively, a production func-
tion approach for the U.S. and France. They both find the presence of employer labor market power
even when controlling for production function heterogeneity and output market power. Karabar-
bounis and Neiman (2013) documented the falling trend of the labor share and Barkai (2016) and
Gutiérrez and Philippon (2016) the rising trend of the profit share for different countries. Output
market power has been pointed out as an explanation for the decline of labor payments out of GDP
(e.g. De Loecker et al., 2020; De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2018). Contrary to the evidence on output
market power, other studies suggest that employer labor market power is not the driver behind the
decreasing trends of the U.S. labor share (e.g. Lipsius, 2018; Berger et al., 2019) with the exception
of Hershbein et al. (2020). The focus of this paper is therefore not on labor share trends but on the
effects of employer and union labor market power in a given cross section of firms, markets and
industries.
Our model builds on the trade (Eaton and Kortum, 2002) and urban economics (Redding, 2016;
Ahlfeldt et al., 2015) literature. The establishment perceived elasticity has the same functional form
as the perceived demand elasticities in Atkeson and Burstein (2008) under Bertrand competition.
Diversity of perceived elasticities is the main source of heterogeneity of the labor wedge and is at
the origin of resource misallocation as emphasized by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Restuccia and
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Rogerson (2008).
Finally, the paper contributes to micro-estimates of firm labor supply elasticities. Staiger et al.
(2010), Falch (2010) and Berger et al. (2019) use quasi-experimental variation on the wages to es-
timate the firm labor supply elasticities that go from 0.1 (Staiger et al., 2010) to 5.4 (Berger et al.,
2019). Both our within and across local labor market labor supply elasticities lie in that range. Dube
et al. (2018) estimate a labor supply elasticity to firm level wage policies that are between 3 and 4
which are close to our within local labor market supply elasticities and the average elasticities in
the meta-analysis of Sokolova and Sorensen (2018). On the contrary, the median estimate in the
meta-analysis and the estimates in Webber (2015) are near 1 and therefore close to our across local
labor market supply elasticity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the data. Section 2.3 shows
the stylized facts and our empirical strategy. Section 2.4 introduces the model. Section 2.5 discusses
details about identification and estimation of the model. Section 2.6 discusses the results from
counterfactual exercises. Section 2.7 presents extensions of the model and Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Data
We use two main data sources. Our first and primary source of data are firm-level fiscal records
consisting of balance sheet information including wage bill, capital stock, number of employees
and value added. This dataset is known as FICUS and it includes all French firms except for the
smallest firms declaring at the micro-BIC regime and some agricultural firms. We also use DADS
Postes, an employer-employee dataset with the universe of salaried employees. It provides firm and
establishment identifiers (SIREN and SIRET respectively). We recover the location, occupation clas-
sification, wages and employment. This data set is necessary to know how employment and wages
are distributed across different establishment-occupations of a given firm. The sample covers pri-
vate manufacturing firms in France from 1994 to 2007. A break in the industry classification series
prevents us from extending the time span of the sample.9 Additionally we use data relating the city
codes to commuting zones and Consumer Price Index data to deflate nominal variables.10 We de-
fine four broad categories of occupations: top management, supervisor, clerical and operational.11
We define a local labor market as the intersection between commuting zone, 3-digit industry and
occupation. On average throughout the sample there are 57,900 local labor markets per year.12
Our sample consists of approximately 4 million establishment-occupation-year observations that
belong to around 1.25 million firms. Details about sample selection are in Appendix 2.F.3.
9Before 1994 the wage data was imputed and after 2007 the industry classification (APE) is not consistent with previous versions. On
the contrary, the classification change between the 1993 and 2003 codes are consistent at the 3-digit level.
10The sources are ❤tt♣s✿✴✴✇✇✇✳✐♥s❡❡✳❢r✴❢r✴✐♥❢♦r♠❛t✐♦♥✴✷✶✶✹✺✾✻ and ❤tt♣s✿✴✴✇✇✇✳✐♥s❡❡✳❢r✴❢r✴st❛t✐st✐q✉❡s✴s❡r✐❡✴
✵✵✶✻✹✸✶✺✹ respectively.
11The classification is very similar to the one in Caliendo et al. (2015). We group together their first two categories (firm owners
receiving a wage and top management positions) into top management because the distinction between the two was not stable in 2002.
12We use interchangeably 3-digit industry or sub-industry throughout the text.
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Table 13 – Establishment-Occupation Summary Statistics
Mean Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) St. Dev.
All Sample
Liot 11.1 1.1 2.3 6.2 59.5
wiotLiot 367.2 31.6 71.8 196.6 2,379.5
wiot 34.0 20.9 27.4 39.5 117.1
sio|m 0.20 0.01 0.05 0.24 0.30
(a) Monolocation
Liot 7.4 1.0 2.1 5.1 29.7
wiotLiot 216.7 29.7 64.5 159.6 925.2
wiot 32.8 20.3 26.6 38.5 35.5
sio|m 0.18 0.01 0.04 0.19 0.29
(b) Multilocation
Liot 26.6 1.3 4.1 15.1 120.3
wiotLiot 1,004.7 45.7 139.3 533.0 5,052.4
wiot 39.0 23.6 30.7 43.7 257.7
sio|m 0.29 0.02 0.11 0.48 0.35
Notes: The top panel shows summary statistics for the whole sample. Panels (a) and
(b) present respectively summary statistics of monolocation and multilocation firm-
occupations. Number of observations for All Sample is 4,151,892. For the Monolo-
cation sample is 3,359,236; and for the Multilocation sample is 792,656. Liot is full
time equivalent employment at the establishment-occupation io, wiotLiot is the wage
bill, wiot is establishment-occupation wage or wage per FTE, sio|m is the employment
share out of the local labor market. All the nominal variables are in thousands of
constant 2015 euros.
2.2.1 Summary Statistics
Table 13 presents the final sample establishment-occupation level summary statistics. The median
occupation at a given establishment has 2 employees and pays 27,439 euros per worker. Certain
firms have the same occupation in different locations, which we denote as multilocation occupa-
tions. The micro evidence in the next Section focuses on multilocation firm-occupations.13 Panels
(a) and (b) of Table 13 have the summary statistics of occupations belonging to monolocation and
multilocation firms. Occupations in firms with establishments at multiple locations have larger
average number of employees of 27 versus 7 average employees for firms with establishments at a
single location. In both groups, the distribution of employment is concentrated in few large em-
ployers, as both medians are smaller than the means. Firms with multilocation occupations pay
wages per capita that are 15% higher than the monolocation ones.
Manufacturing firms belong to 97 3-digit industries or sub-industries that are present in 364
different commuting zones. We denote the 3-digit industries as h and the commuting zones as n.
Table 14 contains summary statistics of sub-industries for the year 2007, which is the year we use
13The multilocation definition is occupation specific. A firm can have both monolocation and multilocation occupations.
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Table 14 – Sub-industry Summary Statistics.
Variable Mean Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) St. Dev.
Nh 2,840 493 1,261 2,639 4,530.5
Lh 30,466 7,559 15,070 50,036 33,899.3
wh 34.6 29.6 33.0 37.531 6.9
LSh 0.52 0.48 0.53 0.58 0.10
KSh 0.26 0.17 0.23 0.32 0.13
Notes: There are 97 3-digit industries, or sub-industries, in the sample. Nh is the
number of establishments per 3-digit industry h, Lh is total employment of h, wh is
the average establishment wage of h, LSh is the labor share and KSh is the capital
share. We get the capital shares following Barkai (2016). All the nominal variables
are in thousands of constant 2015 euros.
for our counterfactuals. The average 3-digit industry labor share is 52% and the share of capital is
26%.14 Taking those averages, the profit share would be around 22%. We see that variation across
sub-industries in size and labor productivity is important but more limited in average wage per
establishment wh. Number of establishments Nh and total employment Lh are about 5 times higher
passing from the first to the third quartile (from percentile 25 to 75), average wage increases by
27%.
We define a local labor market based on location, industry and occupation combinations. The
choice is guided by the observed transition rates in the data where, conditional on changing one
of the dimensions, occupational transitions are the most common followed by changes in industry.
Table 29 in Appendix 2.F.1 shows the transition rates along the location, industry and occupation
dimensions. Following those transition rates, the local labor market, denoted by m, is a combination
of commuting zone n, 3-digit industry h and occupation o. We take the standard approach of
defining local labor markets as rigid entities and abstract from flexible labor markets as in Nimczik
(2017) for Austria, or how easy is to change to similar occupations, as considered by Macaluso
(2017) and Schubert et al. (2020) using rich mobility data coming from resumes in the U.S.
Table 15 presents summary statistics for local markets in 2007. The median local market is
small and has only 2 establishments and 10 employees. This is a consequence of the handful
of manufacturing firms that are present in the countryside demanding certain occupations. One
example of a local labor market are the blue collar workers working in the food industry in Lourdes,
close to the Pyrenees. The median local labor market is concentrated with a Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI henceforth) of 0.68.15 The HHI is very similar (0.69) if we consider wage bill shares sw
io|m
instead of employment shares sio|m. High median local labor market concentrations do not imply
that most of the workers are in highly concentrated environments but rather that there are few local
labor markets with low concentration levels and high employment. Further summary statistics on
establishment and firm level are in Appendix 2.F.1.
14We follow Barkai (2016) to compute the capital share.
15The Herfindahl of local labor market m ranges from the inverse of the number of competitors (1/Nm) if all the establishments have
the same shares to 1. A local labor market can have a HHI of almost one if one establishment has virtually all the employment.
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Table 15 – Local Labor Market Summary Statistics. Baseline Year
Variable Mean Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) St. Dev.
Nm 4.76 1 2 4 14.4
Lm 51.0 2.8 9.4 34.9 196.2
wm 36.6 24.3 30.2 42.5 36.1
ŵm 36.2 24.1 30.0 42.2 25.6
HHI(sio|m) 0.67 0.38 0.68 1.00 0.32
HHI(sw
io|m) 0.68 0.39 0.70 1.00 0.32
Notes: There are 57,940 local labor markets in the year 2007. Nm is the number of
competitors in the local labor market m, Lm is total employment in m, wm is the mean
wiot of the establishment-occupations in m, ŵm is the weighted average wage at m
with weights equal to employment shares, HHI(sio|m) and HHI(swio|m) are respectively
the Herfindahls with employment and wage shares. All the nominal variables are in
thousands of constant 2015 euros.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
This section provides suggestive evidence of employer labor market power in France and presents
the French institutional setting. We start by documenting some stylized facts on labor market
concentration and the labor share at the industry level. Those are complemented with establishment
level estimates that explore the link between wages and concentration. We later present evidence
on the institutional framework of French labor market and the importance of wage bargaining.
2.3.1 Labor Market Concentration and the Labor Share
We start by establishing the relationship between aggregate concentration measures and the labor
share. A standard measure of concentration is the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI). From our
definition of local labor market m, the HHI of market m at time t, HHImt, is the sum of the squared
employment shares of the plants present in m at a given year. Labor share at the 3-digit industry
level, LSht, is the ratio of the wage bill over value added at time t. Due to data restrictions of observ-
ing value added only at the firm level, we cannot compute labor shares at the local labor market
level. We therefore build a sub-industry concentration index HHIht by taking the employment
weighted mean of HHImt across different local labor markets.16
We run the following linear regression:
log(LSh,t) = δb,t + β log(HHIh,t) + εh,t. (2.1)
Table 16 presents the results. In general, the results indicate that more concentrated sub-
16The HHI index at market m and year t is: HHImt = ∑i∈Im s
2
io|m where shares at the market are accounted as shares of full time








where |Mh| is the number of local labor markets that belong to h, Lm is the local labor market employment and Lh is the 3-digit industry
employment.
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Table 16 – Concentration and Labor Share
Dependent variable: log(LSh,t)
(1) (2) (3)
log(HHIh,t) −0.064∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Industry FE N Y N
Industry-year FE N N Y
Observations 1357 1357 1357
R2 0.017 0.290 0.343
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.280 0.170
Notes: This table presents estimates of equation (2.1). Column (1) presents the es-
timate without any fixed effect. column (2) shows the exercise with industry fixed
effects and column (3) has industry-year fixed effects. The dependent variable is the
logarithm of 3-digit industry h labor share log(LSh,t) at time t. log(HHIh,t) is the
logarithm of the employment weighted average of the local labor market Herfindahl
Index. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
industries have a lower labor share. Industry fixed effects capture differences across industries
in the usage of capital. The focus of the paper being the cross sectional allocation of resources we
also take industry-year fixed effects to only use cross sectional variation. Column (3) shows that the
negative relation between employment concentration and the labor share is robust to controlling
for industry and industry-year fixed effects.
This regression gives a sense of the importance of the labor wedge heterogeneity to generate out-
put and labor share losses. At face value, the estimate with industry fixed effects (column (2)) imply
a reduction of 1 percentage point of the labor share when passing from the first to the third quartile
of concentration (quartiles of HHI(sio|m) in Table 15). Estimates in column (3) with industry-year
fixed effects are very similar. The low estimated effects imply that wages, and therefore the labor
share, are not very responsive to differentiated levels of concentration. Nevertheless, one cannot
interpret that they rule out employer labor market power because in a setting where all the firms
acted as pure monopsonists facing an equal labor supply elasticity, wages (and the labor share)
would be insensitive to concentration as all establishments would have the same markdown.
The small estimated coefficient is most likely a result of two effects: the averaging across dif-
ferent local labor markets and level effects. The regression does not take into account the effect of
concentration on the average level of the labor share as this is absorbed by the fixed effects.
2.3.2 Labor Market Concentration and Wages
This section explores the relationship between employer labor market power and wages at the
establishment level. The challenge is finding a source of exogenous variation in our proxy of local
labor market power, the employment share sio|m, that will allow to estimate the effect of employer
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market power on wages or labor shares. Given our restriction of not observing value added at the
plant level, we focus on wages. In what follows, we focus on multi-location occupations where the
effects are estimated using residual variation across local labor markets within a firm-occupation-
year.17
The baseline specification is:
log(wio,t) = β sio|m,t + ψJ(i),o,t + δN(i),t + εio,t , (2.2)
where log(wio,t) is the log average wage at plant i of firm j and occupation o at sub-market m in year
t, sio|m,t is the employment share of the plant out of the market m, ψJ(i),o,t is a firm-occupation-year
fixed effect, δN(i),t is a commuting zone-year fixed effect and εio,t is an error term. Our parameter
of interest is β.
The specification controls for industry labor demand shocks with firm-occupation-year fixed
effects ψJ(i),o,t. These include, for example, trade shocks either to manufacturing as a whole or for
a particular industry. Shocks to occupation labor demand at the aggregate or firm level are also
captured by the fixed effects ψJ(i),o,t. Lastly, the commuting zone times year fixed effects δN(i),t
control for permanent differences across locations and also for potential geographical spillovers of
mass layoff shocks as stressed by Gathmann et al. (2017).
Establishment i’s and occupation o’s employment share, sio|m,t, is very likely to be endogenous to
the wages themselves. On the one hand, everything else equal, higher wages attract more workers
and therefore increase the employment share. On the other hand, if there is labor market power
on the employer side, we expect two establishments with the same fundamentals to pay differently
depending on their local labor market power. That is, everything else equal, we expect the plant
with higher employment share to pay relatively less than the one at a more competitive local labor
market. Given these endogeneity issues, we propose two different instruments for the employment
share. First, we instrument for the employment share by using lagged measures of concentration
and second, we use a quasi experimental variation of the employment shares coming from mass
layoff shocks to competitors.
Lagged Concentration Measures
We start by instrumenting the employment share by lagged concentration measures. More specifi-
cally, we instrument the employment share sio|m,t by the lagged inverse of the number of competitors
at the local labor market 1/Nm,t−1. Lagged concentration measures exclude potential endogeneity
of the market structure to current period shocks. The correlation between employment shares and
lagged concentration measures is 0.77.
Table 17 shows the results. The first two columns recover estimates of the specification (2.2)
with commuting zone (CZ) fixed effects and the last two columns with commuting zone-year fixed
effects. Columns (1) and (3) present the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates. This econometric
model reflects both labor demand and supply therefore a direct OLS estimation of (2.2) is problem-
atic and expected to be biased towards zero. We indeed find that both OLS estimates are very close
17Recall that a multi-location occupation of a firm is an occupation that is present in several establishments across the geography.
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Table 17 – Wage Regression. Multi-location firms
Dependent variable: log(wio,t)
OLS IV OLS IV
sio|m,t 0.010∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Firm-Occ-Year FE Y Y Y Y
CZ FE Y Y N N
CZ-Year FE N N Y Y
Observations 792,656 733,576 792,656 733,576
R2 0.833 0.861 0.853 0.862
Adjusted R2 0.763 0.802 0.790 0.802
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) present estimates with commuting zone (CZ) fixed effects for the
ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variable (IV) exercises. The instruments in this
table are lagged concentration measures
1
Nm,t−1
. Columns (3) and (4) present the analogous
with commuting zone-year fixed effects. The dependent variable log(wio,t) is the logarithm of
establishment-occupation wage at time t. sio|m,t is the establishment-occupation employment
share at time t. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
to zero and positive. Columns (2) and (4) present the results once we instrument for the employ-
ment share. Both specifications (with CZ and CZ-year fixed effects) give the same point estimates.
These estimates imply that an increase of one percentage point (p.p. henceforth) of the local labor
market share is associated with a decrease of 0.03% of the plant wage. This implies that the same
establishment passing from the first to the third quartile of the employment share distribution re-
duce 0.68% the wages. This elasticity translates into a reduction of roughly 190 euros of the median
yearly establishment-occupation wage.
Labor Shock to Competitors
We propose a second reduced form estimation to provide further evidence on the link between
labor market concentration and wages. We now instrument the employment shares by using quasi-
experimental variation coming from mass layoffs to competitors. The instrument is built by the
presence of a firm having a national mass layoff in the same local labor market as non affected estab-
lishments. We expect that a national level shock to a competitor is exogenous to the residual within
firm-occupation variation across local labor markets that identifies the effect. The main specifica-
tion is an instrumental variable regression where we compare establishment-occupations of firms
that had exogenous increases in concentration due to the competitors’ shock against establishment-
occupations that were not exposed to the competitors’ shock. Here we provide some detail of the
construction of the instruments that is complemented in Appendix 2.G.
We first need to identify the firms suffering a mass layoff. We classify a firm-occupation as
having a mass layoff if the establishment-occupation employment at t is less than a threshold κ% of
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Figure 17 – Impact of Employment Share on Wages
Notes: This figure presents the point estimates and 95% confidence bands of the OLS and IV exercises on the y-axis. The x-axis presents different thresholds
κ that define a mass layoff shock. The instrument is the presence of a mass layoff shock firm in the local labor market. We focus on non-affected competitors
(not suffering a mass layoff shock). The specification is as (2.2) with commuting zone fixed effects. Results with commuting zone-year fixed effects are in
Section 2.3.3.
the employment last year for all the firm establishments. Ideally we would like to identify firms that
went bankrupt (κ = 0). Unfortunately, we cannot externally identify if a firm disappears because
it went bankrupt or changes firm identifiers keeping the number of competitors at the local market
constant. Our instrument is a proxy to capture the impact of a firm’s large employment shock into
the competitors.18 We restrict the sample to non affected firm-occupations with establishments in
local labor markets with and without a competitor suffering a mass layoff.
The choice of κ leads to a trade-off as a lower threshold leads to considering stronger negative
shocks and the generated instrument will be cleaner, but it reduces the number of events considered.
This creates a bias-variance trade-off in the selection of the threshold. Lacking a clear candidate for
κ, we try different cut-off values.19
Results with commuting zone fixed effects are in Figure 17. OLS estimates of β from (2.2) are
in blue slightly above zero and IV estimates are in red.20 Both are plotted with 95% confidence
intervals.21 The employment share being endogenous, the OLS estimates are biased towards zero
and are in line with the column (3) of Table 17. The Figure shows clearly the trade-off in the
selection of the cutoff κ. The lower the threshold, the stronger the impact but higher the variance of
the estimated effect. We estimate an elasticity of 0.17 with κ = 20% (a loss of 80% of employment).
A one p.p. increase in the employment share causes a 0.17% decrease of the establishment wage.
This translates into a wage loss of roughly 1000 euros when passing from the first to the third
quartile of employment shares.22 For the more standard threshold of κ = 70% (reduction of 30%
18See Appendix 2.G for a graphical illustration of the identification.
19A standard value in the literature is κ =70% (e.g. Hellerstein et al., 2019; Dodini et al., 2020). That is a 30% loss of employment.
20We are restricting to firm-occupations classified as not having a mass layoff. The regression sample therefore changes depending on
κ which is why the OLS estimates change slightly with κ.
21Details of the point estimates and confidence bands are in Appendix 2.G.
22This computation is done taking the employment share differences between the percentile 75 and 25 from Table 13 for the median
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employment) the elasticity is almost divided by 4 to 0.06 which implies a twice as big reduction
as with lagged concentration measures in Table 17. As we increase the threshold the estimated
coefficient converges to the OLS estimate and the variance is reduced.
2.3.3 Robustness Checks
We perform several robustness checks by changing the instrument, the fixed effects and the defini-
tion of local labor market. Results are qualitatively unchanged.
Instrument. Panel (a) of Figure 25 in Appendix 2.G.2 shows a robustness check where the new
instrument is not binary anymore and takes into account the original employment share of the mass
layoff establishments. Panel (b) of the same Figure shows the results from the specification with
commuting zone times year fixed effects. Results are qualitatively unchanged from the baseline in
both cases.
Local Labor Market. Figure 26 in Appendix 2.G.2 does the same exercise as in the main empirical
strategy but changing the definition of local labor market. Local labor markets are here defined
with 2-digit industries instead of 3-digit industries as in the baseline specification.23
The empirical evidence up to now focused on establishing the presence of employer labor market
power of French manufacturing firms. We found that more concentrated industries have lower labor
shares and firms pay lower wages in local labor markets where they have relatively higher labor
market power. The last part of the empirical evidence aims to motivate the importance of unions
in France.
2.3.4 Unions
The institutional framework of the French labor market is characterized by legal requirements that
give unions an important role even in medium sized firms. French labor market is known to be one
where unions are relevant players, despite the fact that trade union affiliation in France is among
the lowest of all the OECD countries.24 According to administrative data, the unionization rate in
France was 9% in 2014 which is slightly below to the one in the U.S. (10.7%) and well below the
ones in Germany (17.7%) or Norway (49.7%).25
Low affiliation rates do not translate into low collective bargaining coverage for the French case.
Collective bargaining agreements extend almost automatically to all the workers, unionized or not.
That is, if an agreement is reached in a particular sector, all the workers within the sector are
covered. Table 18 presents the unionization and collective bargaining coverage rates for several
countries. This institutional framework implies that coverage of collective agreements was in 2014
as high as 98.5% in France despite the low union affiliation rates.26 This is in stark contrast to the
wage. The analogous computation with the average wage gives a wage reduction of roughly 1300 euros.
23That is, a local labor market is defined as a combination between commuting zone, 2-digit industry and occupation.
24Article in The Economist ’Why French unions are so strong’ The Economist.
25Source OECD data https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TUD. Unionization rate is also denoted as union density.
26The source of collective bargaining agreements is the OECD as for unionization rates.
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Table 18 – Union Density and Collective Bargaining Coverage
Country Union Density Coverage Country Union Density Coverage
Western Europe Southern Europe
Austria 27.7 98.0 Italy 36.4 80.0
France 9.0 98.5 Spain 16.8 80.2
Germany 17.7 57.8 Americas
Netherlands 18.1 85.9 Canada 29.3 30.4
Switzerland 16.1 49.2 Chile 15.3 19.3
Northern Europe United States 10.7 12.3
Finland 67.6 89.3 Asia & Oceania
Ireland 26.3 33.5 Australia 15.1 59.9
Norway 49.7 67.0 Japan 17.5 16.9
United Kingdom 25.0 27.5 Korea 10.0 11.9
Turkey 6.9 6.6
Notes: Year 2014. All the variables are in percents. Union Density is the unionization rate which is unionized workers
relative to total employment. Coverage is the collective agreement coverage; the ratio of employees covered by collective
agreements divided by all wage earners with the right to bargain. The data comes from the OECD and the sources are
administrative data except for Australia, Ireland and United States which are based on survey data. The regions are
defined according to the United Nations M49 area codes.
U.S. collective bargaining agreements that only apply to union members and therefore coverage is
very similar to the unionization rate.
Collective bargaining can happen at different levels. Firms and unions can negotiate at some
aggregate level (e.g. industry, occupation, region) and also at economic units such as the group,
firm or plant.27 When wage bargaining happens at the firm level it affects all the workers. Most
firms that explicitly bargaining over the wages do so at the firm level (rather than at the plant or
occupation level). 92% of mono-establishment firms with a specific collective bargaining agreement
in 2010, negotiated it at the firm level. Only 9% of the multi-establishment firms with specific
agreements negotiated exclusively at the establishment level.28
Legal requirements regarding union representation depend on firm or plant size. The first re-
quirements start when the establishment reaches 10 employees and there is an important tightening
of duties when reaching the threshold of 50 employees.29 As a consequence, firm level wage bar-
gaining is common even at relatively small establishments. 52% (51%) of establishments with at
least 20 employees bargained over the wages in 2010 (in 2004) (See Table 1 of Naouas and Romans,
2014).30
Theoretically, workers organize into unions to extract rents from the firm through bargaining.
Bargaining can happen at different levels in France and here we want to inform the modeling
decisions in the next section by quantifying bargaining differences depending on industries or
occupations. We build a proxy of rents at the firm level and then compare how the correlation of
wages with rents is differentiated depending on the industries and occupations. In particular we
27Several collective agreements can coexist at a given establishment.
28Source DARES.
29The Appendix of Caliendo et al. (2015) provide a comprehensive summary of size related legal requirements in France.
30The prevalence of wage bargaining was 44% for establishments with 11 employees or more.
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compute rents at the firm level yJ(i),t by computing value added minus capital expenditures per
worker. The reduced form model is the following:
ln wio,t = γk ln yJ(i),t + εio,t,
where γk is the elasticity of wages with respect to rents and k denotes either 2-digit industry b or
occupation o, yJ(i),t is the proxy of rents at the firm level and εio,t is the error term.
Results in Appendix 2.H.1 find that the elasticities at the industry level range from 0.14 for
Metallurgy to 0.4 for Food. On the contrary, when running the same regressions per occupation the
elasticities range from 0.27 for Supervisor to 0.38 for Top management. Given the higher dispersion
of the elasticities at the industry level, we will assume differentiated bargaining powers depending
on the industry later on in the model.
The prevalence of wage bargaining in the French labor market suggests it is an important ele-
ment to incorporate into the structural model. Having established the existence of employer labor
market power and the importance of unions, next section lays out a model in line with the stylized
facts and the French labor market institutions.
2.4 Model
The economy consists of discrete sets of establishments I = {1, ..., I}, locations N = {1, ..., N} and
industries B = {1, ..., B}. Each establishment can have several occupations o ∈ O = {1, ..., O}.
Each establishment i is located in a specific location n and belongs to sub-industry h in a particular
industry b. We define a local labor market m as the combination between location n, 3-digit industry
h and occupation o, i.e. m = n× h× o.
We denote the set of establishments that are in local labor market as Im with cardinality Nm.
We define the set of all local labor markets m as M and the set of all sub-markets in industry b
(in sub-industry h) as Mb (Mh). The distribution of establishments across local labor markets is
determined exogenously. Every establishment can only belong to one location and one sub-sector
but can have several occupations and therefore belong to different local labor markets. We define
the set of sub-markets that have at least one establishment of sector b as Nb.
The economy is populated by an exogenous measure L of workers who are homogeneous in abil-
ity but heterogeneous in tastes for different workplaces. They decide their workplace (establishment-
occupation) in two steps without any restriction on mobility. First, workers choose in which local
labor market m they would like to be employed, and second, they choose in which establishment i
of that sub-market they will work. Workers do not save so they do not own any capital.
Capital and output markets are competitive. Establishments are owned by absent entrepreneurs
who rent the capital and collect the profits. We assume the economy is a small open economy
and capital is specific for each industry. Thus, the industry specific rental rates of capital Rb are
exogenous.31
31As it is a small open economy, it is not important whether the entrepreneurs own capital or not.
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Firms and workers bargain over the wages at the establishment-occupation io level. The equilib-
rium bargained wage is the solution to a reduced form Nash bargaining problem. We assume that
establishments and unions are symmetric. Both have zero threat points and internalize how the
marginal cost changes when moving along the labor supply curve. Null outside options for work-
ers are not common in the literature but the assumption is in line with new evidence of insensitivity
of wages to the value of nonemployment (Jäger et al., 2020).32
Having a discrete set of establishments per local labor market means that when bargaining, both
parties internalize the effect of their wages on the labor supply of their most immediate competitors.
This reflects the idea that competition for labor is mostly local. Geography in our model is only
important to define local labor markets.
In the following we first set up the production side of the economy and workers’ labor supply
decisions. Second we present equilibrium wages in the oligopsonistic competition case (in the
absence of bargaining) and finally we incorporate bargaining to the model.
Production
The final good Y is produced by a representative firm with an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production






where θb is the elasticity of the intermediate good produced by firms in sector b and ∑b θb = 1. Profit
maximization implies that the representative firm spends a fixed proportion θb on the industry
composite Yb:
PbYb = θbPY. (2.4)
The final good price, which we choose as the numeraire, is equal to:







Firms produce in a perfectly competitive goods market. Pb is the price of the homogeneous good
produced by every firm in sector b, Yb is their production and P is the price of the final good. Yb is




where Ib is the set of establishments that belong to industry b. The establishment production func-
tion yi is an aggregate of occupation productions. Establishment i produces using occupation o
specific inputs, labor Lio and capital Kio, with a decreasing returns to scale technology. Output elas-
ticity with respect to labor βb and capital αb are industry specific and establishment-occupations
are heterogeneous in their total factor productivity. We assume that occupations are perfect sub-
stitutes and their output is aggregated linearly. That is, total establishment output yi is the sum of
32We show in Appendix 2.A.4 that the same equilibrium wages arise with a different bargaining protocol where employer labor market
power is incorporated through workers’ outside options.
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occupation specific outputs yio. Decreasing returns to scale in the occupation output yio generate
an incentive to produce using several occupations.














The choice of this particular production function is motivated by tractability and empirical reasons.
The linearity of the aggregation within establishments allows for the separability of different local
labor markets.33 The second reason is data motivated. The absence of a particular occupation in
an establishment can be rationalized by having null productivity in that particular occupation. An
alternative specification where labor is a Cobb-Douglas composite of occupations is at odds with
the pervasive prevalence of missing at least one occupation category. The median establishments
lacks at least one occupation. Lacking a particular occupation, those establishments would not be
able to produce if labor is a Cobb-Douglas composite of occupations, unless we were to assume
establishment-specific output elasticities. Appendix 2.I lays out the model and proofs with a Cobb-
Douglas production function.
The separability of local labor markets also requires restricting the inverse elasticity of labor
demand to be equal across different industries. We assume that output elasticities with respect to
capital αb and labor βb are such that:
βb
1−αb = 1− δ, where δ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant across sectors. This
specification nests constant returns to scale when δ = 0. As long as 0 < δ < 1 the establishment
faces decreasing returns to scale within occupations. This assumption together with the linearity of
the production function give us separability of the local labor markets. This is further discussed in
Section 2.4.4.















Aio is a transformed productivity of io that incorporates elements coming from the optimal demand
of capital and Fb is a transformed industry b price.34 Details of these derivations are in Appendix
2.A. From now on we work with the production function after substituting out the capital.
Labor Supply
We now present worker preferences that give rise to upward sloping establishment-occupation
specific inverse labor supplies. A worker k derives utility by consuming the final good ck and by
the product of two idiosyncratic utility shocks: one establishment-occupation specific preference
shifter zkio and another one common for all establishments in local labor market m, ukm. The utility
of a worker k working for establishment i at occupation o in local labor market m is:
Ukio = ckzkioukm. (2.8)




b , χb = (1− αb)(1 + εbδ) is the transformed industry price.
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Following Eaton and Kortum (2002) in the trade literature and Redding (2016) and Ahlfeldt et al.
(2015) in urban economics literature we assume that the idiosyncratic utility shocks are drawn from
two independent Fréchet distributions:
P(z) = e−Tioz
−εb , Tio > 0, εb > 1 (2.9)
P(u) = e−u
−η
, η > 1, (2.10)
where the parameter Tio determines the average utility derived from working in establishment i
and occupation o. In contrast, we normalize these parameter to one for the sub-market specific
shock u. The shape parameters εb and η control the dispersion of the idiosyncratic utility. They
are inversely related to the variance of the taste shocks. We name the parameters εb and η as the
within and across labor market elasticities of labor supply. If both have high values workers have
similar tastes for different local labor markets and establishment-occupations. This in turn implies
that their labor supply is more elastic and will react more to changes in wages.
The labor supply elasticities in this framework are different from the Frisch elasticity studied
by public economists. Our baseline model features a constant level of aggregate employment and
workers do not decide the amount of hours to work but rather the workplace to which they want to
supply their labor. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is zero in our baseline environment but yet
workers do not supply their labor inelastically to any establishment.
We assume that establishments cannot discriminate workers based on their taste shocks. This
implies that establishment i for occupation o pays the same wage wio to all its employees, leaving
the marginal worker indifferent between working in io or moving. Small wage reductions induce
the movement of the marginal worker but infra-marginal workers stay.35
The only source of worker income are wages, therefore the indirect utility of worker k is:
Ukio = wiozkioukm, (2.11)
where the last two elements are the taste shocks. A worker chooses where to work in two steps:
first, they choose their local labor market after observing local labor market shocks ukm. After
picking a local labor market, the worker then observes the establishment idiosyncratic shocks and
chooses the establishment that maximizes expected utility. Following the usual derivations as in
Eaton and Kortum (2002), the probability of a worker choosing establishment i and occupation o
is a product of two terms: the employment share of the establishment-occupation within the local
labor market sio|m and the employment share of the local labor market itself sm. We develop the



















where Φm = ∑j∈Im Tjw
εb





b . Γb is just an industry-specific constant. In equilibrium, the first fraction is
equal to sio|m and the second term in (2.12) is sm.
35One can view these taste shocks as mobility costs in a static model that could be present when changing jobs across the geography,
industry and occupations.
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Integrating over the continuous measure of workers L, the labor supply Lio for establishment












L = ΠioL. (2.13)
The inverse of this labor supply is upward sloping as long as the within and across local labor
market elasticities are finite. In the limit where both tend to infinity, workers are indifferent across
workplaces and the inverse labor supply becomes flat.
2.4.1 Absence of Bargaining
To ease the exposition of our baseline model, in this section we characterize equilibrium wages in
the absence of bargaining. Given the labor supply curves with finite elasticities, establishments post
wages taking into account the (inverse) labor supply curves (2.13) they face. This monopsony power
translates into a markdown between the wages and the marginal revenue products of labor. When
the establishments solve their wage posting problem, they look at probability Πio and take into
account the effect of wages on the establishment-occupation term Tiow
εb
io and also on the local labor
market aggregate Φm. However, they take as given economy wide aggregates (Φ and L).36 The finite
set of establishments per local labor market generates strategic interaction among the competitors.
The strategic interaction within a local labor market induces oligopsonistic competition that features
a heterogeneous markdown.











where eio = εb (1− sio|m) + η sio|m is the perceived labor supply elasticity. This expression is sim-
ilar to Card et al. (2018) with the difference that we have variable perceived elasticities that arise
from the strategic interaction between establishments. The fraction eioeio+1 in equation (2.14) is the
markdown and it is defined as:
µ(sio|m) =
εb (1− sio|m) + η sio|m
εb (1− sio|m) + η sio|m + 1
. (2.15)
In the absence of bargaining, the wedge between the marginal revenue product of labor and the
wages boils down to a markdown (2.15).37 We denote this object in short notation as µio.
As long as workers have less elastic labor supplies across local labor markets than across es-
tablishments within a given local labor market (i.e. as long as η < εb), the markdown (2.15) is a
decreasing function of the employment share sio|m. Once an establishment is big with respect to the
nearby competitors, it internalizes that it is facing a more inelastic labor supply of workers willing
to stay and applies a markdown further away from 1. In the limit where εb and η tend to infin-
ity, establishments face an infinitely elastic labor supply and the labor market would be perfectly
competitive with a markdown µ(sio|m) = 1.
36Similar to Atkeson and Burstein (2008), this type of behavior could be rationalized either by assuming a myopic behavior of the
establishment or by having a continuous of local labor markets.
37Appendix 2.A derives this expression.
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Heterogeneous markdowns distort relative wages across establishment-occupations and there-
fore the labor allocations. By distorting the labor allocation across the production units, the hetero-
geneous markdown generates misallocation of resources and potentially reduces aggregate output
even at the case where total employment is fixed. We formalize the source of misallocation in
Section 2.4.4.38
When the markdown is constant and total labor supply fixed, labor market power does not have
efficiency consequences as it only affects the division of output into the labor share and the profit
share. This is not longer true if we were to allow an endogenous leisure or labor force participation
decision. Counterfactually increasing wages would increase total labor supply L and therefore total
output.39
2.4.2 Bargaining
We now introduce the bargaining between employers and unions.40 We assume that bargaining
happens at the establishment-occupation level and involves only wages rather than indirect utilities
because workers do not know each others’ taste shocks. Given the perfect substitutability of occu-
pations in the production function, bargaining at the occupation level is equivalent to a situation
where bargaining happens at the establishment level but there are different wage agreements per
occupation.
We assume that workers and establishments are symmetric in the bargaining protocol: first, both
parties enter the bargaining with a null outside option and, second, internalize how they generate
rents as they move along the labor supple curve. The former implies that if bargaining were to
fail, workers could not earn any income and establishments could not produce. The zero outside
option for the workers is in line with recent evidence of lack of response of wages to changes in
unemployment benefits (Jäger et al., 2020). The second assumption, where unions also internalize
how the marginal cost changes when introducing an additional worker, is behind the idea that
unions will be bargaining to extract part of the generated rents.
The bargained equilibrium wage is the solution to a reduced form Nash bargaining where the
union’s bargaining power is ϕb and the one of the establishment is 1− ϕb. Appendix 2.A.4 gives
more detail on the bargaining set up and discusses other situations that lead to the same negotiated
equilibrium wages.
The equilibrium bargained wage is:
wio =
[












The wedge between equilibrium wages and the marginal revenue product of labor, λ(µio, ϕb) ≡ (1−
ϕb)µio + ϕb
1
1−δ , is a combination of two parts. First, the markdown µio that would be present under
38Appendix 2.H provides an illustration of the distributional and efficiency consequences.
39The constant µ = ηη+1 drives down the wages. If labor supply is endogenous, workers’ decision between consumption c and leisure
l would be distorted. Denote by w the wage under monopsonistic competition and by w̃ the wage under competitive labor market.
Worker’s maximization under endogenous labor supply leads the marginal rate of substitution to be equal to the wage rate. w < w̃ and
therefore MRSc,l ≡ UlUc = w < w̃. Meaning that workers would supply less labor than in the perfectly competitive case.
40We use interchangeably workers or unions.
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oligopsonistic competition in the absence of bargaining, and second, the markup 11−δ coming from
the bargaining process. The markup is a consequence of the ability of the union to extract quasi-
rents coming from the decreasing returns to scale when δ > 0 we have that 11−δ > 1. Bargained
wages will be above or below the marginal revenue product depending on the union’s bargaining
power ϕb and the relative strength of markdowns and markups. This comes from the fact that the
term inside brackets is a convex combination between µio < 1 and 11−δ > 1.
If the within local labor market elasticity εb < η, then the labor supply elasticity eio is decreasing
in the local labor market employment share. Hence, even if unions bargain over the wages, one
would observe a negative relationship between employment shares sio|m and wages wio as long as
they don’t extract all the quasi-rents i.e. as long as ϕb < 1. A desirable feature of the model is that it
nests the oligopsonistic competition only and bargaining only models as special cases. The former
is equivalent to the limit where the union’s bargaining power is zero ϕb = 0. Equilibrium wages
would be equal to a markdown times the marginal revenue product of labor wMP = µio ×MRPL.
A bargaining model without employer labor market power is encompassed when we take the
alternative bargaining from Appendix 2.A.4 and worker’s outside option is the competitive wage.
The wedge in that case is equal to: 1− ϕb + ϕb 11−δ = 1 + ϕb δ1−δ . The bargained wages incorporate




For given industry rental rates of capital {Rb}Bb=1, the general equilibrium of this economy is a set
of wages {wio}IOio=1, output prices {Pb}Bb=1, a measure of labor supplies to every establishment and
occupation {Lio}IOio=1, capital {Kio}IOio=1 and output {yio}IOio=1, industry {Yb}Bb=1 and economy wide
output Y, such that equations (2.3)-(2.13) and (2.16) are satisfied ∀ io ∈ Im, m ∈ M and b ∈ B.
2.4.4 Characterization of the Equilibrium
Solving the model amounts to finding establishment wages, industry prices and allocations. In
order to simplify the solution, we restrict the labor demand elasticity to be the same across in-
dustries. That is, we assume βb1−αb = 1 − δ, where δ ∈ [0, 1]. This restriction together with the
assumption on the production function implies the separability of the different local labor markets
which allows us to split the solution in two. First, we take a partial equilibrium approach and solve
for establishment-occupation components normalizing aggregates above the local labor market and
show existence and uniqueness of the system of normalized wages. Second, we show that the
model can be rewritten at the industry b level with the solution to these normalized wages and
deep parameters. This last aggregate model is in turn enough to solve for industry prices.





















where νb ≡ δ1+εbδ is an auxiliary parameter to ease notation.
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To gain intuition on the allocation distortions from the heterogeneous wedges we focus on two

















The ratio of heterogeneous labor wedges λ(µio ,ϕb)
λ(µjo ,ϕb)
distorts the relative wages of the establishments
at the same local labor market and consequently the inverse labor supply (2.13). It is important
to note that even in the absence of the labor wedge, in equilibrium, establishments pay different
wages. This is a consequence of the workers’ idiosyncratic taste shocks. In the limit where workers
are infinitely elastic across establishments within the local labor market εb → ∞, wages would
be equalized. The same logic applies for differences across local labor markets and the respective
elasticity η.






Fb); and second, an establishment-occupation specific component. We denote






















We can now establish existence and uniqueness of the system of equations (2.17) in partial
equilibrium:
Proposition 8. For given parameters {αb, βb, ϕb s.t. 0 ≤ αb, βb, ϕb < 1, ∀ b ∈ B} and 1 < η <
εb ∀ b ∈ B, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, transformed price Fb, constants {Φm}, Φ, total labor supply L and non-negative
vectors of productivities {Aio}io∈m and amenities {Tio}io∈m, there exists a unique vector of wages {wio}io∈Im
for every local labor market m that solves the system formed by (2.17).
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 8 tells us that if we take the aggregate terms as constants, then the solution for the
system (2.17) exists and is unique. Employment shares sio|m are not affected if all local labor market
wages are scaled up or down. This is a result of the wedges λ(µio, ϕb) being homogeneous of
degree zero with respect to local labor market constants. The system (2.19) has a unique solution
as we can use Proposition 8 with Φm = Φ = L = Fb = 1.
We now turn to the second step of the equilibrium characterization. Given the solutions to
the establishment-occupation components we build industry level labor supplies and productivity
measures. We can then write the model at the industry b level.




where Φb(wb) = ∑m∈Mb Φm(wm)
η/εb . wb and wm are, respectively, vectors of wages for industry
b and local labor market m. Then, Phib is just a function aggregating wages at the industry b level.
At this stage we do not know the wages for industry b wb, but rather the normalized wages w̃b (see
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. Thus, the industry b





















where Φ̃b = Φb(w̃b) and F = {Fb}b∈B is a vector of transformed prices. So given the solution for all
the normalized wages, the industry labor supplies Lb are just a function of the transformed prices
F.












where Ab is an employment weighted productivity and Fb is the transformed industry price. Solv-
ing the model now amounts to solving the system of intermediate good demand (2.4) to find














Steps to get to this expression are in Appendix 2.A.5. Having the solution for normalized wages we
can leave the industry labor supply Lb and total output Y as a function of the transformed prices
F = {Fb}b∈B .
Collecting all these expressions for the different industries forms a system of B equations with
B unknowns.41 By solving for the vector of transformed prices F we can back out the rest of the
variables in the model. Note that the system of equations is unchanged irrespective of the aggregate
level of employment L because the final good production function being constant returns to scale
and industry employment Lb is linear on aggregate labor supply.42
Given the solution for normalized wages, we can think of industry productivity Ab and the
aggregator for normalized wages Φ̃b as additional parameters at the industry level. The following
proposition characterizes the solution for this system as a function of these parameters.
Proposition 9. For any set of parameters {βb, θb s.t. 0 ≤ βb, θb < 1, ∀ b ∈ B}, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, {ψb ≡
1+εbδ
1+ηδ }b∈B , non-negative vectors {Ab}b∈B and {Φ̃b}b∈B , there exists a unique vector of transformed prices























∑b′∈B θb′ (1−αb′ )(1+ηδ)
for all b ∈ B.
Proof. See Appendix.
41Recall that B is the number of different 2-digit industries.
42This will be useful in the extension with endogenous labor force participation in Section 2.7.
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Proposition 9 provides an analytical solution for the transformed industry prices. Given the
aggregations of the establishment-occupation components up to the industry level, the solution of
the prices is unique and is characterized in closed form.
Proposition 8 showed the existence and uniqueness of the establishment-occupation compo-
nents. A useful characteristic of those components is that they are homogeneous of degree zero
with respect to local labor market aggregates. We therefore have that the normalized wages (or
establishment-occupation components) are independent of industry prices. By taking together
Propositions 8 and 9 we can therefore conclude that there exists a unique solution to the model
for any set of valid parameters and vectors of productivities and amenities.
2.5 Identification and Estimation
In this section, we describe the identification strategy, the estimation procedure and present the
results. We have two types of parameters: (i) related to the labor supply and bargaining, and (ii)
related to technology. The labor supply and bargaining parameters are the within and across local
labor market elasticities ({εb}Bb=1 and η respectively) and the workers’ bargaining powers ({ϕb}Bb=1).
The technology parameters are: the inverse elasticity of the labor demand (δ), the industry output
elasticities ({αb}Bb=1, {βb}Bb=1) and the elasticities of intermediate goods in the final good production
function ({θb}Bb=1, {βb}Bb=1). Given our restriction δ, we only need to estimate either the capital
elasticities {αb}Bb=1 or the labor ones {βb}Bb=1.
We lay out a recursive identification strategy in three steps. First, we identify the across local
labor market labor supply elasticity η and the inverse elasticity of labor demand δ by exploiting
differences in the variance-covariance matrix of structural shocks across occupations. Second, we
estimate the within local labor market labor supply elasticities {εb}Bb=1 by estimating the labor
supply equation while instrumenting for the wages. Finally, we calibrate the output elasticities of
capital {αb}Bb=1 to match industry capital shares. Then, we calibrate the union bargaining powers
{ϕb}Bb=1 to match the industry labor shares, and we calibrate yearly industry elasticities with respect
to intermediate good in the final good production function to match 2-digit industry output in the
data.
We start the identification of global parameters by taking advantage of the presence of establishment-
occupations with sio|m = 1 in the data. We name those establishment-occupations that are alone in
a particular local labor market as full monopsonists. We restrict the sample to full monopsonists
for the first estimation step. Being alone in their local labor markets, the only firm specific labor
supply elasticity in play is the across local labor market one η. Identification of the within local la-
bor market elasticities εb requires to focus on the establishment-occupations competing with others
in their local labor markets.
Full monopsonists being the only players in the local labor market, the markdown part of the




























Similar labor supply and demand systems can be formed for each occupation. This system suffers
from standard identification issues when we have simultaneous equations as independent identifi-
cation requires different instruments shifting only one of them.
Lacking such instruments, we follow the identification through heteroskedasticity approach of Rigobon
(2003) to identify the across local labor market labor supply elasticity η and the inverse elasticity of
labor demand δ. Our identification strategy is based on restrictions on the variance-covariance ma-
trix of structural shocks. First, we assume that the variances of the shifters differ across occupations,
i.e., we assume heteroskedasticity. To gain intuition of how identification through heteroskedastic-
ity works, consider a simple demand and supply system. Now assume we start increasing the
variance of the supply shifter relative to the variance of the demand. Then, the new observed scat-
ter describing price-quantity pairs will be more tilted towards the demand. This variation allows
to identify the parameters. In our preferred specification, we group the occupations into two cat-
egories, white collar (top management and clerical) and blue collar (supervisor and operational),
and assume that the covariance between the demand and supply shifters (productivity and amenity
respectively) are constant within each of the two categories. This assumption reflects the idea that
amenities such as working hours, repetitiveness of the tasks or more general working environments
are similarly related to productivity within our two categories.
Taking logarithms and demeaning by substracting the industry b average per year, the system






















We estimate the variance covariance matrix of the left-hand side, employment and wages per occu-
pation, from the data. The restriction we impose is that the covariance between the labor demand
shifter (the productivity) and the labor supply shifter (the amenity) is constant across occupations
within the same category. Equalizing the covariances for each category we obtain a system of two
equations that do not depend on the within local labor market labor supply elasticity εb anymore
and depends only on η and δ. More details about this identification argument are in Appendix 2.D.
The second step is devoted to the estimation of the within local labor market labor supply
elasticities εb. Those are estimated exploiting the labor supply equation of non full monopsonists.
The labor supply they face (2.13) in logs is:
ln(Liot) = εb ln(wiot) + fmt + ln(Tiot),
where fmt is a local labor market times year constant. At this point of the estimation the amenities
Tio are unobserved. The usual exclusion restrictions when running this regression requires that the
conditional expectation of the error term (here, the amenity) is equal to zero. Everything else equal,
higher amenity establishments pay lower wages violating the exclusion restriction. We therefore
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where Yjt is value added at the firm j in year t and J(i), t denotes the set of establishments belonging
to firm j. The first estimation step did not require independence of the structural shocks. In order
to minimize the potential of endogeneity bias coming from the correlation between amenities and
productivities, we use a lagged instrument instead of the contemporaneous one.
In the final step we calibrate the capital elasticities, the union bargaining powers, we non-
parametrically recover amenities and productivities, and we calibrate the elasticities of the final
good production function. We start the final step by calibrating the capital elasticities to target the
average industry capital shares. We follow Barkai (2016) to construct the industry interest rates or
required rates {Rbt}Bb=1 per year to build yearly capital shares.43 From the first order condition for










= αb. Given our restriction of constant inverse labor demand
elasticity δ, we back out the output elasticities with respect to labor by using βb1−αb = 1− δ.
The union bargaining powers are pinned down by industry labor shares. In the model, labor




= βbλ(µio, ϕb), (2.26)





1− δ . Writing the analogous at the industry level, the union bargaining power ϕb is pinned
down by the average industry labor share.45 When constructing the theoretical labor share, we
assume that given the estimated parameters, we later perfectly match the observed wages of es-
tablishments and labor allocations. We do not target the unobserved establishment-occupation
value added and therefore neither the 3-digit industry value added measures.46 Amenities and
revenue productivities are non parametrically identified to match wages and labor allocations in
equilibrium.
We recover non-parametrically establishment-occupation TFPRs (revenue TFPs) using the wage
first order conditions. We observe employment and nominal wages at the establishment-occupation
level from the data. Equation (2.16) in nominal terms is:





where Ptwiot and Liot are observed and βbλ(µiot, ϕb) depends on the estimated parameters and
observed employment shares. Equation (2.27) makes clear that given the observed nominal wages
43Details are in Appendix 2.F.4.
44This is derived in Appendix 2.A.
45The model aggregation of the labor share is in Appendix 2.A.5 and the industry markdown is characterized in equation (41).
46We could in principle also do the reverse if the occupation specific value added were observed in the data.
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Table 19 – Main Estimates
Param. Name Estimate Identification
η Across labor market elast. 0.42 Heteroskedasticity
δ 1 - Returns to scale 0.04 Heteroskedasticity
{εb} Within labor market elast. 1.2 - 4 Labor supply
{βb} Output elast. labor 0.57 - 0.85 Capital share and δ
{ϕb} Union bargaining 0.06 - 0.7 Industry LS
and employment, one can only back out transformed TFPRs, Ziot = PtF
1+εbδ
bt Aiot, that are a function
of the establishment-occupation physical productivity Aiot and prices PtF
1+εbδ
bt .
47 Details of how we
back out amenities Tiot to ensure that we match employment are in Appendix 2.D.3.
We calibrate the elasticities of the final good production function {θb}b/inB for every year of the
sample such that the industry expenditure shares are equal to the shares of industry value added
in the data. Table 27 in Appendix 2.E has the calibrated elasticities and interest rates for 2007,
our baseline year for the counterfactuals. The next Section presents the estimation results and the
goodness of the fit.
2.5.1 Estimation Results
Table 19 shows the estimation results of the main parameters. The most important parameters of
the estimation are arguably the labor supply elasticities and the union bargaining powers.
The estimated across local labor market elasticity is η̂ = 0.42 and the industry specific local labor
market labor supply elasticities ε̂b range from 1.22 to 4.05.48 The across local labor market elasticity
being lower than the within ones (η̂ < ε̂b ∀b), workers are more elastic within than across local
labor markets. This implies that the markdown µio is decreasing in the employment share and
therefore more relevant (further away from 1) for establishments having higher employment shares
out of the local labor market. Consequently, the structural labor wedge λ(µio, ϕb) of our calibrated
model is decreasing in employment shares sio|m. This feature is in line with the empirical evidence
from Section 2.3.
Our estimates for the labor supply elasticities are within the ball park of the recent estimates
from Berger et al. (2019) for the US. Their analogous estimate of the across local labor market
elasticity η is 0.66 (compared to our estimate of 0.42) and their estimated within local labor market
elasticity is 5.38. The across local labor market estimates are very similar. On the contrary, all of
our industry specific within local labor market elasticities lie below their estimate. This might be a
consequence of the low mobility that characterizes the French labor market.49
47Revenue Total Factor Productivities are defined as PtPbt Aiot. With some abuse of notation, we name the transformed revenue total
factor productivities PF1+εbδbt Aiot as TFPRs. Given that one cannot observe industry prices Pbt, backing out productivities Aiot from the
data would require carry out some normalizations to get rid of industry prices and be able to compute counterfactuals.
48Table 26 in Appendix 2.E provides all of the industry estimates.
49See Jolivet et al. (2006) for a comparison of French mobility against the U.S.
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The estimates of union bargaining power range from 0.06 for Chemical to 0.73 for Telecommunica-
tions. According to our estimates, there is an important heterogeneity of bargaining power across
industries. Lacking direct estimates of bargaining power within manufacturing we validate our
estimates by doing two comparisons. First, French labor law imposes more restrictive legal duties
regarding union representation for larger establishments. We compute the correlation between the
bargaining power estimates ϕ̂b and average establishment size (in terms of employment) per indus-
try. We find a positive correlation of 0.33 between average establishment employment per industry
and union’s bargaining power ϕb. Second, Cahuc et al. (2006) provide manufacturing bargaining
power estimates for France in a framework of search and matching with on the job search. Our
estimated bargaining power for manufacturing as a whole is 0.37.50 This is close to the estimate of
Cahuc et al. (2006) for top management workers of 0.35.
The estimate of the inverse labor demand elasticity, δ, is δ̂ = 0.04. This parameter is also related
to the average returns to scale of the production function which are about 0.97. The combination of
δ and the estimated capital elasticities per industry {αb}b∈B allow us to recover the values for the
output elasticities with respect to labor, {βb}b∈B , as βb = (1− αb)(1− δ). These elasticities go from
0.56 for Transport to the 0.85 for Shoe and leather production.
2.5.2 Estimation Fit
Using the point estimates we first check the fit on non-targeted labor shares at the sub-industry
level and total value added. We then replicate the empirical exercises of Section 2.3 with model
generated variables and compare them with the results obtained with actual data.
Not-targeted Moments
Figure 18 depicts the fit of the model and non-targeted data. In panel (a) we have 3-digit industry
labor shares per year. On the horizontal axis we have the model generated moments while on the
vertical axis we observed the corresponding moment in the data. If the fit was perfect, each dot
would be on the 45 degree line. Each color represents a 2-digit industry. We see that most of the
dots are aligned around the 45 degree line.
Panel (b) of Figure 18 shows the model matches the evolution of aggregate value added. This in
fact might not be surprising as there is a very strong relationship between establishment’s produc-
tion and wage bill in the model and in the data. Since the model exactly matches the establishment’s
wages and labor allocations, it also has a good fit of the value added.
Going Back to the Empirical Evidence
We further validate the model by replicating the empirical evidence of Section 2.3 linking micro-
level concentration to wages and industry concentration to the industry labor shares. We first
simulate the model to explore the quantitative relation between employment shares and wages at
50This is an employment weighted average of the industry estimates. The simple average of industry bargaining powers is 0.41.
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Figure 18 – Model Fit Non Targeted Moments
(a) Sub-industry Labor Share
(b) Aggregate Value Added. Model in dashed
blue, data in red.
the establishment level. We then compare how well the model matches the regression coefficients
linking aggregate measures of employment concentration and the labor shares.
In the micro-level empirical evidence from Section 2.3 we measure the effects of concentration
on wages by using shocks to local competitors to capture an exogenous change in the relative
position within a local labor market of an establishment. Thus, our aim in the simulation and
empirical exercise presented below is to induce such exogenous changes to the local labor market
of establishments. Using the identified amenities, Tio, and TFPRs, Zio, for the year 2007 as baseline,
we simulate proportional changes in establishment-occupations’ productivities and solve again for
the equilibrium wages within each local labor market. Then, we explore the link of employment
shares to log wages according to the following linear model:
log(wio) = fb + βsio|m + uio,
where log(wio) is the logarithm of simulated normalized wages, fb is an industry fixed effect, sio|m is
the equilibrium employment share of establishment-occupation io in the local labor market m, and
uio is an error term. As we are only solving for the equilibrium wages within each local labor mar-
ket, we are implicitly normalizing local labor market, industry and economy wide constants that
would be incorporated after solving for the general equilibrium of the model.51 We include of the
industry fixed effect fb because we use revenue productivities as a fundamental in the simulation.52
To replicate the exogenous change in the local labor market structure, we instrument the employ-
ment share with the weighted average of the productivity proportion changes of each establishment-
occupation’s competitors, where the weights are the employment shares in the baseline scenario.
51We consider normalized counterfactual wages similar to the baseline ones in equation (2.19), but with revenue productivities Zio
instead of productivities Aio .
52Recall that revenue productivities are a function of both an industry level price and the productivity at the baseline equilibrium. The
fixed effect would capture such industry prices.
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where Z′(io)′ is the simulated revenue productivity for establishment-occupation (io)
′, and L(io)′ is
its employment in the baseline, i.e. before the simulation.
The estimated coefficient is −0.203 with a standard error of 0.035. The point estimate is a
little below to the one presented on Figure 17 but well within the confidence intervals. We take
this as evidence that the model is able to replicate the intensity of the link between employment
concentration and wages at the establishment occupation level.53
We now turn to the model validation using the aggregate empirical evidence of Section 2.3.
Here we generate model consistent value added and labor shares taking the market structure and
fundamentals (amenities and productivities) from the data. Table 20 presents in the first 2 columns
the empirical evidence of Table 16 with fixed effects (columns (2) and (3)) and the rest are devoted
to compare two alternative models. Model results present the same regressions as the ones for the
data for two competing models: one with oligopsonistic competition only LSM,MPh,t (columns (3)
and (4)) and our model with collective wage bargaining LSMh,t (columns (5) and (6)). The negative
relationship between labor share and concentration in the model with oligopsonistic competition is
about 8 times higher than in the data. Comparing now the last two columns that correspond to our
model, the negative relationship is still too strong but it is half of the model without bargaining. On
the contrary, models with bargaining only and with employer labor market power without strategic
interactions would not match the data as the effect of concentration on the labor shares would be
null. These results support the mechanism of our structural model where union bargaining power
and employer labor market power are relevant.
2.6 Counterfactuals
In this section we evaluate efficiency and welfare effects of the labor wedges coming from labor
market power. We start by showing that counterfactuals can be computed observing establish-
ment Revenue Total Factor Productivities (TFPRs) instead of the underlying productivities, which
are unobserved. Second, we perform our main counterfactual where we completely eliminate the
structural labor wedges and compute output and welfare gains under free mobility of workers. That
is, we characterize the competitive equilibrium allocation where wages are equal to the marginal
revenue product. We also consider other counterfactual situations where labor wedges remain and
are equal to the bargaining only or oligopsonistic competition only cases. These aim to disentan-
gle the relative distortions coming from each side of labor market power. We perform the main
counterfactuals for 2007, the last year of our sample.
53The first stage of the instrumental variable is highly significant (p-value<0.001) and the point estimate is negative. This is an expected
result, as for a larger average productivity of the competitors the employment share should diminish. The OLS estimate is 0.851 with
standard error 0.005. This is expected as all the variation comes from productivity changes, so the only thing shifting, leaving market
structure constant, is the establishments demand. Thus the supply elasticity would be identified.
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Table 20 – Concentration and Labor Share: Data vs. Model
Data: log(LSDh,t) Oligopsony: log(LS
M,MP
h,t ) Model: log(LS
M
h,t)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(HHIh,t) −0.054∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.388∗∗∗ −0.416∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005)
Ind FE Y N Y N Y N
Ind-Year FE N Y N Y N Y
Obs. 1357 1357 1357 1357 1357 1357
R2 0.29 0.343 0.901 0.903 0.946 0.909
Adj. R2 0.280 0.172 0.899 0.878 0.945 0.936
Notes: The dependent variable of the first two columns are the logarithm of 3-digit industry labor share at year t, log(LSDh,t).
These present the results from Table 16 with fixed effects. Next two columns present the model generated log labor shares
log(LSM,MPh,t ) when the model does not incorporate wage bargaining. This is a framework where the labor wedge λ boils
down to λ(µio , 0) = µio . Last two columns present the analogous regressions with our framework where bargaining is
incorporated log(LSMh,t). Throughout the different frameworks column (1) presents estimates with industry fixed effects and
column (2) results with industry-year fixed effects. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Our baseline counterfactuals assume free mobility of labor. We perform three additional coun-
terfactuals modifying the free mobility assumption to evaluate if output gains can be attained when
mobility is restricted. First, in the most restrictive case, we allow movements only within local labor
markets. This is equivalent to assuming infinite mobility costs across location-industry-occupations.
Second, we fix employment at the 2-digit and occupation level and let labor move across locations
and 3-digit industries. Third, we fix employment at the 2-digit industry level. Compared to the
previous case, in this last counterfactual, labor is mobile across occupations.
We finally use the model to study the incidence of labor market power on the pass-through of
productivity to wages, the urban-rural wage gap and the de-industrialization process over time.
2.6.1 Counterfactuals using Revenue Productivities
This section shows that is possible to compute the counterfactuals in general equilibrium by using
Revenue Total Factor Productivities (TFPRs), which are a function of prices determined in general
equilibrium, rather than the underlying physical productivities. A priori, the issue is that coun-
terfactually changing the labor wedge changes equilibrium prices and therefore the ’fundamental’
TFPRs.
The literature on misallocation has used the TFPRs, together with a modeling assumption on
the industry price, to compute the normalized within industry productivity distribution. This has
prevented to perform general equilibrium counterfactuals that also take into account productivity
differences across industries.54 We show that we can: (i) carry out counterfactuals in general
54For example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) conduct a counterfactual where they remove distortions at the firm level and compute the
productivity gains at the industry level. The productivity gains are a result of factors of production reallocating to more productive firms
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equilibrium by writing the model in relative terms from a baseline scenario; and (ii) compute
the movement of production factors across industries.
Our approach is to write counterfactual industry prices relative to the baseline and to fix the
transformed revenue productivities.55 Using the definition of the transformed revenue productivi-
ties Zio, the equation (2.27) for nominal wage is:
Pwio = βbλ(µio, ϕb)ZioL
−δ
io .
We denote with a prime the variables in the counterfactual (e.g. F′b) and with a hat the relative
variables (e.g. F̂b =
F′b
Fb
). Writing the model as deviations from a baseline scenario has been dubbed
’exact-hat-algebra’ by Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014). We can then rewrite the revenue pro-






1+εbδ Aio = P̂F̂
1+εbδ
b Zio.
The counterfactual revenue productivity is a function of the relative (transformed) price F̂b and the




















where in the last step we used the definition of the transformed TFPRs. In the counterfactuals Zio
is taken as a fixed fundamental and we have to solve for industry prices relative to the baseline F̂b.




































Finally, the counterfactual establishment-occupation components are enough to compute the em-
ployment shares at the local labor market level, s′
io|mo, and at the industry level, s
′
m|b. Following the
same steps as in the baseline, the industry level system of equations is analogous to (2.22) but with
relative variables and solving for relative industry prices we can compute the industry employment
L′b.
56 Propositions 8 and 9 apply and therefore the solution for the relative counterfactuals exists
and is unique.
within each industry. This allows them to compute a partial equilibrium effect on total factor productivity, i.e. keeping the production
factors constant across industries. A general equilibrium effect on total factor productivity takes into account, not only the reallocation
of inputs within, but also across industries. They cannot do this as they can only identify relative productivity differences within each
industry while normalizing average differences across industries. For more details, see equation (19) and the discussion below in their
paper.
55Solving the counterfactuals in levels as stated in Section 2.4 would require to back out the productivities. It would be possible to do
so by making some additional normalizations per industry. For example, one could assume that the minimum physical productivity (or
Total Factor Productivity, TFP) is constant across industries and get rid of industry relative prices by normalizing the minimum TFP per
industry.
56Appendix 2.A provides the steps for the computation of the relative counterfactuals.
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2.6.2 Main Counterfactuals
We consider four different counterfactual situations to evaluate the efficiency and welfare effects of
labor market power in general, and of each of the sides of labor market power in particular. First,
the main counterfactual characterizes the competitive equilibrium where labor wedges disappear
and establishments and workers acts as price takers leading to the equalization of the wages and
the marginal revenue products. Second, we present the counterfactual characterizing the limit case
of our framework where there is only bargaining. Third, we have the limit case where employer
labor market power is the only one present, and finally, a situation where unions collect all the
profits.
Table 21 shows results of different counterfactuals under the free mobility assumption. The
first column present labor shares in the baseline or the counterfactuals and the rest of the columns
recover the percentage gains of the counterfactuals with respect to the baseline. Output gains are
in column 2 of Table 21. Eliminating labor wedges coming from employer and union labor market
power increases aggregate output by 1.62%. Setting wages equal to the marginal revenue product
induces efficiency gains that translate into output gains.
The second counterfactual without employer labor market power but keeping the one of unions
almost attains the output gains from eliminating both distortions. This counterfactual is a situ-
ation where none of the sides would internalize movements along the labor supply but bargain
over the wages. The labor wedges become λ(1, ϕb) = 1 + ϕb
δ
1−δ . It is important to note that the
assumed institutional framework for the unions with heterogeneity only across industries makes
labor wedges almost constant. This reduced heterogeneity of labor wedges (only different across
industries) almost eliminates the allocative distortions and is behind the result of almost attaining
the output gains of the main counterfactual.
Comparing now to the third counterfactual with employer labor market power, we see that out-
put is reduced by 0.21% with respect to the baseline. Union bargaining power therefore attenuates
the labor market distortions in our calibrated model. This reduction does not incorporate extensive
margin responses of total employment as it is fixed. The mechanism behind the reduction in output
is that labor wedges would be slightly more heterogeneous than in the baseline and distortions are
amplified. Finally, output gains when there is full bargaining and workers extract all the profit
rents are the same as in the main counterfactual as wedges would be constant.
In respect of the distributional effects or the split of output into the labor and profit shares, the
aggregate labor share in the model can be constructed from industry level labor wedges Λb. Those
Λb are sufficient statistics to compute the aggregate labor share which is a value added weighted





Aggregate labor share is equal in all the variations of the main counterfactual without labor wedges
that we present later. This comes from Λb being equal to one for all industries b.
57The derivation of the theoretical labor share is in Appendix 2.A.5.
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Table 21 – Counterfactuals: Efficiency and Distribution
Gains (%)
LS (%) ∆Y ∆ Wage ∆ Welfare (L)
Baseline 50.62 - - -
Counterfactuals
No wedges λ(µ, ϕb) = 1 72.26 1.62 45.06 42.07
Bargain λ(1, ϕb) = 1 + ϕb
δ
1−δ 73.38 1.60 47.27 44.34
Oliposonistic λ(µ, 0) = µio 40.94 -0.21 -19.29 -20.53
Full bargain λ(µ, 1) = 1 + δ1−δ 75.47 1.62 51.51 48.38
Notes: First column presents the aggregate labor share (in percent) for the baseline and the different coun-
terfactuals. The last three columns changes with respect to the baseline in percentages. ∆Y is the change
of aggregate output, ∆ Wage is the change in aggregate wage. Aggregate wage is an employment weighted
average of establishment-occupation wages. ∆ Welfare (L) is the change of the median expected welfare of the
workers. The main counterfactual is the one without wedges λ = 1. The second counterfactual Bargain is the
standad bargaining framework where the workers’ outside options are the competitive wages and they don’t
internalize movements along the labor supply. Oligopsonistic is the counterfactual where the wedge is equal
to the equilibrium markdown under oligopsonistic competition and Full bargain is the counterfactual where
ϕb = 1 workers earn all the profits. Counterfactuals are performed in 2007.
Column (1) of Table 21 presents the aggregate labor shares of the different counterfactuals. We
find that completely removing structural labor wedges increases the labor share by 21 percentage
points, passing from 50.62% in the baseline to 72.26% in the counterfactual. Aggregate labor share
increases slightly more in the counterfactuals where employer labor market power disappears (up
to 75% where there is full bargain) and is reduced by 9 p.p. in the counterfactual with oligopsonistic
competition.
Labor share changes imply changes in aggregate wages and worker welfare. Column (3) presents
the relative change of wages with respect to the baseline. Wages go up by 45% in the price taking
case and are reduced by 19% in the oligopsonistic case when the wedges become λ(µ, 0) = µio.
Increases in the aggregate wage do not imply that wage inequality is reduced. Figure 29 in Ap-
pendix 2.H shows that the demeaned wage distributions are very similar on the baseline and the
price taking counterfactuals (in Panel (a) and (b) respectively). This Figure highlights that even in
the absence of labor wedges, wages across establishments are not equalized. This result is due to
the idiosyncratic preferences of workers for different establishments.
Aggregate wage changes translate into welfare differences. We study the median expected wel-




Column (4) of Table 21 present counterfactual gains of the median worker utility. The median ex-
pected worker utility is 42% greater in the scenario without labor wedges compared to the baseline.
58As the across local labor market elasticity η being smaller than 1, the expected value of the Fréchet distribution is not defined. We
therefore can only compute the median and the mode of the worker welfare.
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Unsurprisingly, welfare gains are greater than output gains as the workers not only benefit from
the productivity boost but also from the redistribution of pure rents that the owners were taking.
We perform three additional counterfactuals to locate the output gains in an environment with
mobility costs. They differ in restrictions imposed on mobility where we allow mobility to happen
only within industry, industry-occupation and local labor market. Table 22 compares the free
mobility case with the restricted mobility cases. Comparing the output gains in column (1) across
the different scenarios, we find that the key margin of adjustment is geographical mobility. Fixing
employment at the industry-occupation level accounts for 82% of the gains of the free mobility
case. Restricting workers to stay in their particular local labor market output gains are 0.49% which
constitute only 30% of the gains under free mobility.
Table 22 – Counterfactuals: Limited Mobility
Contribution (%)
∆Y (%) ∆ Prod (%) Sh. GE Sh. Prod Sh. Labor
Free mobility 1.62 1.33 9 83 8
Mobility within
Industry 1.32 1.33 -1 101 0
Industry-occ 1.33 1.35 -2 102 0
Local market 0.49 0.49 -2 102 0
Notes: All the table presents results in percentages. First column presents the ∆Y is the change of aggregate
output with respect to the baseline, ∆ Prod is the change in aggregate productivity from decomposition
(2.30). Last three columns present the contribution of each of the elements of the decomposition (2.30) to
output gains. Free Mobility presents the main counterfactual without wedges and under free mobility of
labor. Industry is the counterfactual where mobility is restricted to be only within industry, Industry-occ fixes
employment at the industry-occupation and allows for mobility across locations, and Local market allows for
mobility only across establishments within local labor markets. Counterfactuals are performed in 2007.
These results underscore the importance of free mobility of labor across locations as the main
driver for output gains. Figure 19 shows the percentage change of manufacturing employment
in the free mobility case. Each block is the aggregation of local labor markets to the commuting
zone. The main conclusion from the counterfactual analysis is that, in the absence of labor wedges,
manufacturing employment in big cities as Paris, Lyon, Marseille or Toulouse would be reduced.
The counterfactual reveals that there are a handful rural productive establishments in concentrated
local labor markets. In the baseline these have lower wage markdowns and lower employment.
Moving to the counterfactual, those are the ones with the biggest relative wage and employment
gains.59
Turning now to the source of the output gains, we can use the aggregate production function
and the relative industry output from Appendix 2.A (equation (43)), and decompose the logarithm
59Another potential reason is the differential in the amenities. The reduction of manufacturing labor in the big cities could be magnified
if they have in general worse amenities.
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Figure 19 – Employment Change (%) with Counterfactual
Notes: The map presents employment changes with respect to the baseline economy in percentages. Each block constitutes a commuting zone. Local labor
markets are aggregated up to the commuting zone. Counterfactuals are performed in 2007.
of the relative final output into three terms:




















The first term on the right hand side corresponds to the capital effects or general equilibrium
effects of capital flowing to different sectors as a response to changes in relative prices. The second
term, arguably the most important, represents total productivity gains. This term suffers the most
from labor market concentration as big productive firms are shrinking their relative participation,
therefore reducing overall productivity. The third term corresponds to how labor is allocated across
sectors.
Columns (3) to (5) of Table 22 show the decomposition of relative changes of output.60 The
main source of output gains come from productivity. Industry productivity is an employment
weighted sum of establishment-occupation productivities (that are unchanged). The original source
of productivity and output gains is therefore the reallocation of workers towards productive firms.
Column (2) shows the productivity gains in the different mobility cases. Those are similar as
long as labor is mobile at the industry level. General equilibrium effects determine the reallocation
of employment across industries and total output gains but mobility restrictions below the industry
level prevent the reallocation towards productive establishments and reduce the productivity gains.
Figure 20 shows geographical differences of productivity gains in the free mobility case. The
Figure is similar to Figure 19 in the sense that most significant gains of the counterfactual produc-
tivity happen outside urban areas. As a result, the largest gains relative to the baseline in wages
and employment are in commuting zones without big cities.
60Note that ∆Y = Ŷ − 1 ≈ ln Ŷ. The decomposition is with respect to ln Ŷ. The share of the gains that come from productivity (Sh.
Prod) is simply ∑b∈B θb ln Ẑbln Y . Each row from columns 3 to 5 sums up to 1.
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Figure 20 – Productivity Change (%) with Counterfactual
Notes: The map presents productivity changes with respect to the baseline economy in percentages. Each block constitutes a commuting zone. Local
labor markets are aggregated up to the commuting zone. Commuting zone productivity is an employment weighted average of individual productivities.
Following the discussion in Section 2.6.1, keeping fixed the baseline revenue productivities, any change in the counterfactual comes from changes in
productivities. Counterfactuals are performed in 2007.
2.6.3 Pass Through
The efficiency losses are the consequence of distortions in the pass through of productivity to
wages. The structural wage equation (2.29) relates our recovered measure of productivity Zio to




(log Ziot − δ log Tiot + log λ(µiot, ϕb)) + fmt, (2.31)
where fmt is a local labor market times year constant. We use this equation to study the incidence of
labor market power on the pass through of the transformed revenue productivity Z. The elasticity
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where ǫλs and ǫ
s
Z denote respectively the elasticity of the wedge λio with respect to the employment
share s and the elasticity of the employment share s with respect to the transformed TFPR Z. The
equation above emphasizes the origin of potential distortions coming from labor market power.
When the wedge λ is constant, the last term becomes zero because ǫλs = 0. In that case, the pass
through of productivity to wages is the same as in the price taking case and the labor allocations
are not distorted.
We estimate the following:
log wiot = fmot + β
Z
b log Ziot + β
T
b log Tiot + uiot
Table 33 in Appendix 2.J presents the estimates of the productivity pass through in the baseline βZb
and the one in the absence of labor wedges. The average dampening due to labor market power is
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Figure 21 – De-industrialization differences
Notes: The x-axis shows the percentage differences of commuting zone employment shares out of manufacturing over time in the data (∆D = SD07 − SD94).
The y-axis presents the analogous for the counterfactual without wedges (∆M = SPT07 − SPT94 ). The initial year is 1994 and the final one is 2007.
equal to 0.05. This means that when Z increases by 1%, 0.05% of that increase is not translated to
wages due to labor market frictions.
2.6.4 Mobility and Wage Gap
Figure 19 suggests an important movement from cities to rural areas in the counterfactual. This
section explores the impact of employer and union labor market power on the urban-rural mobility
over time and the urban-rural wage gap.
Mobility over time
We compare the urban-rural mobility process observed in the data to the one from yearly coun-
terfactuals without labor market power. In the data, the de-industrialization or the reduction of
manufacturing employment occurred primarily in cities leading to the gain in relative importance
of rural areas within manufacturing. Figure 21 compares the relative employment shares observed
in the data to the one in a counterfactual without labor wedges for each commuting zone.
First, we performed the main counterfactual where there are no labor wedges because establish-
ments and unions act as price takers (PT) for the initial year 1994. Then we compute the commuting
zone employment share out of total manufacturing for the initial and final years (1994 and 2007 re-
spectively) and for the different scenarios. To compare the mobility over time, we compute the
differences over time of the commuting zone employment shares in the data (∆D = SD07 − SD94) and
in the counterfactual (∆M = SPT07 − SPT94 ). Figure 21 presents this comparison. The x axis shows ∆D
and the y axis shows ∆M. The size of the dots are the initial population of the commuting zone.
The counterfactual urban-rural mobility is very similar to the process observed in the data which
is mostly guided by exogenous productivity and firm location decisions and not by labor market
distortions.
The line generated by the largest population commuting zones in Figure 21 is slightly flatter than
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Table 23 – Wage Gap
Rural Wage Urban Wage Gap (%)
Baseline 33.321 45.210 36
Counterfactual 49.486 60.675 23
Note: Wages in thousands of constant 2015 euros. We classify as Urban the 10 biggest
commuting zones: Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Toulouse, Nantes, and the Paris surround-
ing, Boulogne-Billancourt, Creteil, Montreuil, Saint-Denis and Argenteuil. The rest
are considered as Rural. Wages are employment weighted averages per category for
the baseline and counterfactual for the year 2007.
the 45 degree line. Cities would loose their relative importance a bit slower in the counterfactual.
A potential reason is the closure of manufacturing firms in the largest cities that became more
concentrated over time leading to distortions that are closer to the ones present in rural areas.
Wage Gap
Table 23 presents wage levels and the urban/rural wage gap.61 Both, urban and rural areas, experi-
ence important wage gains in the counterfactual. Gains being bigger outside cities the wage gap is
reduced from 36% to 23% in the counterfactual. This reveals that labor market distortions account
for more than a third of the urban/rural wage gap.
2.7 Extensions
We made important assumptions in the main counterfactual: workers were perfectly mobile, total
labor supply was fixed and there were no agglomeration externalities. In this section, we propose
extensions to relax the last two assumptions. First, we allow for an endogenous labor participation
decision. Second, we introduce agglomeration forces in the local labor markets.
2.7.1 Endogenous Participation
We briefly present the extension with endogenous labor force participation decisions. We assume
workers can decide between working and staying at home. In the latter case, they earn wages
related to home production. In the model, staying at home is an endogenous choice that happens
when the indirect utility of being out of the labor force is higher than the one being employed.
We lack detailed data on the geographical distribution of out of the labor force status as labor
force surveys provide only information at the region level. Basing our counterfactuals in those
surveys would require the extreme assumption of constant rates of labor participation for entire
regions. Instead, while acknowledging is not a perfect assumption, we use commuting zone level
unemployment rates as out-of-the labor-force rates.
61We consider urban the 10 biggest commuting zones: Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Toulouse, Nantes, and the Paris surrounding, Boulogne-
Billancourt, Creteil, Montreuil, Saint-Denis and Argenteuil. Rural are the rest of the commuting zones.
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Table 24 – Counterfactual: Endogenous Participation
Contribution (%)
∆Y (%) ∆ Prod (%) ∆ L (%) Sh. GE Sh. Prod Sh. Labor
Fixed L 1.62 1.33 0.00 9 83 8
Endogenous Part.
No wedges λ(µ, ϕb) = 1 1.98 1.18 1.00 11 60 29
Bargain λ(1, ϕb) = 1 + ϕb
δ
1−δ 2.04 1.18 1.04 10 58 32
Oligopsonistic λ(µ, 0) = µ(s) -1.29 -0.59 -0.75 2 46 53
Full bargain λ(µ, 1) = 1 + δ1−δ 2.09 1.18 1.12 10 57 33
Notes: All the table presents results in percentages. First column ∆Y is the change of aggregate output with respect to the baseline, ∆ Prod is the
change in aggregate productivity from decomposition (2.30) and ∆L is the counterfactual change in total employment. Last three columns present
the contribution of each of the elements of the decomposition (2.30) to output gains. Fixed L is the main counterfactual without wedges, under
free mobility of labor and fixed total labor supply. The main counterfactual is the one without wedges λ = 1. All the other counterfactuals in this
table allow for endogenous labor force participation. No wedges is the analogous to the main counterfactual without wedges. Bargain is the standad
bargaining framework where the workers’ outside options are the competitive wages and they don’t internalize movements along the labor supply.
Oligopsonistic is the counterfactual where the wedge is equal to the equilibrium markdown under oligopsonistic competition and Full bargain is the
counterfactual where ϕb = 1 workers earn all the profits.
Defining out-of-the-labor-force, from now on OTLF, as a new 3-digit industry at every location,
2-digit industry and occupation combination, we have that the probability of being OTLF in a









L, Φ = Φe + Φu,










is the part from the unemployed (Um is the set of all OTLF local labor markets). L is the total labor
supply of both, the employed and the OTLF workers. The proportion of OTLF workers in each
local market identifies the home production amenity times the wage Tuow
εb
uo.62 This wage is fixed in
the counterfactuals while the real wages of firms change depending on the counterfactual wedges.
Table 24 shows the results of the counterfactuals with endogenous labor force participation.
The counterfactual output gain is 1.98%. Introducing the endogenous labor participation margin
induces higher output gains than in the baseline (Fixed L). In contrast to the output gain decom-
position in Table 22, around 30% of the gains come from the increased total employment. Labor
force increases 1% in the main counterfactual without wedges. This extensive margin of adjustment
in the total labor supply amplifies original differences in output gains across counterfactuals. In
particular, output losses from oligopsonistic competition are as high as 1.29% because total labor
force participation is reduced by -0.75%. Despite featuring high wage gains, the increase in total
employment is minor in the counterfactual because we assume that workers have idiosyncratic
shocks to stay OTLF.
62Details on the theoretical model with endogenous participation are in Appendix 2.B.
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Table 25 – Counterfactuals: Agglomeration
Contribution (%)
∆Y (%) ∆ Prod (%) Sh. GE Sh. Prod Sh. Labor
No Agglomeration 1.62 1.33 9 83 8
Agglomeration
γ = 0.05 1.73 1.40 8 82 10
γ = 0.1 1.84 1.48 7 81 12
γ = 0.15 1.96 1.57 6 81 13
γ = 0.2 2.08 1.66 5 80 15
γ = 0.25 2.22 1.75 3 80 17
Notes: All the table presents results in percentages. First column ∆Y is the change of aggregate output
with respect to the baseline, ∆ Prod is the change in aggregate productivity from decomposition (2.30). Last
three columns present the contribution of each of the elements of the decomposition (2.30) to output gains.
No Agglomeration is the main counterfactual without wedges, under free mobility of labor, fixed total labor
supply and no agglomeration forces. All the other counterfactuals in this table allow for agglomeration within
the local labor market. Similarly to the main counterfactual, workers are freely mobile and total employment
is fixed. We present different counterfactuals depending on the agglomeration elasticity γ.
2.7.2 Agglomeration
In this section we present an extension of the model that includes agglomeration forces at the
local labor market level. To keep the model tractable, we assume that the productivity is: Âio =
ÃioL
γ(1−αb)
m . The agglomeration effect is a local labor market externality with elasticity γ(1− αb).
The wage first order condition is:





Similarly to the baseline counterfactual, we back out the transformed TFPRs Zio to perfectly match
observed establishment-occupation wages wio under the assumption of agglomeration externali-
ties. In the case where employment for a given local labor market is high, the productivity of the
establishments in that market m is lower than for the main counterfactual.63
Table 25 summarizes the counterfactual results for different values of γ. All the counterfactuals
in Table 25 also assume price taking and free mobility but introduce agglomeration forces in local la-
bor markets. As γ becomes higher, the more important are the agglomeration forces and the higher
are the efficiency gains. The reason behind this result is that increasing γ the local labor market
employment Lm becomes more important in (2.32). Consequently, productivity differences across
local labor markets with different employment are amplified. The movements towards small local
labor markets are therefore bigger than in the main counterfactual (No Agglomeration). Output
gains are monotonic in the importance of agglomeration externalities.




This paper measures efficiency and welfare losses generated by employer and union labor market
power for French manufacturing establishments. We present stylized facts at the aggregate level
that show higher employment concentration relates to lower labor shares for French manufacturing
firms. We further document the relevance of heterogeneous labor market power at the establish-
ment level. Our empirical strategy identifies a negative relationship between local labor market
employment share and wages. This reduced form evidence suggests employer labor market power
is relevant and heterogeneous across markets and firms. We also present reduced form evidence
on the heterogeneity of union bargaining power across industries within manufacturing.
We lay out a quantitative general equilibrium model that links structural labor wedges to em-
ployment shares and union bargaining power. Our framework nests the cases with bargaining only
and oligopsonistic competition only as special cases. We show existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium and provide its analytical characterization. We separately identify parameters leading
to employer and union labor market power by implementing a recursive estimation strategy. We
first estimate global parameters by imposing restrictions on structural shocks, second we identify
the industry specific labor supply elasticities using the structural equation of the labor supply and
then we calibrate the rest of parameters to match industry moments.
We evaluate the efficiency and welfare costs of employer and union labor market power. We
find that removing structural labor wedges increases output by 1.62%. Gains are amplified up to
1.98% when we allow for an endogenous labor force participation margin. The main mechanism
behind the output gains is the reallocation of resources towards more productive establishments.
Removing labor market distortions also leads to significant labor share and wage gains. These
results imply that the employer labor market power is more important than the one of unions on
the labor wedge for manufacturing in France.
The counterfactual suggests that there is missing employment in French rural areas due to em-
ployer labor market power. Eliminating these distortions would not only increase wages but also
the efficiency of manufacturing. The potential insights for policy are clear. Our calibrated model
suggests that unions counteract employer labor market power but promoting unions would not
completely overcome the distributional and efficiency effects. On the contrary, the allocation with-
out labor market distortions can be implemented by hiring subsidies that would eliminate the effect
of the labor wedge. Those subsidies could be financed either by taxes on profits or on wage earn-
ings. Unfortunately, the implementation of this policy would be very cumbersome as it would
require taking into account the structure of the labor market and the fundamentals of establish-
ments. Alternatively, the efficiency gains could be partially achieved by attracting employment to
remote locations. Place based policies aimed to improve the amenities of rural areas would possibly




In this section we provide the derivations of the model that are not presented in the main text. First, we show
how to obtain the establishment (inverse) labor supplies by solving the workers establishment choice problem.
Later, we show how we obtain the markdown function from the establishments optimality conditions. We
then show how to get a close form solution for the prices given the solution for the normalized wages.
2.A.1 Establishment-Occupation Labor Supply
To simplify the notation, we get rid of the occupation subscript o in this subsection. The indirect utility of a









m are independent utility shocks. They are both distributed Frèchet with shape and scale
parameters εb and Ti for z1i|m, and η and 1 for z
2
m.
Workers first see the realizations of the shocks z2m for all local labor markets. After choosing to which
labor market to go, the workers then observe the establishment specific shocks. Therefore, there is a two
stage decision: first, the worker choose the local labor market that maximizes her expected utility, and later
will choose the establishment that maximizes her utility conditional on the chosen sub-market.
The goal is to compute the unconditional probability of a worker going to establishment i in sub-market












































To ease notation, define conditional utility vi = wiz1i|m for all i, i
′. We need to solve for P
(
vi ≥ maxi′ 6=i vi′
)
.

















−Φ−im v−εb = G−im (v),
where Φ−im = ∑i′ 6=i Ti′w
εb









where Φm = ∑i′ Ti′w
εb
i′ . Integrating G
−i

















































m ≥ maxm′ 6=m Em′(maxi wiz1i|m′)z2m′
)
. So first, the expected















We define this new variable:
x = Φmv
−εb dx = −εbΦmv−(εb+1)dv.
Now we can change variable in the previous integral and obtain:
∫ ∞
0






































































































Workers’ welfare. An obvious way to measure workers welfare would be to compute the average utility for
workers. However this is not possible as the shape parameter η is smaller than 1. This implies that the mean
for the Frechét distributed utilities is not defined. Instead, we compute the median utility agents expect to





































where Liot(wiot) is the labor supply (2.13) where they take Φ and L as given but internalize their effect on Φio
and Φm. Pbt and Rbt are respectively the industry price and required rate.64 Getting rid of the time index t,














eio = εb (1− sio|m) + η sio|m is the perceived elasticity of supply for establishment i in occupation o.
64The construction details of the rental rate of capital or the required rate are in Appendix 2.F.4.
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We can use the first order conditions of capital to substitute it into the establishment’s production function

















In order to gain tractability in the solution of the model we restrict the output elasticity with respect
to capital such that 1 − βb1−αb = δ, where δ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant across sectors. This specification would
nest a constant returns to scale technology when δ = 0. As long as 0 < δ < 1 the establishment faces

















We derive the markdown function from the establishments optimality condition with respect to wages. The
establishment post a wage and choose capital quantity in order to maximize profits subject to their individual
labor supply. Establishments only take into account the effect on their local labor market. As explained in the
main text, this can happen because of a myopic behavior from the establishments or if there is a continuum


























= Lio(wio) + wio
∂Lio
∂wio,
























































































εb(1− sio|m) + ηsio|m
)
.
Substituting this last derivative into the first order condition we get:
Lio+Lio
(








εb(1− sio|m) + ηsio|m
)
⇒ wio =
εb(1− sio|m) + ηsio|m










We provide derivations under the baseline bargaining protocol where employers and unions have zero outside
options and internalize movements along the labor supply curve. An alternative bargaining protocol leading
to the same equilibrium condition for the wages is at the end.
Each establishment has different occupation profit functions (1− αb)PbF(Lio)−wuioLio, where the optimal
capital decision has been taken. We assume that workers and establishments are symmetric both having null
threat points and internalizing the generation of rents as they move along the labor supply curve.






ϕb [(1− αb)PbF(Lio(wuio))− wuioLio(wuio)]1−ϕb ,
where we made explicit the fact that both parties internalize how labor supply is a function of equilib-
rium wages. ϕb is the union’s bargaining power, wuio the wage bargained with the unions at establishment-
occupation io, Lio the number of workers employed at establishment-occupation io in equilibrium, (1 −
αb)F(Lio) is the output of the establishment-occupation after substituting for the optimal decision of capital.


























and rearranging the first order
condition:
wu = ϕb(1− αb)Pb
F(Lio)
Lio









is the markdown that establishments would set under oligopsonistic competition.
In the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, the marginal revenue product of labor is proportional
to the labor productivity, i.e. (1− αb)p ∂F(Lio)∂Lio = βb
pF(Lio)
Lio
, where βb is the elasticity of output with respect to
labor. By the definition of δ, βb/(1− αb) = (1− δ), the bargained wage becomes:













where we recovered the expression from the main text.
The alternative bargaining assumption leading to the same equilibrium wages is that employers and
unions bargain over the wages without internalizing movements along the labor supply and workers’ outside
options are the oligopsonistic competition wages wMio under the allocation with the given equilibrium wages.
This alternative protocol is quite ad-hoc as the employer labor market power is embedded in the workers






[(1− αb)PbF(Lio)− wuioLio]1−ϕb .
2.A.5 Aggregate Model
Given the equilibrium definition, the model contains a very large number of variables that could make it
unfeasible to be solved numerically. This is because each firm in every location and industry sets its own
wage. So if in every sector location pair there would be H sub-industries, and each sub-industry would have
I firms, there would be N × B× H × I wages to be solved in the model plus B + 1 equations for the prices
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and final output. In comparison, quantitative spatial economic models that assume implicitly that all firms
in the same location have the same amenity would only need to solve for N different wages. In this section
we show how the fact that firms only take into account the effect of their wage decision on the local labor
market helps to tackle this problem by separating it in two main parts. First, we show that we can solve
for each sub-market wages by normalizing the sectoral prices and an economy wide constant. Later, we use
this normalized wages to construct aggregate expressions that are just functions of sectoral prices and some
economy wide constants. Finally, we provide a closed form solution of these prices and the final output
conditional on having the solution for the normalized wages.
Following this path allows us to solve the model in a feasible way. Instead of solving a system of (N ×
B× H× I) + (B + 1) equations, we can solve N× B× H smaller and simpler systems of I equations each and
later a system of B + 1 equations.











































The establishment-occupation labor supply Lio can be written as Lio = sio|msm|bLb. Given the solution of

















We can also compute the employment share of the local labor market out of the industry sm|b. Using the


















whereMb is the set of all local labor markets that belong to industry b. This just formalizes the notion that,
as long as we know the relative wages within an industry, we can compute the measure of workers that go
to each establishment conditioning on industry employment.
Turning now to output, we can compute output at the industry level by aggregating establishment-














where we obtained an expression that represents the productivity at the industry level Ab. As it is evident
from the definition, Ab is an employment weighted industry productivity. The covariance between those
two is key in order to determine industry productivity. As long as market power distorts the employment
distribution making more productive firms to constraint their size, the covariance between productivity and
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employment is lower than in the case with competitive labor markets. This decreases total industry produc-
tivity Ab.























This is where the simplifying assumption on the labor demand elasticity δ ≡ 1− βb1−αb being constant across
industries buys us tractability. We can factor out the economy wide constant from (36) and leave everything
on terms of normalized wages and transformed prices.
In order to find equilibrium allocations, we need to solve for the transformed prices F = {Fb}Bb=1. Using
the intermediate input demand from the final good producer (2.4) and the above expression for industry


























where we used 1 + εbδ + ψbη(1− δ) = ψb(1 + η). Solving for Fb we get (2.23) from the main text.
Aggregate Labor Share
Here we present the steps to compute aggregate labor share, capital to labor expenditures and profit to labor
expenditure shares.
Aggregating (2.16) to the industry level,
wbLb = βbΛbPbYb, (40)
where, wb = ∑io∈Ib wiosio|msm|b is the labor weighted average of individual and Ib is the set of establishment-
occupations that belong to industry b. The industry wedge Λb = ∑io∈Ib λio
PbYio
PbYb
is just the value added










Industry and aggregate labor shares are:








For given parameters, knowing the industry wedge Λb is enough to compute the aggregate labor share.
2.A.6 Hat Algebra













where we denote by ωio the establishment-occupation component of the counterfactual wage. This variable
ωio contains the counterfactual equilibrium wedge λ′io.
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Summing Tio(w′io)



































































































The analogue expression for the baseline is: yio = 1PPb ZioL
1−δ
io . Aggregating up to industry b level, the





















b with Zb(s) analogue to the one defined




m|b . Taking the ratio,








































By taking the ratio, the elasticities θb and the economy wide constants cancel out on both side. Rewriting, we


















































Fixing lower levels than b would only change the last element. Keeping total employment at the local labor





. The constant Γb does not appear in this case as workers
can’t move across industries and the functional Γb is the same for all the local labor markets within an
industry. Also, fixing lower levels than b clearly implies that L′b is known and equal to the baseline labor in
the industry Lb.
The counterfactuals where employment at b or lower level employment is fixed will give rise to a condition
similar to (44). Given that L′b is known, we have that:
F̂
1+εbδ








Propositions 8 and 9 therefore also apply in the relative counterfactuals with fixed labor at the industry level
b (or at a lower level).
2.B Extensions
2.B.1 Endogenous Participation
We showed in the proof of Proposition 9 that the solution of transformed prices F is homogeneous of degree


































b is the part from the out of the labor force as in the main text.
The model aggregation steps are the same as in 2.A with the exception that Lb now is Lb,e.






























































where L is total labor supply (employed and out-of-the-labor-force) and we can solve for the prices without








The solution is obviously unique as the left hand side is convex and the right hand side linear. With the
solution for Φe one can construct all the aggregates back.
2.B.2 Agglomeration


































. Analogously, the counterfactual wage



















1 + η(δ− γ) . (48)







In order to be able to find a solution to the model, we need that ψ̃b < ∞. This is equivalent to requiring
γ 6= 1η + δ. The parameter γ governs the strength of agglomeration forces within a local labor market, and
δ and 1η are related with dispersion forces. Those come from the decreasing returns to scale (δ) and from
the variance of taste shocks ( 1η ). When the latter is high, the mass of workers having extreme taste shocks is
higher. This implies that agglomeration forces will impact less as workers would be more inelastic to changes
in wages. The standard condition for uniqueness of the equilibrium with agglomeration would be that is
sufficiently weak (γ ≤ 1η + δ). In our context we do not find such inequality condition.

















Turning to production, the establishment-occupation output y′io and local labor market output Ym in the






















The expressions for the baseline are analogous but setting F̂b = 1. The counterfactual output of industry b,














where γ changed the returns to scale of the industry production function and the aggregation of productivi-




































Uniqueness of the solution to this system of equations is guaranteed by ∑b∈B αbθb < 1. This condition
being the same as for Proposition 9, uniqueness of the equilibrium with agglomeration forces only needs the
additional requirement of γ 6= 1η + δ.
2.C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 8.
Existence. We follow closely the proof by Kucheryavyy (2012). Define the right hand side of (2.17) as:
fio(w) = [λ(µio(w), ϕb)]
1
1+εbδ cio, fio(w) = [λ(µ(s(w)))]
1
1+εbδ cio,
where w denotes the vector formed by {wio}, we simplified the notation of the wedge λ(µio, ϕb) from the main

















Fb is an establishment-
occupation specific parameter. This means we take Φm and Φ as constants and not as functions of wio.
Under the assumption 0 < η < εb, the function µ(s) =
εb(1−s)+ηs
εb(1−s)+ηs+1 is decreasing in s, the employment
share out of the local labor market. We therefore also have that the wedge λ(µ(s)) = (1− ϕb)µ(s) + ϕb 11−δ
is also decreasing in s. The employment share has bounds 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, which implies (1− ϕb) ηη+1 + ϕb 11−δ ≤
λ(µ(s)) ≤ (1− ϕb) εbεb+1 + ϕb
1





































































The function fio(w) is continuous in wages on S. We can therefore apply Brouwer’s fixed point theorem
and claim that at least one solution exists for the system of equations formed by (2.19).
Uniqueness. First we introduce the following Theorem and Corollary that we will use later to establish
uniqueness in our proofs. These are transcribed from Allen et al. (2016) as they are not present any more in
the current version of the paper Allen et al. (2020a):
Theorem 2. Consider g : Rn++ ×Rm++ for some n ∈ {1, ..., N} and m ∈ {1, ..., M} such that:




> 0 for all i 6= j,
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(iii) monotonicity with respect to the joint variable:
∂gi
∂yk
≥ 0, for all i, k.
Then, for any given y0 ∈ RM++ there exists at most one solution satisfying g(x, y0) = 0.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose there are two different up-to-scale, solutions, x1, x2, such
that f (x1) = f (x2) = 0 i.e. g(x1, y0) = g(x2, y0) = 0. Without loss of generality, suppose there exists
some t > 1 such that tx1j ≥ x2j for all j ∈ {1, ..., n} and the equality holds for at least one j = j̄. Then the
inequality must strictly hold since x1 and x2 are different up-to-scale. Condition (iii) ∂gi∂yk ≥ 0, for all i, k implies
g(tx1, y0) ≤ g(tx1, ty0) = 0 where g(tx1, ty0) = 0 is from condition (i) (and also g(tx2, ty0) = 0 because x1
and x2 are solutions). However, condition (ii) implies gj(tx1, y0) > gj(x2, y0) = 0, thus a contradiction.







k(x) where gj(x), hk(x) are non-negative vector functions and, respectively, homogeneous of degree αj and βk,
ᾱ = max αj ≤ min βk.
1. Then there is at most one up-to-scale solution of f (x) = 0.
2. In particular, if for some j, k αj 6= βk, then there is at most one solution.
Proof. Define m(x, y) as a vector function where mi(x, y) = ∑
ν f
j=1 y
ᾱ−αj gji(x) − ∑
νg
k=1 y
ᾱ−βk hki (x). Obviously,
m(x, y) is of homogenous degree ᾱ and ∂mi∂y ≥ 0. Also we have f (x) = m(x, y0) where y0 = 1, thus the above
theorem applies.
Furthermore, if fi(x) is not homogeneous of some degree because αj 6= βk, there is at most one solution.
Suppose not, tx1 and x1 are the solutions, then fi(x1) > t−min(βk) fi(tx1) = 0, also a contradiction.
In order to prove uniqueness we use Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 stated above.
Define the function g : Rn++ → Rn for some n ∈ {1, ..., N} as:
gio(w) = fio(w)− wio, ∀i ∈ {1, .., N}.
We want to prove that the solution satisfying g(w) = 0 is unique. In order to do so, we first need to show
that g(w) satisfies the gross substitution property ( ∂gio∂wjo > 0 for any j 6= i).





















> 0. We have that
∂λ(µ(sio|m))
∂µ(sio|m)
> 0 and we previously established that, under
the assumption that 0 < η < εb,
∂µ(sio|m)
∂sio|m
< 0. The share of an establishment i with occupation o in sub-market












< 0 for any i 6= j. Therefore ∂gio∂wjo > 0 for any i 6= j and g satisfies the gross-substitution property.
The remaining condition to use Corollary 1 is simply that fio(w) is homogeneous of a degree smaller than
1.65 Clearly, fio(w) is homogeneous of degree 0 as a consequence that the markdown function itself µ(sio|m)
is homogeneous of degree 0. Therefore, the function g satisfies the conditions of Corollary 1 and we can
conclude that there exists at most one solution satisfying g(w) = 0.
65The degree of homogeneity of hio(w) = wio is 1.
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Proof of Proposition 9.


























































Define fb = log(Fb) and f as a B× 1 vector whose element b′ is fb′ . Then, taking logs and rearranging the
previous expression we obtain:











log(Ab′) + (1− δ) log(Φ̃b′Γηb′)
)]








(αb′(1 + ηδ) + η(1− δ)) .
Define the vector C = [C1, ..., Cb, ..., CB] that contains the constant terms and the matrix D = [d, ..., d] which
repeats the d vector B times. We can stack all the terms for all b ∈ B from the previous expression and obtain
the following system of equations:
f = C + D′f. (49)
A solution to the system (49) exists if the matrix I−D′ is invertible. This matrix has an eigenvalue of zero
if and only if the sum of the elements of the vector d is equal to 1. Additionally, this sum is equal to 1 if and
only if ∑b αbθb = 1 as:
∑
b
db = 1 ⇔ ∑
b
(αb(1 + ηδ) + η(1− δ)) θb = 1 + η
⇔∑
b
αbθb(1 + ηδ) = 1 + η − η(1− δ) ⇔∑
b
αbθb =





Therefore we can conclude that whenever ∑b αbθb 6= 1 the transformed prices F have a unique solution. This
is always the case as long as 0 ≤ βb, θb < 1 ∀b ∈ B and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
















































Substituting Fb into the price index and solving for C we recover the expression showed in Proposition 9.
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2.D Identification Details
2.D.1 Identification of η and δ
In order to identify the across markets labor supply elasticity η and the labor demand elasticity δ we exploit
the fact that in local labor markets where there is only one establishment, the wedge λ(µ, φb) is constant
within industries b. We denominate this type of establishments as full monopsonists. Additionally, the effect of
wages on the labor supply of full monopsonists is only affected by the parameter η as the within market labor
supply elasticity εb is irrelevant in local labor markets with only one establishment. Taking the logarithm for
the labor supply full monopsonists face (2.13) we get:






As mentioned before, full monopsonists apply a constant markdown equal to µ(s = 1) = ηη+1 that in turn
will imply a constant wedge λ(µ, φb) within industry b. Their (inverse) labor demand (2.16) in logs is:
ln(wio,s=1) = ln(βb) + ln(
η
η + 1




In order to get rid of industry and economy wide constants, we demean ln(Lio,s=1) and ln(wio,s=1) by re-
moving the industry b averages per year. Denoting with ln(X) the demeaned variables, we rewrite the labor
supply and (inverse) demand equations as:




ln(wio) = −δ ln(Lio) + ln(Aio). (50)
The above system is just a traditional demand and supply setting. As it is well known, the above system
is under-identified. It is the classic textbook example of when a regression model suffers from simultane-
ity bias. The reason for this under-identification is the following: while the variance-covariance matrix of(
ln(Lio), ln(wio)
)
gives us three objects from the data, the system above has five unknowns, which are the
elasticities, η and δ, plus the three components of the variance-covariance matrix of the structural errors
η
εb
ln(Tio) and ln(Aio). Therefore, in absence of valid instruments that would exogenously vary either the
supply or demand equations in (50) we can not identify the elasticities.66
In order to identify the elasticities using the labor supply and demand equations in (50), we impose re-
strictions on the variance-covariance matrix of the structural errors while exploiting the differences in the
variance-covariance matrix of the employment and wages across occupations. This way of achieving identifi-
cation is known in the literature as identification through heteroskedasticity (see Rigobon (2003)). We classify our
four occupations into two broader categories S ∈ {1, 2}. Our identification assumption is that the covariance
between the transformed productivity ln(Aio) and amenities
η
εb
ln(Tio), that we denote σTA is constant within
each category S. The fact that the elasticities are the same across occupational groups, in addition to the
assumption of common covariance of the structural errors within broad categories, are the reason we can
achieve identification. The reason is simple: while the four occupational categories give us 3× 4 = 12 bits of
information, the unknowns to be identified are 2, δ and η, plus 2, the broad category covariances, plus 8, the
variances of the transformed productivities and amenities for each of the four occupational categories.67
66Also note that even if we would have available some valid instruments, we would only be able to identify δ and η but not εb.
67Of course we could have a more stringent identification assumption that would leave us with an overidentified system, for example,
that all covariances are equal to zero. As an additional exercise we also estimated the parameters following a different identification
strategy: we assume that the covariances of the structural errors were the same among all the occupational groups. This gives us a
system with one overidentification restriction. The point estimates using this assumption and the one we mentioned above are pretty
similar.
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We can rewrite the system (50) in the following way:
η
εb
ln(Tio) = ln(Lio)− η ln(wio),
ln(Aio) = δ ln(Lio) + ln(wio). (51)
Denote the covariance matrix of the structural errors for occupation o in category S (meaning the left hand side
of system (51)) by ΨoS. Denote the covariance matrix between employment and wages of the full monospon-
ists by V̂oS. The covariance of system (51) writes as:
ΨoS = DV̂oSD







where T denotes the transpose. Formally, our identifying assumption is that σAT,oS = σAT,o′S for occupations
that belong to the same category S. Taking differences within category,
∆S ≡ ΨoS −Ψo′S = D[V̂oS − V̂o′S]DT , ∀S ∈ {1, 2}
where the differences of covariances in the left hand (element ∆S,[1,2]) is equal to zero. This gives us a just
identified system (two equations with two unknowns) to find the parameters η and δ. More details are
provided in Appendix 2.D.






































This system only allows us to identify η and δ. Denote by ΩS ≡ V̂oS− V̂o′S the difference between the variance
covariance matrix within category S and by ΩS,[1,2] = ω12,S the element on first row and second column. The
system of differences is:
∆S = DΩSD
T , ∀S ∈ {1, 2}
With the identification assumption of equal covariance within category, we have that:





, ∀S ∈ {1, 2}
Equalizing the above across both occupation categories we get a quadratic equation in δ̂ that solves:
δ̃2[ω11,1ω12,2 −ω11,2ω12,1]− δ̃[ω11,1ω22,2 −ω11,2ω22,1] + ω12,1ω22,2 −ω12,2ω22,1 = 0. (52)
This is the same system as the simple case without covariance between the fundamental shocks in Rigobon
(2003). Different to him, ΩS is not directly the estimated variance-covariance matrix of each of the 4 occupa-
tions but rather the matrix of differences within category or state S. As mentioned by Rigobon (2003) there
are two solutions to the previous equation. One can show that if δ̃∗ and η∗ are a solution then the other
solution is equal to δ̃ = 1/η∗ and η = 1/δ̃∗. This means that the solutions are actually the two possible ways
the original structural system (50) can be written. In order to identify which of the two possible solutions we
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are identifying, we have that by assumption η is positive while δ̃ is negative. Therefore as long as the two
possible solutions for δ̃ have different signs, we just need to pick the negative one.
Given the identification strategy, in order to estimate the elasticities δ and η we just need to obtain the em-
ployment and wages covariance matrices directly from the data on establishments that are full monopsonists
and solve for (52).
2.D.2 Identification of ϕb
In order to identify the industry workers bargaining power, we need to construct the model counterparts of





Ib being the set of all establishment-occupations that belong to 2-digit industry b. We target the average






Given that the wedge λ(µio, ϕb) is increasing in ϕb, then LSMbt (ϕb) is increasing in ϕb as well. Therefore, if a
solution exists for (53) with ϕb ∈ [0, 1] this has to be unique.68
2.D.3 Amenities
In order to preform some counterfactuals we still need to compute other policy invariant parameters, or
fundamentals, from the data. In particular we need to recover establishment-occupation amenities and TFPRs,
while ensuring that in equilibrium the wages and labor allocations are the same as in the data.







The sub-market level Φm is a function of the amenities of all plants in m. We proceed by normalizing one
particular local labor market. Note that the allocation of resources is independent from this normalization.
We denote the local labor market that we normalize as 1. The relative employment share of market m with



































2.E Additional Estimation Results
Table 27 has the calibrated final good production function elasticities of the intermediate the {θb}Bb=1 and the
required rate {Rb}Bb=1 for the year 2007.
68It can be the case that the solution does not exist. For example, given values of βb, εb and η, even with ϕb = 1 the labor share
generated by the model is too small to the one in the data. This does not happen with our data.
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Table 26 – Industry Estimates
Industry Code Industry Name β̂b ε̂b ϕ̂b
15 Food 0.74 1.69 0.22
17 Textile 0.74 1.49 0.51
18 Clothing 0.84 1.41 0.31
19 Leather 0.85 2.09 0.26
20 Wood 0.77 1.51 0.42
21 Paper 0.61 3.06 0.55
22 Printing 0.84 1.52 0.18
24 Chemical 0.67 3.25 0.06
25 Plastic 0.73 2.51 0.35
26 Other Minerals 0.65 1.62 0.43
27 Metallurgy 0.61 3.77 0.59
28 Metals 0.81 1.22 0.38
29 Machines and Equipments 0.79 2.18 0.32
30 Office Machinery 0.81 3.33 0.20
31 Electrical Equipment 0.65 3.02 0.67
32 Telecommunications 0.62 3.54 0.73
33 Optical Equipment 0.75 1.91 0.45
34 Transport 0.57 4.05 0.69
35 Other Transport 0.72 3.49 0.44
36 Furniture 0.81 1.57 0.43
Notes: All the estimated parameters are 2-digit industry specific. β̂b are the estimated output
elasticities with respect of labor, ε̂b are the within local labor market elasticities and ϕ̂b are
union bargaining powers.
2.F Data Details
We provide additional summary statistics and details about sample selection and variable construction.
2.F.1 Additional Summary Statistics
Table 30 – CZ Summary Statistics. Baseline Year
Variable Obs. Mean Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75) St. Dev.
Nn 356 773.798 266.8 461 861.2 1,168.407
Ln 356 8,300.567 2,567.403 5,244.300 10,086.210 11,322.000
Ln 356 11.389 8.148 10.878 13.547 6.043
wn 356 34.399 32.707 34.161 35.593 3.242
Note: Nn is the number of establishments at the CZ, Ln is full time equivalent employment at CZ, Ln is the average Liot
of establishment-occupations at n, wn is the mean wiot of the establishment-occupations at n in thousands of constant 2015
euros.
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Table 27 – Calibrated {θb} and {Rb}
Industry Code Industry Name θb Rb
15 Food 0.13 0.11
17 Textile 0.02 0.14
18 Clothing 0.01 0.14
19 Leather 0.01 0.14
20 Wood 0.02 0.13
21 Paper 0.02 0.13
22 Printing 0.06 0.13
24 Chemical 0.14 0.16
25 Plastic 0.06 0.15
26 Other Minerals 0.05 0.15
27 Metallurgy 0.03 0.14
28 Metals 0.10 0.14
29 Machines and Equipments 0.09 0.17
30 Office Machinery 0.00 0.17
31 Electrical Equipment 0.04 0.23
32 Telecommunications 0.04 0.23
33 Optical Equipment 0.04 0.23
34 Transport 0.04 0.19
35 Other Transport 0.06 0.19
36 Furniture 0.03 0.14
Notes: All the calibrated parameters are 2-digit industry specific for the year 2007. θb are
the intermediate good elasticities in the final good production function and Rb are the capital
rental rates for 2007. We construct the rental rates following Barkai (2016).
2.F.2 Sample Selection
Ficus. This data source comes from tax records therefore we observe yearly firm information. We exclude
the source tables belonging to public firms.69 Before 2000 we take table sources in euros and from 2001
onward we use data from consolidated economic units.70 After excluding firms without firm identifier the
raw data sample contains about 29 million firms from which about 2.8 million are manufacturing firms.71
Manufacturing sector (sector code equal to D) constitutes on average 10% of the observations, 19.2% of value
added and 27.2% of employment.
Postes. DADS Postes covers all the employment spells of a salaried employee per year. If a worker has several
spells in a year we would have multiple observations. The main benefit of this employer-employee data
source is that we can know the establishment and employment location of the workers. We exclude workers
69We only use the Financial units (FIN) and Other units (TAB) tables and exclude Public administration (APU).
70The profiling of big groups consolidates legal units into economic units. In 2001 the Peugeot-Citroën PSA was treated, Renault in
2003 and the group Accor in 2005. This implies the definition of new economic entities and would therefore lead to the creation of new
firm identifiers. Given the potential impact of big establishments in local labor markets we opted to maintain them.
71We consider a missing firm identifier (SIREN) also if the identifier equals to zero for all the 9 digits.
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Table 28 – Estimated Within Elasticities for Different Lags
Industry Code Industry Name 1 Lag ε̂b 2 Lags ε̂b
15 Food 1.69 1.99
17 Textile 1.49 1.83
18 Clothing 1.41 1.69
19 Leather 2.09 2.50
20 Wood 1.51 1.77
21 Paper 3.06 3.39
22 Printing 1.52 1.79
24 Chemical 3.25 3.56
25 Plastic 2.51 3.04
26 Other Minerals 1.62 1.77
27 Metallurgy 3.77 4.35
28 Metals 1.22 1.48
29 Machines and Equipments 2.18 2.63
30 Office Machinery 3.33 3.72
31 Electrical Equipment 3.02 3.61
32 Telecommunications 3.54 4.08
33 Optical Equipment 1.91 2.36
34 Transport 4.05 4.56
35 Other Transport 3.49 4.05
36 Furniture 1.57 1.90
Notes: All the estimated parameters are 2-digit industry specific. 1 Lag ε̂b are the estimated
within local labor market elasticities when we instrument for the wages with one lag and 1
Lag ε̂b present the analogous when we instrument with two lags.
in establishments with fictitious identifiers (SIREN starting by F) and in public firms. For every establishment
identifier (SIRET) we sum the wage bill and the full time equivalent number of employees.
Merged Data. After merging both data sources we finish with data with yearly establishment observations.
After the filters and merging the sample consists of 1.3 million firms and 1.6 million establishment observa-
tions. In the process of filtering and merging about half of the original firms are lost. Wages and value added
are deflated using the Consumer Price Index.72
Labor and wage data coming from the balance sheets (at the firm level) and the one from employee
records needs to be consolidated. In order to be consistent with balance sheet information we assign labor
and employment coming from FICUS to the establishments according to their respective shares. We proceed
in several steps. First, we filter out observations with no wage or employment information from Postes
from firms present at different commuting zones. Second, we do some additional cleaning by getting rid of
observations with no labor, capital and wage bill information coming from FICUS and also observations with
non existing or missing commuting zone. Third, we aggregate employee data to the firm times commuting
72Nominal variables are expressed in constant 2015 euros.
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Table 29 – Transition Probabilities
Occup. Ch. CZ Ch. Ind. Ch. Trans. Prob. FTE Trans. Prob.
0 0 0 91.39 91.01
0 0 1 2.37 2.36
0 1 0 0.02 0.02
1 0 0 6.03 6.40
1 0 1 0.20 0.21
1 1 0 0.00 0.00
1 1 1 0.00 0.00
Note: The transition rates are computed over the whole sample period 1994-2007. Occup. Ch. is an
indicator function of occupational change, CZ. Ch. is an indicator function of commuting zone change,
Ind. Ch. is an indicator function of 3-digit industry change, Trans. Prob. FTE are the unconditional
transition probabilities based on full time equivalent units and Trans. Prob. are the unconditional
transition probabilities based on counts of working spells independently of duration and part-time
status.
zone level.73 Then we compute the labor and wage shares of these entities out of the firm’s aggregates. What
we call establishment through out the text is the entity aggregated at the commuting zone level. Finally, we
split firm data from the balance sheet according to those shares. This procedure leaves the firms in a unique
commuting zone with their balance sheet data but allows to split wage bill and employment data coming
from the balance sheet for multi-location firms. Establishment wage is simply the average wage. That is,
wage bill over total full time equivalent employees.
We further exclude Tobacco (2-digits industry code 16), Refineries & Nuclear industry (code 23) and
Recycling (code 37). We finally get rid of the outliers reducing the sample 1.5% and finish with 4,156,754
establishment-occupation-year observations that belong to 1.25 million firms.74
2.F.3 Variable Construction
Ficus:
• Value added: value added net of taxes (VACBF). We restrict to firms with strictly positive value added.75
• Capital: tangible and intangible capital without counting depreciation. It is the sum of the variables
IMMOCOR and IMMOINC.
• Employment: full time equivalent employment at the firm (EFFSALM).
• Wage bill: gross total wage bills. Is the sum of wages (SALTRAI) and firm taxed (CHARSOC).76
73Data from 1994 and 1995 do not have commuting zone information. We therefore impute it using correspondence tables between
city code and commuting zone. A city code has 5 digits coming from the department and city. Some commuting zone codes beyond
the 2 missing years were modified or cleaned. City codes (commune codes) of Paris, Marseille and Lyon were divided into different
arrondissements. We assign them codes 75056, 13055 and 69123 respectively. Then we proceed to the cleaning of commuting zones by
assigning to the non existing codes the one corresponding to the city where the establishment is located. We get rid of non matched or
missing commuting zone codes. We aggregate the data coming from Postes at the commuting zone level after this cleaning.
74We get rid of wage per capita outliers by truncating the sample at the 0.5% below and 99.5%.
75We follow the advise of the French statistical instiute (INSEEE) in using net value added to perform comparisons across industries.
76For firms declaring at the BIC-BRN regime (TYPIMPO= 1) we only take SALTRAI .
152
• Industry: industry classification comes from APE. The sub-industries h are 3 digit industries and indus-
tries b are at two digits.
Postes:
• Occupation: original occupation categories come from the two digit occupations (CS2). We group
occupations with first digits 2 and 3 into a unique occupation group.77 This regrouping is done to
avoid substantial changes in occupation groups between 1994 and 2007. Observations with missing
occupation information are excluded.
• Employment: full time equivalent at the establishment-occupation level (etp).
• Wage: is the gross wage (per year) of individual worker (sbrut). If the spell is less than a year is the
gross wage corresponding to the spell.
• Commuting zone: depending on the year, the commuting zone classification is taken from the variable
zemp or zempt. Commuting zone information is missing for the years 1994 and 1995 and is imputed
using the city codes.78
2.F.4 Construction of Required Rates
In order to construct the required rates for the different sectors we follow the methodology proposed by
Barkai (2016) using the Capital Input Data from the EU KLEMS database, December 2016 revision. In this
dataset one can find, for a given industry, different depreciation rates and price indices for different types of
capital. The types of capital that are present in the manufacturing sector are: Computing Equipment, Com-
munications Equipment, Computer Software and Databases, Transport Equipment, Buildings and structures
(non-residential), and Research and Development. We construct a required rate for each of the industries at
the 2 digit level defined in the NAF classification. However, unlike the NAF classification, that we have up
to 20 different industries, there are only 11 industries classified within manufacturing within the EU KLEMS
database. Any industry classification in EU KLEMS is just an aggregation of the 2 digit industry classification
in NAF. Therefore there are industries within the NAF classification that will have the same required rate of
return on capital.
For a type of capital s and sector b, we define the the required rate of return Rsb as:
Rsb =
(
iD −E [πsb] + δsb
)
,
where iD is a the cost fo debt borrowing in financial markets, and πsb and δsb are, respectively, the inflation
and depreciation rates of capital type s in sector b.




where PKsbKsb is the nominal value of capital stock of type s. Summing over all types of capital within a sector






77Occupations with first digit 1 and 7 are excluded. They constituted less than 0.05% of the matched sample.
78City codes are the concatenation of department (DEP) and city (COM).
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where the first term Rb is the interest rate that we use in the model.
2.G Empirical Evidence
Example of an economy with four local labor markets and four firms identified by color. Each firm is multi-
location with plants at different local labor markets. The blue firm is affected by a mass layoff at the national
level (in all the local markets where it is present). Natural experiment on sio|m for non-blue establishments.













The treated establishments are the ones in local markets 1 and 2.
Figure 23 – Treated Establishments
1 2
3 4









where the right hand side is the marginal cost ( ∂wio Lio∂Lio ) when internalizing movements along the labor supply
curve. Noting that ∂wio∂Lio
Lio
wio












When labor supply is infinitely elastic, the MRPL is equal to the wage. When eio < ∞ the wage will be below
the MRPL. Panel (a) of Figure 24 shows equilibrium wages and employment when the firm acts as a price
taker (PT) and when it exerts labor market power (MP).
When firms have labor market power and do not act strategically, their perceived elasticity is constant,
eio = e. The last term above is therefore constant implying that conditional on a labor supply level, wages are
independent to employment shares. When the perceived elasticity is a decreasing function of the employment
share, shocks that increase employment share will move the marginal cost (MC) curve to the left. Panel (b)
of Figure 24 gives an intuition of our instrument.






















2.G.1 Definition of Mass Layoff
Denote by ML the set of firms with a national mass layoff. That is, firms with all the establishments suffering
a mass layoff. We instrument the employment share of the establishments of firms not suffering the national
mass layoff j /∈ ML by the exogenous event of a firm present at the local labor market having a negative
shock. We restrict the analysis to non-shocked firms present in different commuting zones with at least
one establishment in a sub-market where a competitor has suffered a mass layoff and another plant whose
competitors do not belong to firms in ML.
Local labor markets where a mass-layoff has occurred will take a value of Dm,t equal to 1.79 The first stage
is:
sio|m,t = ψJ(i),o,t + δN(i) + γ Dm,t + ǫio,t
79A firm j at occupation o is hit by a negative shock if ✶{Lio,t/Lio,t−1 < κ ∀i where J(i), t = j} = 1. A local labor market is identified
as shocked Dm,t = 1 if at least one establishment at the local market belongs to a firm in ML.
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where as before, ψJ(i),o,t is a firm-occupation-year fixed effect and δN(i) is a commuting zone fixed effect.
Using the fitted values we consider the following model for the second stage:
log(wio,t) = ψJ(i),o,t + δN(i) + α ŝio|m,t + uio,t (54)
Before generating the instrument, we need to identify the firms suffering from a mass layoff. Defining
a cut-off value κ, we identify a firm-occupation j ∈ LO if establishment-occupation employment at t is less
than κ% employment last year. The best instrument would be identifying firms that went bankrupt (κ = 0).
Given that we cannot externally identify if a firm disappears because it went bankrupt or change identifiers
keeping the number of competitors at the local market constant. There is a trade-off when choosing κ. On
the one hand, a lower threshold leads to considering stronger negative shocks and the generated instrument
would be cleaner. On the other hand, we would classify less firms as having a negative shock reducing the
number of events considered. This creates a bias-variance trade-off on the election of the threshold. Lacking
a clear candidate for κ, we try with different cut-off values.80
2.G.2 Robustness Checks
Figure 25 shows robustness checks of the reduced form exercise. The former considers a different instrument
for the employment shares and the latter is taking commuting zone-year fixed effects. The results in the main
text are with commuting zone fixed effects.
Figure 25 – Robustness
(a) Instrument: Intensive Share (b) CZ-year fixed effects
Notes: This figures present the point estimates and 95% confidence bands of the OLS and IV exercises on the y-axis. The x-axis presents different thresholds
κ that define a mass layoff shock. In both cases we focus on non-affected competitors (not suffering a mass layoff shock). The instrument in Panel (a) is the
presence of a mass layoff shock firm in the local labor market interacted with the employment share of the affected firm. Panel (b) presents the results with
commuting zone-year fixed effects.
Instead of considering local labor markets with industries at the 3-digit level h as in the baseline, they are
defined at the 2-digit level b.
80A standard value in the literature is κ =70%. That is a 30% lost of employment.
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Figure 26 – Robustness. Local Labor Market at 2-digit Industry
Notes: This figure presents the point estimates and 95% confidence bands of the OLS and IV exercises on the y-axis. The x-axis presents different thresholds
κ that define a mass layoff shock. We focus on non-affected competitors (not suffering a mass layoff shock). The instrument is the presence of a mass
layoff shock firm in the local labor market. The definition of local labor market is a combination of commuting zone, 2-digit industry and occupation. The
difference with respect to Figure 24 is that the local labor market is at 2-digit rather than 3-digit industry.
2.H Distributional and Efficiency Consequences
Here we illustrate the distributional and efficiency effects when the labor wedge λ is below one. Figure 27
illustrates the effect of labor market power on the distribution of value added into profits and wage payments.
For simplicity, we illustrate with the case of a production function using only labor with a decreasing returns
to scale technology. On the left panel, we have the case of perfect competition in the labor market where
wages are equal to the marginal revenue product of labor and the firm earns quasi-rents generated from
having decreasing returns. On the right panel, we illustrate the case with labor market power where employer
monopsony power dominates. Wages are below the marginal revenue product because the wedge λ is below
one. This generates additional profits for the firm, reducing wage bill payments and therefore the labor share.


















Figure 28 shows the efficiency consequences due to the misallocation of resources. The left panel shows
two firms with the same labor wedge. For simplicity we assume that all firms and local labor markets have the
same amenities so workers being indifferent, all establishments will have the same wage in equilibrium. With
homogeneous wedges, the marginal revenue products are equalized across establishments. In particular, if
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firm B is more productive we have in equilibrium LB > LA. On the right panel we show an example with
heterogeneous wedges. Firm B being more productive is more likely to have a higher employment share at
the local labor market and therefore a more important markdown. That is, µB < µA and therefore λB < λA.
Wages being equalized for all the establishments MRPLB > MRPLA. We illustrate the extreme case where
the distortion generated by labor market power flips the employment size of both firms and we have LA > LB.
Shifting employment from A to B, from low to high marginal revenue product firms, there could be efficiency
gains.
































The next Figure shows the wage inequality in the baseline scenario and in the counterfactual without
labor wedges when workers and firms act as price takers. Wages are demeaned.
Figure 29 – Wage Distribution
(a) Baseline Demeaned Wage Distribution (b) Counterfactual (PT) Demeaned Wage Distribution
2.H.1 Union
Tables 31 and 32 present respectively the rent sharing elasticities for industries and occupations.
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Table 31 – Rent Sharing: Industry
Industry Code Industry Name Rent Sharing SE Rent Sharing
15 Food 0.40 0.00
17 Textile 0.22 0.00
18 Clothing 0.31 0.00
19 Leather 0.31 0.00
20 Wood 0.32 0.00
21 Paper 0.22 0.00
22 Printing 0.34 0.00
24 Chemical 0.17 0.00
25 Plastic 0.23 0.00
26 Other Minerals 0.25 0.00
27 Metallurgy 0.14 0.00
28 Metals 0.37 0.00
29 Machines and Equipments 0.30 0.00
30 Office Machinery 0.33 0.01
31 Electrical Equipment 0.25 0.00
32 Telecommunications 0.23 0.00
33 Optical Equipment 0.32 0.00
34 Transport 0.22 0.00
35 Other Transport 0.31 0.00
36 Furniture 0.37 0.00
Table 32 – Rent Sharing: Occupation
Occupation Rent Sharing SE Rent Sharing
Top management 0.38 0.00
Supervisor 0.27 0.00
Clerical 0.29 0.00
Blue collar 0.30 0.00
2.I Alternative Production Function
In this section we denote the local labor market as in the main text. m denotes the combinations between
commuting zone, 3-digit industry and occupations. That is: m = n× h× o. We denote as a location l the
combinations of commuting zones and 3-digit industries l = n× h.



















γo = 1, αb + βb ≤ 1. (55)
The first order conditions are:
wio = βbγoλ(µio ϕb)Pb
yi
Lio





Substituting the first order condition for capital into the production function, the wage first order condition
becomes,












































































































































Fb ≡ P1/χb ,























The last system is equivalent to the one in (56) and has the benefit to being able to write the wages: wio =
w̃ioCmFb, where we want w̃io to be homogeneous of degree zero with respect constants to m level. Note that
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the last term inside the brackets is homogeneous of degree zero with respect to location l constants shared
by all the occupations of a establishments. Then, defining Φ̃m = ∑i∈Im Tiow
εb
io , the establishment-occupation























w̃io is homogeneous of degree zero with respect to location l constants shared by all occupations. This
property, allows to solve for the normalized wages of every location l (combinations of commuting zone n
and sub-industry h combinations) independently and then recover the aggregate constants. Aggregating (58)



















































which recovers all the constants inside w̃m.





























Cl Fb = ŵiozl = w̃ioCl Fb. (59)
We can show that the system formed by (59) has a solution and is unique.
Proposition 10. For given parameters 0 ≤ αb, βb < 1, 1 < η < εb, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, transformed price Fb, constants
Cl , Φ̃m, Ll and non-negative vectors of productivities {Ai}i∈m and amenities {Tio}io∈m, there exists a unique vector
of wages {wio}io∈Im for every location l (combination of commuting zone n and sub-industry h) that solves the system
formed by (59).
Sketch of the proof. For existence, first note that λ(µio, ϕb) ∈
[








Define a vector w with wage of all the occupation-establishments at location l, w ≡ {w11, w12, ..., w1O, ..., wI1, wI2, ..., wIO}.
Taking for now the elements of zl as constants. The system to solve is: fio(w) = ŵiozl . We have that

























































The system fio is continuous on wages and maps into itself on C. The last set being a compact set we can
apply Brower’s fixed point theorem.
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Define the function gio(w) = fio(w)− wio. Gross substitution is fulfilled if ∂gio(w)∂wjo > 0, ∀j 6= i with j ∈ Il and
∂gio(w)
∂wio′
, ∀o′. Gross substitution resumes to taking the partial derivatives of ŵio which are positive by similar
reasoning as in the main proof. Finally, ŵio is homogeneous of degree
εb
1+εb
(1− δ) < 1. Therefore the solution
to the system (59) exists and is unique.
Finally, the model can be aggregated up to the industry level following similar steps as in the baseline.
Steps to write the industry model are in Appendix 2.A.5 of the paper.
2.J Pass Through
Table 33 – Pass Through of Z
Industry Code Industry Name ǫWZ PT β̂
Z
b Diff SE β̂
Z
b
15 Food 0.933 0.890 0.043 0.000
17 Textile 0.940 0.916 0.024 0.000
18 Clothing 0.943 0.925 0.018 0.000
19 Leather 0.918 0.842 0.076 0.000
20 Wood 0.939 0.888 0.052 0.000
21 Paper 0.885 0.835 0.050 0.000
22 Printing 0.939 0.914 0.025 0.000
24 Chemical 0.879 0.720 0.159 0.000
25 Plastic 0.904 0.856 0.048 0.000
26 Other Minerals 0.935 0.887 0.048 0.000
27 Metallurgy 0.862 0.777 0.085 0.001
28 Metals 0.951 0.932 0.019 0.000
29 Machines and Equipments 0.915 0.861 0.054 0.000
30 Office Machinery 0.876 0.760 0.116 0.001
31 Electrical Equipment 0.886 0.848 0.039 0.000
32 Telecommunications 0.869 0.840 0.029 0.000
33 Optical Equipment 0.925 0.894 0.031 0.000
34 Transport 0.853 0.802 0.051 0.000
35 Other Transport 0.871 0.788 0.083 0.000
36 Furniture 0.938 0.909 0.029 0.000
Notes: This table presents the estimation results of equation (2.31) in column (4) β̂Zb and its comparison to the pass through
without the labor wedges in column (3) ǫWZ PT. Diff in column (5) shows the difference between the pass thorough without
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Abstract
Estimations of quadratic forms in the parameters of linear models exhibit small-sample bias.
The direct computation for a bias correction is not feasible when the number of covariates is large.
We propose a bootstrap method for correcting this bias that accommodates different assumptions
on the structure of the error term including general heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Our
approach is suited to correct variance decompositions and the bias of multiple quadratic forms
of the same linear model without increasing the computational cost. We show with Monte Carlo
simulations that our bootstrap procedure is effective in correcting the bias and we compare this
to other methods in the literature. Using administrative data for France, we apply our method by
carrying out a variance decomposition of a linear model of log wages with person and firm fixed
effects. We find that the person and firm effects are less important in explaining the variance of log
wages after correcting for the bias and depending on the specification that the correlation becomes
positive after the correction.
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3.1 Introduction
With the increased availability of large panel data sets, researchers have been interested in un-
derstanding to what extent unobserved heterogeneity can explain the variation of an outcome of
interest. Usually, econometricians include fixed effects in a standard linear model to control for this
unobserved heterogeneity and then perform a variance decomposition. These methods have been
used in the context of education to study the importance of classroom effects (e.g. Chetty et al.
(2011)) and extensively in the labor market context where log-additive models of wages are used
to study the determinants of labor income (e.g. Abowd et al. (1999); Card et al. (2013); Iranzo et al.
(2008); Lopes de Melo (2018)).
The elements of a variance decomposition of a linear model are quadratic objects in the param-
eters. As long as the parameters are estimated with noise, these quadratic objects are subject to
small-sample bias. This bias can be substantial and can even change the sign of estimated covari-
ances and correlations. Moreover, this bias does not fade away by increasing the sample size when
using panel data, as the number of parameters to estimate, i.e. the number of fixed effects, grows
with the sample size.
Focusing on the context of labor economics, researchers have used employer-employee matched
datasets to study the sorting patterns of workers into firms. Various papers have estimated a linear
model of log wages with person and firm fixed effects, following the seminal work of Abowd,
Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) (AKM henceforth). These studies compute the correlation between
the person and firm fixed effects to determine the degree of sorting in the labor market. Most
studies have found zero or negative correlations, casting doubt on whether there is sorting in the
labor market. However, as first noted by Abowd et al. (2004) this correlation is likely to suffer from
small-sample bias, dubbed limited mobility bias in their paper. Andrews et al. (2008) derive formulae
for correcting the bias when the errors are homoscedastic. Gaure (2014) provides formulae for more
general variance structures. Unfortunately, the direct implementation of these corrections in high
dimensional models is infeasible. The reason is that the corrections entail computing the inverse of
an impractically large matrix.2 This has prevented the direct application of the correction formulae.
In this paper we propose a bootstrap method to correct for small-sample bias in quadratic forms
in the estimated parameters of linear models with a large number of covariates. The main appli-
cation of the method is the correction of variance decompositions of multi-way fixed effects. The
method is very similar to MacKinnon and Smith Jr (1998) when the bias is flat or independent of
the initial estimates, but is more efficient than one that follows their approach directly. Compared
to other methods in the literature, our estimator also has the benefit of being fast and easy to im-
plement while allowing for a flexible error structure. Using Monte Carlo simulations we show that
our method successfully corrects the bias of quadratic forms in the parameters in cases where the
error term is heteroscedastic and when there is serial correlation or clustering of the errors. Our
procedure consists of a wild bootstrap under the assumption of diagonal covariance matrix, and a
2By large matrix we mean a matrix with dimension in the order of hundreds of thousands or millions. Instead of computing the
inverse directly, researchers usually rewrite the object of interest as a system of linear equations that can be solved by preconditioned
conjugate gradient methods. A particular example of such systems are the normal equations in OLS regressions.
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wild block bootstrap (Cameron et al., 2008) for those that are non-diagonal that is valid for unre-
stricted dependence of the error terms within group and heteroscedasticity. The method is flexible
in the definition of the group and therefore allows for example clustering of the errors depending
on the geographical area or serial correlation within the worker-firm match.
We apply our method to French administrative data and perform a variance decomposition of
an estimated AKM type model. Consistent with the Andrews et al. (2008) formulation, we find
that sample variances of person and firm effects are reduced and their covariance increased after
the correction. The estimated correlation at the connected set passes from -0.10 to -4.1e-04 under
the assumption of serial correlation of the error terms within the match.3 Abowd et al. (2004),
also using French data but a different sample, found a correlation of -0.28. Compared to estimates
from other countries, the correlation obtained with French data has been more negative and farther
from zero than the ones found in these other studies. We believe the reason behind this is that
the French data is a representative sub-sample of around 8% of the whole universe of workers. As
identification of the fixed effects comes from workers moving across firms, the particular sampling
procedure used to generate the French panel tends to deliver a sample with few workers moving
across jobs, resulting in noisier estimates of the fixed effects. Indeed, in Table 1 of Lopes de Melo
(2018) the correlation in the French data is the most negative and the ratio of workers to firms the
smallest of all studies, suggesting that this dataset can exhibit substantial noise in the estimates
making it harder to correct for the bias.
Our approach is similar to the ones proposed by Gaure (2014) and by Kline et al. (2020). All
methods rely on iterative procedures to compute an estimate of the bias correction term. In general,
the bias appears as the trace of a matrix, but when the number of covariates of the linear model is
large, the explicit computation of this trace is not practical. Gaure exploits the fact that the trace can
be represented as the expectation of a more manageable quadratic form in a random vector, which
is estimated as a sample mean.4 He sketches the procedure to correct for the bias when the error
terms are heteroscedastic but to the best of our knowledge does not implement it in his R package
lfe.5
Kline et al. (2020) (KSS henceforth) follow a similar approach to Gaure (2014) in estimating the
small sample bias of second order moments. They compute the trace term leading to the bias and
estimate the covariance matrix based on leave-one-out estimates. For the applications with many
covariates where the direct computation is unfeasible, they propose an approximation algorithm
to estimate the bias. Similarly to us, they show their estimator is unbiased and consistent. Our
approach differs in the way we estimate the trace term and also on the estimate of the covariance
matrix we use. The main benefit of our method is to be faster and more flexible. Monte Carlo
3In a more restricted sample fulfilling the requirements to apply the method of Borovičková and Shimer (2017), the estimated
correlation passes from -0.06 to 0.08 after the correction.
4In particular, the way Gaure estimates the trace is known as the Hutchinson method. Denote a random vector x ∈ Rn, where each
individual entry is independently distributed Rademacher (entries can take values of 1 or -1 with probability 1/2). Then, for a square
matrix A ∈ Rn×n we have that tr(A) = E(x′Ax). The Hutchinson estimator of the trace of matrix A is 1M ∑Mi=1 x′i Axi , where xi is the i-th
draw of the random vector x. See Hutchinson (1989) and Avron and Toledo (2011).
5One can download the lfe package at: ❤tt♣s✿✴✴❝r❛♥✳r✲♣r♦❥❡❝t✳♦r❣✴✇❡❜✴♣❛❝❦❛❣❡s✴❧❢❡✴✐♥❞❡①✳❤t♠❧. The function applying the
correction is bccorr.
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simulations show that our correction is between 30% to 60% faster than KSS, has similar accuracy
and is suited to perform a full variance decomposition while their method focuses on the two main
fixed effects. Nevertheless, KSS go one step further and propose how we can perform inference in
situations when the rank of the quadratic form depends on the sample size (e.g. when we have
two-way fixed effects).
The computational cost in Gaure and KSS comes from estimating a bias correction for each inter-
ested quadratic form, as it requires solving a large system of linear equations in each iteration that
are particular to each quadratic form. In contrast, we re-estimate the model with bootstrapped data
and show that a sample mean of the bootstrapped moment estimates is an unbiased and consistent
estimator of the almost feasible bias correction term. In our method, the computational cost comes
from estimating the linear model in each bootstrap but does not increase depending on the number
of moments to correct. Regardless of the number of moments to correct, we need to solve one sys-
tem of linear equations per bootstrap, while with the Gaure and KSS methods one needs to solve as
many systems of equations per iteration as needed corrections.6 They implement corrections of the
second order moments of the two leading fixed effects while we can directly perform a full variance
decomposition, which is therefore suited for corrections on multi-way fixed effect regressions.
Following the work of MacKinnon and Smith Jr (1998) bootstrap methods have been used to
correct for variance estimates in linear models with fixed effects (e.g. Kane and Staiger, 2008; Best
et al., 2017). Our contribution with respect to those is to propose a more efficient bootstrap method
with a special focus on two-way fixed effects and to compare it to other methods in the literature.
Borovičková and Shimer (2017) (henceforth BS) provide an alternative method to compute the
correlation of firm types and workers, which has the advantage of not requiring estimates of all
the worker and firm fixed effects and directly computing the correlation. We perform two exercises
to compare our method with theirs. First, we simulate labor market data that fulfills the key
identifying assumptions of the AKM linear model and of BS. We find that both methods correct
the bias but ours outperforms theirs in terms of accuracy of the estimation of each of the elements
of the correlation, but is naturally more time consuming. Second, we apply their method to the
French data. In order to do so, we need to deviate in two aspects from the original dataset used
in our main application: first, we need to restrict the sample to workers that have at least two jobs
and firms that have at least two workers; second, we need to take averages of every match between
firm and workers.7 The first restriction implies that the sample used for BS is about half of the
original sample of private firms.8 Suggestive of the potential sample selection issues is that the
plug-in estimate of the correlation between worker and firm fixed effects is -0.10 under the original
data whereas is -0.06 under the connected set generated from BS data. Both approaches now yield
different estimates. They estimate a correlation between worker and firm types of 0.56 while we
estimate correlations of 0.09 or 0.16 depending on the specification. We estimate our corrections of
6For example, consider the linear model yt = X1t β1 + X2t β2 + εt where one is interested in doing a variance decomposition for each
period t. This would yield three quadratic objects to correct (Var(X1 β̂1), Var(X2 β̂2), Cov(X1 β̂1, X2 β̂2)) per period.
7More precisely this would mean that if we observe one worker employed for a certain firms for several years, we would take the
average wage of that worker in that firm as one observation.
8The original data of private firms has 5.8 million observations while after filtering of two job and worker restrictions the sample has
only 2.5 million observations.
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the variance components at the connected set originated from the BS data restrictions.
Labor economists have been aware of the small-sample bias problem with quadratic forms in
the parameters and the difficulty in estimating a correction at least since Andrews et al. (2008).
There have been several attempts to correct this bias when performing variance decompositions
of estimated linear models. Some methods are based on leaving out part of the data, such as the
panel jacknife estimator by Dhaene and Jochmans (2015) or the leave one out estimator by KSS
already mentioned. Another method relies on reducing the dimensionality of the parameters to be
estimated, thereby reducing the noise in the estimates and the small-sample bias in any quadratic
form, like in Bonhomme et al. (2019). Recently Jochmans and Weidner (2019) characterize the
dependence between the bias of nonlinear functionals on the parameters and the network structure
of the data allowing for more than second order moments. Exploring these dependencies is out of
the scope of this paper.
3.2 The Bias
For clarity of exposition we layout the source of the bias characterized by Andrews et al. (2008).
Consider the following linear model:9
Y = Xβ + u, (3.1)
where Y is a n× 1 vector representing the endogenous variable, X is a matrix of covariates of size
n× k, and β is a vector of parameters. The error term u satisfies mean independence E(u|X) = 0.
The OLS estimate of β is,
β̂ = β + Qu,
where Q = (X′X)−1 X′. We are interested in estimating the following quadratic form ϕ = β′Aβ for
some non-random matrix A of dimensions k× k. From the expression for β̂ we can decompose the
the plug-in estimator ϕ̂PI = β̂′Aβ̂ as,
ϕ̂PI = β
′Aβ + u′Q′AQu + 2u′Q′Aβ. (3.2)
Using the general formula for the expectation of quadratic forms and the exclusion restriction
E(u|X) = 0 we obtain,10




= ϕ + δ, (3.3)
where the bias δ ≡ trace (Q′AQV(u|X)) comes from the fact that β̂ is estimated with noise. This
bias is larger in cases where the sample size is small relative to the number of parameters to
estimate. In the two-way fixed effects AKM model, the number of observations per worker/firm
are usually small relative to the amount of fixed effects. Moreover, the observations identifying the
firm fixed effects are the ones of firm movers which tend to be small in samples with low mobility.






9We somewhat follow the notation in Kline et al. (2020) for the interested reader to compare the papers.
10Given a random vector x and a symmetric matrix B we have that E(x′Bx) = E(x′)BE(x) + trace(BV(x)).
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where V̂(u|X) is an estimator of the conditional variance of the error term V(u|X). The almost fea-
sible bias correction δ̂ is an unbiased estimate of the bias term δ if and only if V̂(u|X) is an unbiased
estimator of V(u|X).11 Therefore we need an unbiased estimate of the conditional variance to be
able to compute the almost feasible bias correction δ̂.12 We can define then the following unbiased
estimate of ϕ as:13
ϕ̂ = β̂′Aβ̂− δ̂.
Unfortunately, when the number of covariates is very large, computing the almost feasible bias
correction δ̂ directly is computationally infeasible. This is because, in order to compute the trace, we
need to calculate first the matrix Q, which is itself a function of the inverse of a very large matrix.14
In the next section we propose a methodology to apply a computationally feasible correction. But
first, we describe how the components of a variance decomposition of a linear model are indeed
quadratic forms in the parameters.
3.2.1 Components of a variance decomposition as quadratic objects
When performing a variance decomposition of a linear model, one can think of each element as a
particular form of β̂′Aβ̂ with the appropriate choice of A. To see this, we can rewrite (3.1) as
Y = X1β1 + X2β2 + u,
where X1 and X2 are matrices of covariates of size n× k1 and n× k2, k = k1 + k2 with X = [X1 X2]
and β′ = [β′1 β
′
2].
We are interested in the sample variances (v̂ar(X1β1), v̂ar(X2β2)) and covariance (ĉov(X1β1, X2β2)),
denoted, respectively, as σ21 , σ
2
2 and σ12.
15 Define 1 as a vector of ones with appropriate length. Then,
denote the demeaning operator as M1 = I− P1 = I− 1n 11′. We can then write the sample variances
and covariances in matrix notation as
σ2j = β
′Ajβ, for j = {1, 2} and
σ12 = β
′A12β,






































= trace (Q′AQV(u|X)) = δ.












13Notice that we say "unbiased" and not "bias-corrected". The reason for this is that as long as E(δ̂|X) = δ, then it follows that
E(ϕ̂|X) = ϕ.
14The dimension of this matrix is related to the number of covariates that are estimated in the linear model. In a typical AKM type
model the data will comprise of hundreds of thousands of workers and tens of thousands of firms, each representing a covariate in the
model.
15The sample variance for a vector x = {x1, x2, ..., xn} is v̂ar(x) = 1n−1 ∑Ni=1 (xi − x)
2, where x is the sample mean. Similarly, the sample
covariance for vectors x and y is ĉov(x, y) = 1n−1 ∑
N
i=1 (xi − x) (yi − y).
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The plug-in estimators of σ21 , σ
2
2 and σ12, obtained by substituting β with the OLS estimate β̂, are
just particular examples of ϕ̂PI . Therefore, these estimates will also be biased.
3.3 Bootstrap Correction
The bootstrap correction estimates the almost feasible bias correction (3.4) by replicating the bias
structure of the plug-in estimates (3.2). In this section we present the bootstrap correction and
discuss different implementations depending on the choice of the covariance matrix estimate.
Suppose that we have the residuals of our original regression û = Y−Xβ̂. Using these residuals
we can construct an estimate of the covariance matrix, V̂(u|X), which we discuss in Section 3.3.1.
We generate a new dependent variable for the bootstrap Y∗ as:
Y∗ = v∗,
where v∗ is a vector containing the bootstrapped residuals. This is equivalent to performing a
traditional bootstrap as in MacKinnon and Smith Jr (1998), while setting β̂ = 0. The construction of
v∗ will depend ultimately in the assumption that we are making about the error term. In particular,
we need that the variance of the bootstrapped errors V(v∗|X) to be equal to V̂(u|X). The following
proposition states the main result of the paper and all the proofs are left to Appendix 3.A:
Proposition 11. Suppose the regression model (3.1) is correctly specified. Let n∗ denote the number of
bootstraps. Define β∗j as the OLS estimate of regressing v
∗
j over X for the j-th bootstrap iteration. If the







is an unbiased and consistent estimator of the almost feasible bias correction δ̂.
The proposition tells us that instead of computing directly the almost feasible bias correction
term δ̂, which can be infeasible, we can estimate it using a sample average of estimated quadratic
forms.
The intuition behind our bias estimator is that in every bootstrap iteration we are replicating
the source of the bias, which is the noise embedded in the estimated parameters. MacKinnon
and Smith Jr (1998) propose a similar bootstrap to correct for flat biases like the one we want to
eliminate.16 MacKinnon and Smith Jr (1998) propose building the bootstrapped dependent variable
by using the original estimate of β, Y∗ = Xβ̂ + v∗. In our application we would next compute the
quadratic objects β∗′j,MS Aβ
∗







β̂′Aβ̂. They already note that one can estimate a flat bias correction by using any β to generate
Y∗. In particular, the one we use β̂ = 0. Nevertheless, analogously to equation (3.2) we have that
in bootstrap j: β∗′j,MS Aβ
∗
j,MS = β̂




′Aβ̂. When the covariance matrix of
the errors is diagonal, it can be shown that the covariance of the last two terms conditional on X
and u is equal to 0. Thus we have that the conditional variance of their estimator in the bootstrap
16A flat bias is one that does not depend on the levels of the original estimates. In our notation, the bias is flat because the trace term
in (3.3) is independent of β̂.
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is: V(δ̂b,MS|X, u) =
1
n∗
V((v∗)′Q′AQv∗|X, u) + 4
n∗
V(v∗′Q′Aβ̂|X, u) where we used the fact that
β̂ is not a random variable once we condition on X and u to eliminate the first term, and the
independence of the bootstrap errors v∗ across j to enter the variance into the sum. We therefore
have that the conditional variance of their estimator:




is higher than ours, attributable to the presence of the last term similarly to equation (3.2). Both
methods are unbiased and consistent but ours is more efficient as we show in Section 3.3.2.
The computational burden of our method comes from estimating β∗j for each bootstrap. The
advantage of our method is twofold. First, we can correct several moments simultaneously, without
increasing the computational time. If we are interested in doing a variance decomposition exercise
for each year using a linear model, we need a correction for the variances of each group of covariates
and the covariance term for every year but estimate the effects only once. Second, to estimate β∗j in
every iteration one just needs to solve for a least squares regression. There are extremely efficient
procedures to compute these regressions, especially in cases where the high dimensionality of the
covariates is the result of a large number of fixed effects. This is the case in most applications.
The key for the bootstrap correction to work is that V(v∗|X) is equal to the sample variance-
covariance matrix V̂(u|X), so the bootstrap correction δ̂b is an unbiased and consistent estimator of
the almost feasible bias correction term δ̂. Therefore, the bootstrap procedure has to be consistent
with the underlying assumption on the structure of the error term.
The small sample properties of the bootstrap estimate δ̂b would depend ultimately on the choice
of estimate for the covariance matrix V(u|X). In particular, for the bias we have the following
corollary of Proposition 11:
Corollary 2. Conditioning on X, if V̂(u|X) is an unbiased estimator of V(u|X), then the bootstrap correc-
tion δ̂b is an unbiased estimator of the bias δ.
Given that the estimate of the covariance matrix is non-linear, in general, we would have a
bias. In the next section we discuss the properties for some particular cases of popular choices for
estimators of the covariance matrix and how to implement the correction.
3.3.1 Choice of covariance matrix estimate
We divide the discussion in this section into two parts. First, one when the researcher assumes
that the covariance matrix is diagonal. This includes the cases where the error is homoscedastic
or iid and cases with general heteroscedasticity. Second, we discuss estimators of non-diagonal
covariance matrix, in particular, when we have clustering or serial correlation.
Diagonal covariance matrix
If a researcher assumes that the underlying covariance matrix V(u|X) is diagonal, with non-zero
ith diagonal element equal to ψi, Proposition 11 suggests an algorithm to make simultaneous M
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corrections.17 Let ψ̂i be the estimate of the variance for the ith observation error term. Algorithm 4
in Appendix 3.C takes as inputs X, {ψ̂i}Ni=1 and the different matrices {Am}Mm=1 associated with the
different M quadratic forms that want to be computed. The output is a vector of bias corrections
{δ̂b,m}Mm=1 whose elements correspond to each quadratic form m.18
The White (1980) estimator is biased:19
E(û2i |X) = ψi − 2ψihii + h′iV(u|X)hi,
where hi and hii are, respectively, the ith column and ith diagonal element of the projection matrix
H = X (X′X)−1 X′. The latter term, hii is sometimes known as the leverage of observation i, because,
as explained by Angrist and Pischke (2008), it tell us how much pull a particular observation exerts
over the regression line. MacKinnon and White (1985) explore different variance estimates, includ-
ing the original proposed by White HC0, and compare their performance using simulations. The
different estimators considered include:
HC0 = û
2












20 Alternativelly, under the homoscedastic case we could replace steps (3) and (4) of
Algorithm 4 by a residual bootstrap. That is, we can obtain the vector v∗ by resampling with re-
placement from the estimated residuals and adjusting by the corresponding degrees of freedom.21
In the general hereoscedasticity case, MacKinnon and White (1985) acknowledge the existence
of a bias in all three but denote HC2 as an almost unbiased estimate of the variance. These het-
eroscedasticity robust are inconsistent when the model has many covariates (Cattaneo et al., 2018)
as is usually the case with multi-way fixed effects. Recently, Kline et al. (2020) and Jochmans (2018)





In practice, estimating ψ̂i with HCU some observations have a negative estimated variance and that
prevents us from taking the square root in step (4) of the Algorithm 4.22 However, even though HCU
is unbiased, it might not minimize the mean squared error compared to other variance estimates.
For example HCU has a larger variance than the related estimator HC2. Let Ŷi = h′iY be the fitted














17 M can be equal to 3 if we are interested only in the correlation between two variables but can be higher if the model has other
covariates and we want to do a variance decomposition.
18One does not necessarily need to compute Am and feed to the algorithm. If the matrix A is, for example, an operator to obtain a
sample variance or covariance, one could just compute such sample variance or covariance within the algorithm.
19A textbook exposition of these issues can be found in Chapter 8 of Angrist and Pischke (2008).
20The origine of the bias is again a trace term that under homoscedasticity is equal to n− k. For a textbook explanation see Proposition
1.2. in Hayashi (2000).
21The bootstrap errors will be equal to v∗ =
√
n/(n− k) û∗ where û∗ is the vector of resampled residuals.
22Negative estimates of individual variances are also prevalent in KSS.
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The expectation of the first term is zero but HCU has a higher variance than HC2. Ŷiûi is a random
variable with positive covariance with û2i and increases the variance of HC2. We could alternatively
define a mixed estimator, HCM, that takes values of HCU whenever they are positive and use HC2
when the estimator HCU is negative. In other terms,
HCM =
{
HCU if HCU ≥ 0
HC2 otherwise.
The use of HC2 or HCM requires the computation of the leverage hii for each observation. Moreover
we need them to be smaller than 1 for every observation. In the following we describe how we
ensure that the leverages are below the unity by computing the leave-one-out connected set, how
we estimate them and finally propose a diagnosis and an adjustment for our leverage estimates.
Leave-one-out connected set. Two-way fixed effect models are only estimated at the connected set.
In typical applications on the labor market or teacher evaluations, firm (school) fixed effects are
only identified within the connected set that is generated by moving workers (teachers). Movers
therefore determine the connected set of firms (schools) whose fixed effect can be identified. The
need to have hii < 1 for all i requires that no single observation is necessary to estimate a particular
fixed effect. That is, eliminating any observation the set of fixed effects in the connected set needs
to remain the same. We achieve this by first pruning the data to get the leave-one-out connected set
without critical movers identifying a given firm fixed effect and eliminating unique observations.
The pruning is analogous to Kline et al. (2020) and we leave the details for the Appendix.
Estimation of leverage. The direct computation of the leverage, by using the diagonal of the
projection matrix H, is computationally infeasible when the number of covariates is large.23
We propose a way to estimate the leverage of each observation that is similar to our bias estima-
tor. We simulate repeatedly random variables and use the fitted values of the projection into X to
estimate the leverage. The procedure starts by generating the endogenous variable ω where each
entry is i.i.d. with (conditional) mean equal to zero and (conditional) variance equal to 1. Projecting






















where x′i is the ith row of matrix of covariates X. Let nh the number of simulations for the vector
ω used to estimate the leverages ĥii. Similarly to Proposition 11, we simulate different vectors of
the dependent variable ω, compute the fitted values for each simulation j and then take a sample
mean across all the simulations j = {1, ..., nh} of ω.24 Estimating the leverage this way entails two
different sets of bootstrap, one for the leverage and the second one for the estimation of the bias
correction.25
Alternatively, an exact computation of the leverage is possible by using the definition of fitted
values Ŷ = HY and a regression intensive procedure. We have that the leverage of observation i is
23 H ≡ X (X′X)−1 X′ is a function of the inverse of a very large matrix X.
24This is exactly the way Kline et al. (2020) estimate the leverage in their paper. However, they directly solve for the normal equations
of the regression using the preconditioned conjugate gradient method.
25One is usually interested in estimating corrections for at least three moments that involve solving two systems of linear equations







The following remark shows how to compute these leverages.
Remark 1. Let Ỹ(i) be a vector of length n where every entry is equal to zero, except the ith entry that is
equal to one. The leverage of observation i is equal to the fitted value ŷi of a linear regression of Ỹ(i) on X.




slope. Consider an initial scenario where all entries of the dependent variable Y are equal to zero.
In that case all of the fitted values are equal to zero. Then, change the ith entry of Y to 1 and the
rest are zero. We can compute a new vector of fitted values Ŷ′. Thus the leverage, that is a partial








Recovering the estimates of a linear regression is very efficient nowadays and in principle we
could compute the leverages one by one in what would involve n regressions. When the data set
is large, this is clearly not plausible and we leave the exact computation for the problematic ones
identified in the following diagnostic.
Diagnostic and adjustment. We detect problematic leverage estimations by checking that they are
under unity and above an observation specific lower bound. Let X̃ = X1, meaning X̃ is a vector









i . We diagnose our leverage estimates by
comparing them to h̃ii. Those that are underestimated or are above 1 can thus be directly computed
using the result of Remark 1.










, where the last term corrects for a non-linear bias
with v̂ar(ĥii) being a sample variance of the different estimates of the squared fitted values.
Algorithm 7 in Appendix 3.C takes as inputs the covariates X and gives output a combination
of actual and estimated leverages, as well as the variance v̂ar(ĥii) for the non-linearity adjustment.
Clustered errors and serial correlation
When the error terms are clustered or present serial correlation within group, the covariance matrix
is no longer diagonal. We restrict our attention to dependence of the errors only within a given
group. The variance covariance matrix is block diagonal as there are non zero elements around
the diagonal corresponding to the dependence of the errors within the group g.26 One particular
example is when the group is a worker-firm match and errors are autocorrelated within match.
When the errors present dependence within the group we adapt the bootstrap from Algorithm 4 to
a wild block bootstrap as proposed by Cameron et al. (2008). This consists of a wild bootstrap that
takes into account the group or cluster dependence of the data. Differently to the sieve bootstrap
26Assume that the the errors have a first order autocorrelation within group g and the true innovations are i.i.d. and therefore
homoscedastic. We consider that the error term u of worker i at group g at time t in (3.1) is:
ui,g,t = ρui,g,t−1 + εi,g,t, εi,g,t i.i.d.
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(e.g. Davidson and MacKinnon, 2006) it has the benefit of accommodating any structure of the
dependence within group and also heteroscedasticity of the true innovations.
Following Roodman et al. (2019) we estimate the variance of observation i, ψ̂i, with a variant of






Algorithm 5 in the Appendix describes the procedure for our bias estimator that keeps the depen-
dence structure through a wild block bootstrap. It takes as inputs X, {ψ̂i}Ni=1 and the different
matrices {Am}Mm=1.
3.3.2 Simple example
Monte Carlo simulations illustrate the effectiveness of our bias correction method. The model
design is the same as in (3.1) with homoscedastic errors and sample size n = 500. The number of
covariates is k1 = k2 = 200. We keep this number relatively low to compute the direct correction. We
have 10,000 simulations in total. In each simulation, conditioning on X, we draw new error terms to
form the dependent variable. We estimate β̂ and compute the almost feasible bias correction terms.
After the estimation, we perform n∗ = 100 bootstraps and use them to compute the estimation of
the bootstrap correction terms.28
Figures 30 and 31 compare the distributions of the bias of the variance and covariance of the
naive plug-in (i.e. non-corrected) estimates (σ̂21,PI and σ̂12,PI) and the bootstrap corrected estimates
(σ̂21,b and σ̂12,b). The Figure shows that the distribution of the bias (i.e. the difference between the
bootstrap corrected and the true moment) of the bootstrap corrected moment is centered at zero.
Table 34 presents the mean and variance of the differences of our bootstrap method δ̂b and the
bootstrap following MacKinnon and Smith Jr (1998) δ̂b,MS with respect to the direct correction δ̂.29
The mean differences of our method are very small as well as the variances, meaning that the
estimated bootstrap correction is performing well in comparison to the direct correction in almost
all simulations. The alternative bootstrap correction δ̂b,MS in Columns 3 and 4 performs worse in
terms of mean differences and also variances.
We denote the variance of the innovation ε as σ2ε . Ordering the data by group, suppose the first group has three observations and the
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The covariance matrix under clustering of the errors is similar but with al non-zero elements out of the diagonal equal to ρ.
27Introducing covariance estimation refinements proposed by Bell and McCaffrey (2002) and further developed in Imbens and Kolesar
(2016) are left for future research. They extend the HC2 corrections to the cases where the covariance matrix is not diagonal by correcting
by the leverage of the group.
28We use the covariance estimator HC1 and therefore skip the part of computing that involves the leave-one-out connected set.










− β̂′Aβ̂, where the last term is the plug-in estimate.
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Table 34 also shows the Mean Squared Error (MSE) between the different estimated moments
and the true ones. The MSE of naive plug-in estimators is larger than the one obtained with
the directly corrected and bootstrap corrected moments. As our estimator is a random variable,
the MSE of the directly corrected moments are always smaller than the ones with the estimated
bootstrap correction, although very close. As expected, our bootstrap has lower MSE than the
alternative directly following MacKinnon and Smith Jr (1998).
3.3.3 Choosing the number of bootstraps
In the previous simple example we arbitrarily chose the number of bootstraps. In practice, given
the computational burden of the procedure, we might want to discipline the choice of the number
of bootstraps. Our estimator δ̂b is a sample mean estimate of the almost feasible bias correction
term δ̂. Using results from probability theory we can exploit the information given by Chebyshev’s
inequality.




= δ̂b. Now assume that V(δ̂b,j|X, u) = η2 < ∞.
As δ̂b is a sample mean over a sequence of {δ̂b,j}n
∗
j=1, we have that Ev∗(δ̂b|X, u) = δ̂ (as shown in
Proposition 11) and V(δ̂b|X, u) = 1n∗ η2.30 Then, by Chebyshev’s inequality we have
P
(∣∣∣δ̂b − δ̂







Next one can choose the number of bootstraps n∗ such that the distance between the bootstrap
estimate δ̂b and the almost feasible bias correction term δ̂ is greater or equal than λ standard







Solving for n∗ we get n∗ = 1
αλ2
. So if, for example, we set α = 0.05 and λ = 1/2 we get that the
number of bootstraps such that the distance between the bootstrap estimate and the almost feasible
correction term is greater than half a standard deviation is an event with a probability smaller than
5 per cent is n∗ = 10.05×(1/2)2 = 20× 4 = 80. One could be more conservative and set λ = 0.1. In
that case, we would obtain n∗ = 20× 1000 = 2000 bootstraps.
Admittedly, the number of bootstraps suggested by inequality for any α and λ can be quite
conservative. But this just reflects the generality of the result. Indeed, this criteria would work
regardless the distribution of v∗, therefore regardless the choice of bootstrap.
3.4 Comparison of Methods
In this section we first compare our method to Gaure (2014), Kline et al. (2020) and Borovičková and
Shimer (2017).31 The closest methods to ours are the ones by Gaure (2014) and Kline et al. (2020). All
three aim to compute the trace term in equation (3.3). Yet, Borovičková and Shimer (2017) propose










j V(δ̂b,j|X, u) =
1
n∗
η2 where we used the independence of different δ̂b,j
conditional on X and u.
31The codes to implement our method are here.
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a method to compute the correlation of theoretically different worker and firm types. Second, we
present the results of Monte Carlo simulations of labor markets to compare the methods under
different assumptions on the error terms.
The differences between Gaure, KSS and our method are on the scope of error structures al-
lowed, the covariance matrix estimation and the flexibility of application. All three methods are in
principle suited to perform corrections with homoscedastic and heteroscedastic errors. Neverthe-
less, Gaure implemented his bias correction method on the R package lfe only under the assumption
of homoscedastic errors. Moreover, KSS and ourselves provide corrections under serial correlation
or clustering of the errors. Second, our method is the only one implementing corrections on the
full variance decomposition correcting several second order moments at a time. Adding additional
moments to correct (e.g. the variance of occupation fixed effects and their covariance with firm and
worker types) does not increase the computational burden of the correction and our approach is
therefore suited for multi-way fixed effect models or full variance decompositions in two-way fixed
effect models. KSS and Gaure on the contrary need to compute new sets of normal equations per
additional correction and only implement corrections of the two leading fixed effects. Our method
is also more flexible than Gaure and KSS in the type of corrections by allowing for yearly correc-
tions and different types of dependencies on the error structures. Finally, the methods differ on
the covariance matrix estimator they use. Gaure uses HC0 directly estimating the variance from
the residuals. As explained in Section 3.3.1, KSS estimate the covariance matrix by HCU and our
baseline application is with HC2 even if we explore other covariance matrix estimates.
An important application of two-way fixed effect models are the AKM type log wage regressions
with worker and firm fixed effects. We closely follow Card et al. (2013) to implement the estimation
of the following regression model for the log of the wage of worker i at time t:
wit = θi + ψJ(i,t) + qitγ + εit, (3.5)
where the function J(i, t) gives the identity of the unique firm that employs worker i at time t, θi
is a worker fixed effect, ψJ(i,t) is the premium for all employees at firm J(i, t), qit are time varying
observables (age and education interacted with year effects), and εit is the error term.
Equation (3.5) can be estimated by OLS where the person/firm fixed effect estimators have the
same structure as the one in Section 3.2. Thus the second order moments exhibit a similar bias and
the implementation of the correction is analogous.
In the following we give some detail of an alternative method to compute the correlation be-
tween the types of matched workers and firms by Borovičková and Shimer (2017). Their method
completely bypasses the need to estimate a linear model and therefore avoids using noisy estimates,
which are the source of the bias, to compute the correlation.
As explained by BS, the worker and firm types that they define are different to the types defined
in the AKM model. In BS, a worker’s type, denoted λi, is defined to be the expected log wage of the
worker, while a firm’s type, denoted µJ(i,t), is defined to be the expected log wage that it pays. In
contrast, in the AKM model, a worker and firm types (θi, ψJ(i,t)) are defined as such that a change
in type will change the expected log wage while holding fixed the partner’s type.32
32We refer to an old version of the Borovičková and Shimer from 2017 where they provide a way to translate the variances and
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BS show that their correlation and the AKM correlation, ρ, will be the same if the joint distribu-
tion of θ and ψ is elliptical (e.g. a bivariate normal) and (σλ − ρσµ)(σµ − ρσλ) > 0, where σλ and σµ
are, respectively, the standard deviations of worker and firm types. With these assumptions, there
is also a direct correspondance between the standard deviation of AKM types and BS types:33
σθ =
σλ − ρσµ
1− ρ2 , σψ =
σµ − ρσλ
1− ρ2 .
The key identifying assumption in the BS method is that for each worker and firm they have two
or more observations of the actual wage (received or paid) which are independent and identically
distributed conditional on the types. In AKM, the identifying assumption is a standard exclusion
restriction, i.e. that the error term is mean zero conditional on the types (and other covariates) with
the underlying assumption of exogenous mobility.
3.4.1 Labor market simulations
We compare the correction methods by simulating many labor markets under different assumptions
on the error terms. We evaluate the methods in terms of computation time and mean squared errors.
We also explore differences between the covariance estimation methods described in Section 3.3.1.
We compare all the methods under conditional homoscedasticity of the errors. Results are in
Table 35. All the methods improve the initial bias of the plug-in estimate. The least accurate method
is BS reducing by 69% the MSE of the naive estimates whereas the other three methods reduce it by
98%.34 The objective of BS is to provide an estimate of the correlation and they base their estimation
in different worker and firm types (λ and µ respectively). Table 35 presents their estimates of the
AKM types. Under the assumption of linearity of conditional expectations, the correlation of their
types ρλ,µ is a good estimator of the correlation of the AKM types ρθ,ψ. Their original types are, on
the contrary, not suited to perform a variance decomposition. We find that the MSE taking their
types are orders of magnitude greater.35 Gaure, KSS and our method are very similar in terms of
MSE, Gaure being slightly more accurate than the other two.36 Figure 33 shows the distribution
of the bias of the firm variances for the naive estimate (σ2ψ,PI − σ2ψ) and the different correction
methods. We see that our method is very similar to KSS and both are the ones with lowest biases.
Even if the bias of Gaure is higher, his method has lower variance and outperforms KSS and ours
in terms of MSE. Regarding the computation time, BS is the fastest one with computation time of
less than a second. Our method is the one performing fastest among the three closest competitors
(Gaure, KSS and our method) as it has the lowest computing time.37
covariances of their worker and firm types to the ones in AKM. In the latest version, they slightly changed their estimator and no longer
provide this link.
33See Proposition 1 in Borovičková and Shimer (2017).
34We wrote the code for BS following Borovičková and Shimer (2017) and converting the data to the match level.
35The scaled MSE (MSE ×102) of σ2λ, σ2µ and σλ,µ are respectively 57.4, 81.9 and 4.00.
36Gaure is corrected using the bccor with 300 maximum samples and tolerance of 1e-2. We run Version 2.15 of the KSS code eliminating
observations (instead of matches) for the leave-one-out estimation and with epsilon parameter of 0.05. This translates into number of
simulations p equal to 289. This guided our choice of 300 simulations to estimate the leverages and the bias corrections. We run our
corrections in Matlab with tolerance of 1e-5.
37KSS and our method do not incorporate the simplifications that come from having homoscedastic errors. In particular, under
homoscedasticity of the errors HC1 is an unbiased estimate of the variance and one could skip the pruning of the data.
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Table 36 presents the comparison of our method to KSS under conditional heteroscedasticity
for different degrees of mobility. Both methods are similar in accuracy and reduce by roughly
85% the MSE of the plug-in estimate in the low mobility case.38 Our method is slightly more
accurate for both mobility cases, it also outperforms KSS in terms of time. Figure 34 shows the
distribution of the bias of the plug-in estimate, KSS and our method. Both corrections have similar
distributions but the bootstrap method has smaller variance for reasons shown in Section 3.3.1.
Table 37 compares the different covariance matrix estimators applicable with our method. All the
estimators have similar MSE but HC2 outperforms the rest.
Tables 38 and 39 present results from a simulation with a non diagonal covariance matrix. In
particular we assume that there is serial correlation of the wages within a given match and we allow
the true innovation to be homoscedastic and heteroscedastic. We compare the plug-in estimate to
our bootstrap with the wild block bootstrap method from Algorithm 5 Boot, Boot Av Match where
observations are averaged to the match, and the KSS correction methods where the observations are
also averaged to the match KSS Av Match. The best performing correction method is Boot Av Match
both in terms of time and MSE under homoscedasticity (Table 38) and heteroscedasticity (Table 39).
Our method using a wild block bootstrap Boot also improves the MSE of the plug-in estimates but
has higher MSE than Boot Av Match because of a higher bias of the person fixed effects component.
KSS Av Match improve the MSE of the naive estimates but perform worse than our method with
and without taking match averages and under homoscedasticity and heteroscedasticity.
3.5 Application
In the application we use a panel data from the French statistical agency (INSEE) from 2002 to
2014.39 Our dependent variable is (log) gross daily wage of full time employees with ages between
20 and 60 working at private firms.
The goal is to use our bootstrap method to do a bias corrected variance decomposition of log
wages. In order to do so we have to pick the number of bootstraps. To guide our choice of number
of bootstraps, we perform some simulations with a fixed set of covariates with low mobility and
simulate a thousand samples by simulating the error. With each dataset we perform corrections
from one to 300 bootstraps as in the Monte Carlo simulations of Section 3.4. Figure 32 shows
the mean squared error between the true covariance between person and firm fixed effects and the
corrected one for different number of bootstraps.40 The figure shows that with the first 25 bootstraps
the MSE reduces significantly and around 150 it flattens. This suggests that few bootstraps are
enough to gain accuracy.41
38Table 1 in Kline et al. (2020) shows that their connected set is similar to our low mobility scenario with 2.7 movers per firm and
average firm size of 12.
39In particular we use Panel tous salariés-EDP that consists of a random subsample of workers with firm identifiers and socio-
demographic variables. The sample consists of workers born in October on certain days. The sample size was increased in 2002 so
we took this as the starting year.
40For all the samples we take the corrections obtained with different bootstraps and take the mean squared error against the true
moment.
41Throughout the application corrections we run corrections with 300 simulation to estimate the leverage and 1000 bootstraps to
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Table 40 shows the variance decomposition of log wages as well as the correlation between firm
and worker fixed effects using the naive moments and the corrected ones under the assumption of
serial correlation within match. The variance of the person and firm effects are both reduced and
they explain a lower share of the total variance after the correction. The correlation becomes closer
to zero and it approaches values that have been found in other countries with a larger number
of movers per firm, which should attenuate the bias, as reported by Table 1 of Lopes de Melo
(2018). Naturally, the variance and covariance of the person and firm effects are the moments that
change the most after the correction. The reason is that the underlying estimates of the person
and fixed effects are very noisy. In contrast, when the underlying estimates of a particular moment
are estimated with precision, as it is in the case of the parameters γ̂ associated with the common
covariates q, the change between the naive and corrected moments is negligible.
To fully exploit the benefit of our bootstrap correction method we also perform a yearly variance
decomposition. In Figure 36 we compare the year-to-year evolution of the different explained shares
using the naive estimated moments and the corrected ones. The main takeaway from this figure
is that the correction changes the levels but not the slopes of explained shares. This leads to a
change in the relative importance of each component. In particular, the corrected variance of the
residuals is relatively more important than the corrected variance of the firm effect in almost every
year, while both are similar when considering uncorrected variances. A very interesting trend is
the decline in explanatory power of the individual fixed effects for recent years. It might be just
a feature of the French data and explanations for this phenomenon are outside the scope of this
paper.
3.5.1 Comparison of Methods
We compare our method to BS using the French data. Adapting to their method, instead of using
annual wage data, we first average all the wage data to the worker-firm match level. We do this
to ensure that annual wage observations are independent conditional on type, which might not
be the case especially for workers who do not switch firms. In order to accommodate for the
extra covariates in the BS method, we first run a linear regression of log wage versus qit (age and
education interacted by year effects) and take the residual. We use this residual-wage to average at
the worker-firm match and use this as the dependent variable to compute the moments, both for
the BS and our bootstrap method. We estimate the bootstrap corrected moments at the connected
set or leave-one-out-corrected set of the BS final sample.
Table 41 compares the estimated moments using the BS method and the bootstrap correction
method on the French data. Both columns report the moments using the AKM defined worker
and firm types. In contrast to the Monte Carlo simulations that satisfied the assumptions for both
methods, estimates differ by a large amount when using French labor market data. The bootstrap
corrected estimated correlation is 0.16 (0.09) under HC2 (HC1) covariance matrix estimation, well
below the estimated one using BS method, 0.55.42 Looking at each of the components of the corre-
estimate the corrections of second order moments.
42The BS estimates are obtained by using the formulas of Section 5.2. in Borovičková and Shimer (2017).
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lation, both variances are larger and the covariance is smaller when using the bootstrap corrected
method instead of BS method.
There are different reasons why BS estimates might differ from ours. To begin with, the types
defined by BS are fundamentally different from the ones defined in the AKM model. They are
related only when the assumptions stated at the beginning of this section are satisfied. It might be
that the two correlations are not comparable because, even if the log-linear AKM model is correctly
specified, these assumptions are violated, in particular, if the joint distribution of AKM types is
not elliptical. Second, it might be that the identification assumption of at least one of the methods
fail. It’s hard to think of examples where an identifying assumption for a particular method holds
while failing for the other. It is easier to think of examples where both identification assumptions
are violated. For example, whenever there is selection of workers via the error term, some matches
will be formed whenever this idiosyncratic component is high. This endogenous mobility would
violate both the AKM and BS identification assumptions.
Results in Table 41 under our method also differ from the ones previously reported in Table 40.
Table 42 presents some summary statistics of the original data differentiated by being in the final
BS data or not.43 The Table shows that the requirements to use the Borovičková and Shimer (2017)
method are quite demanding as only 43% of the original observations are included in their final
sample. Furthermore, Table 42 shows that their data requirements lead to a sample with similar
average wage but almost 5 years younger on average and slightly more educated. The applied
user might be worried by sample selection when using the BS method to estimate worker and firm
correlation as Lentz et al. (2018) document that most of the worker-firm sorting happens early in
the career which would lead to higher correlations for younger workers.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a computationally feasible bootstrap method to correct for the small-
sample bias found in all quadratic forms in the parameters of linear models with a very large
number of covariates. We show using Monte Carlo simulations that the method is effective at re-
ducing the bias. The application to French labor market data shows that the correction increases
the correlation between firm and worker fixed effects. Depending on the sample and on the speci-
fication, our bias correction method changes the sign of that correlation and in all cases it changes
the relative importance of the different components in explaining the variance of log wages.
The only requirements to implement our correction is to have a bootstrap procedure that is con-
sistent with the assumption on the variance-covariance matrix of the error term and to estimate the
model several times. The correction can thus be applied easily to any study running an AKM type
regression or multi-way fixed effects regressions. The method is faster than Kline et al. (2020) and
similarly accurate. Besides the speed, the other biggest advantage of our approach is its flexibility
because it allows for yearly corrections or an increase in the number of moments to correct without
increasing the computational costs.
43The original data constitutes of almost 5.9 observations that translate into a connected set of 5.1 million observations as in Table 40.
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Comparisons to other models through Monte Carlo simulations show that, in terms of accu-
racy, our method is comparable in accuracy to Gaure (2014) and Kline et al. (2020). Our method
is broader than the implementation of Gaure (2014) given that he only offers corrections under
homoscedasticity of the errors. Compared to Kline et al. (2020) our approach is faster, is more
flexible in the type of corrections it can perform and can incorporate the correction of additional
moments at no cost. The comparison to Borovičková and Shimer (2017) using Monte Carlo experi-
ments showed that both are similar but our method is more accurate than theirs in simulated data
that fulfill the assumptions of both approaches. However, when applied to French administrative
data, the methods yield different estimates for the correlation and all its components. This suggests
that the assumptions of one or both methods do not hold in the French labor market data. Further




Proof. First, note that for any bootstrap estimate of the quadratic form β∗′j Aβ
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Under the bootstrap, the only source of randomness is v∗j . Taking expectations under the bootstrap of
β∗′i Aβ
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= Eu(δ̂|X) = δ.
3.B Construction of Simulated Labor Market
We construct several simulated labor markets depending on the number of movers per firm and, the corre-
lation between the worker and firm fixed effects. Here, we briefly describe the construction of the simulated
labor markets.44
We start by determining the size of the labor market. We have 5000 unique workers and 400 unique firms
at the beginning of the sample. This gives an average firm size of 12 workers which is similar to the average
firm size in the data of Kline et al. (2020).45 Their connected set with 2.7 movers per firm is similar to our
low mobility simulations with 3 movers per firm. The sample runs for 7 years but we allow that workers
randomly drop from the sample with a minimum of 2 observations per worker. This leads to a total sample
size of roughly 22000 observations.
Worker and firm fixed effects are random draws from normal distributions. We assume that there is
sorting depending on the permanent types, which leads to non negative correlations between worker and
44We thank Simen Gaure for sharing with us a piece of code that we used as a base for the simulations.
45See Table 1 in Kline et al. (2020) where each worker is observed twice.
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firm fixed effects while fulfilling exogenous mobility. That is, a low type worker is more likely to match
with a low type firm if we assume positive sorting but sorting does not depend on match specific shocks.
Matches are formed either at the beginning of the sample or afterwards for the movers. Errors are i.i.d.
and normally distributed in the baseline simulation with homoscedastic errors. Heteroscedastic errors are
also normally distributed with an observation (worker-year) specific variance that is randomly drawn from a
uniform distribution. Finally, serially correlated errors are simulated from a first order autoregressive process
with persistence of 0.7 and homoscedastic innovations. The simulated log wage is like equation (3.5) without
other covariates.
3.C Algorithms
Here we detail the implementation algorithms of our method. Algorithm 4 and 5 describe respectively the
estimation of the bias correction for diagonal and non diagonal covariance matrices. Algorithm 6 describes
how to prune the data to ensure that the maximum leverage is below 1 and Algorithm 7 details how to
estimate the leverage.
Algorithm 4 Estimate {δ̂b,m}Mm=1 when the covariance matrix is diagonal
1: for j = 1, ..., n∗ do
2: Simulate a vector r∗ of length n of mutually independent Rademacher entries.
3: Generate a vector of residuals v∗ of length n whose ith entry is equal to
√
ψ̂i × r∗i .
4: Compute β∗ as the estimate of a regression of v∗ on X.
5: Compute δ̂(j)aux,m = (β∗)
′ Amβ∗ for all m ∈ {1, ..., M}.
6: end for







for all m ∈ {1, ..., M}.
Algorithm 5 Estimate {δ̂b,m}Mm=1 when covariance matrix is non diagonal
1: Let G = {1, ..., G} be the set of groups g each with length ng.
2: for j = 1, ..., n∗ do
3: Simulate a vector r∗g of length G of mutually independent Rademacher entries. All the observations
withing the group will have the same Rademacher entry.
4: Generate a vector of residuals v∗ of length n whose ith entry belonging to group g is equal to
√
ψ̂i× r∗g.
5: Compute β∗ as the estimate of a regression of v∗ on X.
6: Compute δ̂(j)aux,m = (β∗)
′ Amβ∗ for all m ∈ {1, ..., M}.
7: end for







for all m ∈ {1, ..., M}.
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Algorithm 6 Leave-one-out connected set
1: Let Λ be the connected set.
2: a = 1.
3: while a > 0 do
4: Compute the articulation points a.
5: Eliminate articulation points a.
6: Compute the new connected set Λ1.
7: end while
Algorithm 7 Estimate leverages, diagnose and compute underestimated ones
1: z
(0)
1 = 0 and z
(0)




2 are vectors of length n.
2: for j = 1, ..., n∗ do
3: Simulate a vector ω∗ of length n of mutually independent Rademacher entries.
4: Compute fitted values ω̂∗ from a regression of ω∗ on X.
5: Compute z(j)1 = z
(j−1)
1 + (ω̂





7: Compute ĥii = z
(n∗)
1,i /n
∗ for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}.














S,i for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
10: for i = 1, ..., n do
11: if ĥii < h̃ii then
12: Generate Ỹ(i) ∈ Rn, where Ỹ(i)j 6=i = 0, Ỹ(i)i = 1.
13: Compute the fitted values ̂̃Y(i) of a regression of Ỹ(i) on X.




3.D Tables and Figures
Table 34 – Results of simple Monte Carlo simulations
δ̂− δ̂b δ̂− δ̂b,MS Mean Squared Error True
Mean Variance Mean Variance Naive Ideal Boot Boot MS Moment
v̂ar(X1β1) 0.33×10−3 0.00156 -0.79×10−3 0.07945 45.53 22.94 22.94 23.04 243.19
v̂ar(X2β2) 0.36×10−3 0.00156 -4.25×10−3 0.15211 67.59 44.75 44.76 44.98 458.83
ĉov (X1β1, X2β2) -0.33×10−3 0.00138 0.93×10−3 0.04417 22.54 12.50 12.51 12.57 -9.09
Notes: The first two columns represent, respectively, the mean and the variance of the difference between the almost feasible correction and the bootstrap correction.
Columns 3 and 4 are analogous to the bootstrap following MacKinnon and Smith Jr (1998). Columns 5 to 9 compute the MSE between the estimated moments and the
true ones and Column 10 presents the true moments in the simulation.
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Table 35 – Monte Carlo simulations. Homoscedastic errors.




Plug-in 6.43813 0.28682 0.11545 2.28013
BS 0.3 1.95426 0.11898 0.02482 0.69935
Gaure 1.2 0.04790 0.10116 0.01338 0.05415
Boot 1.1 0.04792 0.10328 0.01369 0.05496
KSS 2.7 0.04842 0.10288 0.01382 0.05504
Notes: Plug-in is the naive plug-in estimator, BS refers to Borovičková and Shimer (2017),
Gaure refers to the method Gaure (2014) implemented through the R package lfe, Boot
is our method with HC2 covariance matrix estimator, and KSS is the Kline et al. (2020)
method. The results of Borovičková and Shimer correspond to the AKM worker and firm
types present in the cited version of the paper. The average firm has 10 movers and 12
employees. Time is the computing time in seconds. True moments are computed at the
largest connected set. σ̂2θ , σ̂
2
ψ and σ̂θ,ψ present respectively the mean squared errors (MSE)
of the corrected estimates of the variance of the worker fixed effects, variance of the firm
fixed effects and the covariance between worker and firm effects. All the MSE are multi-
plied by 100. Average is the average MSE (also scaled).
Table 36 – Monte Carlo simulations. Heteroscedastic errors.
Mean Squared Error (MSE×102)




3 Plug-in 19.53008 1.12075 7.41524 9.35536
3 Boot 1.4 0.17457 3.38480 0.38844 1.31594
3 KSS 2.0 0.20498 3.46213 0.41224 1.35979
Mid Mobility
5 Plug-in 10.44445 0.41531 1.90528 4.25501
5 Boot 1.3 0.09246 1.00829 0.13824 0.41299
5 KSS 2.3 0.09735 1.01536 0.13689 0.41653
Notes: Plug-in is the naive plug-in estimator, Boot refers to our method with HC2 covariance matrix estimator, and
KSS is the Kline et al. (2020) method. True moments are computed at the largest connected set. Mov/firm is the
number of movers per firm and the average firm has 12 employees. Time is the computing time in seconds. σ̂2θ ,
σ̂2ψ and σ̂θ,ψ present respectively the mean squared errors of the corrected estimates of the variance of the worker
fixed effects, variance of the firm fixed effects and the covariance between worker and firm effects. All the MSE are
multiplied by 100. Average is the average MSE (also scaled).
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Table 37 – Comparison of variance estimations.




Plug-in 19.896 5.997 5.034 10.309
Boot HC0 2.236 1.245 0.792 1.424
Boot HC1 0.428 0.716 0.291 0.478
Boot HC2 0.173 0.622 0.171 0.322
Notes: Plug-in is the naive plug-in estimator, Boot refers to our method.
True moments are computed at the largest connected set. Model is the
model and type of variance estimator. σ̂2θ , σ̂
2
ψ and σ̂θ,ψ present respec-
tively the mean squared errors of the estimates of the variance of the
worker fixed effects, variance of the firm fixed effects and the covariance
between worker and firm effects. All the MSE are multiplied by 100. Av-
erage is the average MSE (also scaled). Simulated data exhibits low mo-
bility like in the top panel of Table 36 and all the estimations are done at
the leave-one-out.
Table 38 – Monte Carlo simulations. Serial correlation with homoscedasticity.




Plug-in 91.43846 1.52054 0.52576 31.16158
Boot 0.5 9.14621 0.23902 0.04491 3.14338
Boot Av Match 0.3 5.58738 0.38655 0.23283 2.06892
KSS Av Match 2.3 18.62253 0.36095 0.04201 6.34183
Notes: Plug-in is the naive plug-in estimator, Boot Av Match refers to our method with HC1 covariance
estimator where the observations are averaged to the match and wages are transformed to average
match wage. Boot refers to our method with a wild block bootstrap where each match defines a block.
In both, Boot and Boot Av Match we skip the pruning of the data. KSS Av Match is the Kline et al. (2020)
method where the observations are averaged to the match. The average firm has 10 movers and 12 em-
ployees. Time is the computing time in seconds. True moments are computed at the largest connected
set. σ̂2θ , σ̂
2
ψ and σ̂θ,ψ present respectively the mean squared errors (MSE) multiplied by 100 of the cor-
rected estimates of the variance of the worker fixed effects, variance of the firm fixed effects and the
covariance between worker and firm effects. Average is the average MSE.
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Table 39 – Monte Carlo simulations. Serial correlation with heteroscedasticity.




Plug-in 91.03966 1.53866 0.53512 31.03782
Boot 0.5 9.04595 0.28665 0.04516 3.12592
Boot Av Match 0.3 5.46460 0.43006 0.22812 2.04093
KSS Av Match 2.3 18.45137 0.39646 0.04425 6.29736
Notes: Plug-in is the naive plug-in estimator, Boot Av Match refers to our method with HC1 covariance
estimator where the observations are averaged to the match and wages are transformed to average
match wage. Boot refers to our method with a wild block bootstrap where each match defines a block.
In both, Boot and Boot Av Match we skip the pruning of the data. KSS Av Match is the Kline et al. (2020)
method where the observations are averaged to the match. The average firm has 10 movers and 12 em-
ployees. Time is the computing time in seconds. True moments are computed at the largest connected
set. σ̂2θ , σ̂
2
ψ and σ̂θ,ψ present respectively the mean squared errors (MSE) multiplied by 100 of the cor-
rected estimates of the variance of the worker fixed effects, variance of the firm fixed effects and the
covariance between worker and firm effects. Average is the average MSE.
Table 40 – Application. Plug-in vs corrected decomposition.
Plugin Boot Serial
Component Exp. Sh. Component Exp. Sh.
Var(y) 0.216 1.00 0.216 1.00
Var(θ̂i) 0.163 0.75 0.135 0.62
Var(ψ̂j) 0.049 0.23 0.032 0.15
Var(qγ̂) 0.008 0.03 0.007 0.03
2Cov(θ̂i, ψ̂j) -0.033 -0.15 -0.006 -0.03
2Cov(θ̂i, qγ̂) -0.000 -0.00 -0.000 -0.00
2Cov(ψ̂j, qγ̂) -0.000 -0.00 -0.000 -0.00
Var(ǫ̂) 0.030 0.14 0.049 0.23
Corr(θ̂i, ψ̂j) -0.100 - -0.000 -
Obs. 5108399 5108399 5108399 5108399
Notes: Plug-in refers to the uncorrected estimates of each of the variance components and Boot
Serial refers to the estimates after our bootstrapped correction using a wild block bootstrap.
Var(y) is the variance of log wages, Var(θ̂i) the variance of worker fixed effects (naive σ̂2θ or
corrected σ̃2θ ), Var(ψ̂j) is the variance of firm fixed effects, Var(qγ̂) is the variance of other co-
variates and Var(ǫ̂) is the variance of the error term. The other terms of the decomposition
are twice the covariances between the fixed effects and the covariates (2Cov(θ̂i , ψ̂j), 2Cov(θ̂i , qγ̂)
and 2Cov(ψ̂j , qγ̂)). Finally, Corr(θ̂i , ψ̂j) is the estimated correlation between worker and firm
fixed effects and Obs. is the number of observations.
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Table 41 – Application. Comparison of the Methods.
BS Plugin Boot HC1 Boot HC2
σ̂2θ 0.061 0.095 0.066 0.063
σ̂2ψ 0.005 0.038 0.024 0.019
σ̂θ,ψ 0.010 -0.004 0.003 0.005
ρ̂θ,ψ 0.558 -0.064 0.087 0.156
Obs. 945356 942235 942235 931925
Notes: The results of BS correspond to the AKM worker and firm types of
Borovičková and Shimer. Plugin are the plug-in estimates at the connected set
originated from BS data, Boot HC1 are the results of our method under diagonal
covariance matrix estimator HC1 at the connected set originated in the BS data,
Boot HC2 are the results of our method under diagonal covariance matrix estima-
tor HC2 at the leave-one-out connected set in the BS data. σ̂2θ and σ̂
2
ψ are respec-
tively the estimates of the variance of worker and firm fixed effects. σ̂ψ,θ is the
covariance, ρ̂ψ,θ the correlation between worker and firm fixed effects and Obs. is
the number of observations.
Table 42 – Application. Summary Statistics.
BS Data Obs. Mean Wage Mean Age Mean Education
No 3311804 4.39 41.43 4.56
Yes 2541773 4.37 36.94 4.95
Notes: BS Data is an indicator if the observation belongs to the final sample of Borovičková and Shimer
(2017), Obs. is the number of observations before taking match level averages in the original data and
before computing the connected set, Mean Wage is the average log daily wage, Mean Age is the aver-
age age in years and Mean Education is the average education where education is a discrete variable
between 1 (no education) and 8 (university degree).
188
Figure 30 – Density of σ̂21,PI − σ21 and σ̂21,b − σ21
Notes: This figure presents the distributions of the differences between the true
variance σ21 and both, the naive plug-in estimated variance σ̂
2
1,PI and the bias cor-
rected estimated variance σ̂21,b . The distribution of the difference between the true
moment and the bias corrected estimated covariance is centered at zero.
Figure 31 – Density of σ̂12,PI − σ12 and σ̂12,b − σ12
Notes: This figure presents the distributions of the differences between the true
covariance σ12 and both, the naive plug-in estimated covariance σ̂12,PI and the bias
corrected estimated covariance σ̂12,b . The distribution of the difference between the
true moment and the bias corrected estimated covariance is centered at zero.
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Figure 32 – MSE of corrected σ̂(θ, ψ) by number of bootstraps.
Notes: This figure presents the mean squared error (MSE) of the covariance be-
tween worker-firm fixed effects σ̂(θ, ψ) across 1000 homoscedastic error simula-
tions. The bootstrap correction assumes a diagonal covariance matrix and we use
the HC1 covariance matrix estimator.
Figure 33 – Model Comparison: Homoscedastic Errors.
Notes: This figure presents the distributions of the bias of σ̂2ψ for the naive plug-in
estimate and the corrected moments for the different methods. Simulated errors
are homoscedastic and labor mobility is high.
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Figure 34 – Model Comparison: Heteroscedastic Errors.
(a) Bias of σ̂2θ (b) Bias of σ̂
2
ψ
(c) Bias of σ̂θ,ψ
Notes: These figures present the distributions of the bias for the naive plug-in
estimate and the bias of corrected moments for KSS and our method. Simulated
errors are heteroscedastic and labor mobility is low.
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Figure 35 – Model Comparison: Serial Correlation with heteroscedasticity.
Notes: This figure presents the distributions of the bias of σ̂2ψ for the naive plug-in
estimate and the corrected moments for the different methods. Simulated errors
have serial correlation, true innovations are heteroscedastic and labor mobility is
high.
Figure 36 – Application. Evolution of the explained shares.
Notes: This figure presents the year-to-year evolution of the explained shares of the total log wage
variance of the plugin and corrected estimates of the person and firm fixed effects, their covariance
and the variances of other covariates and the residual.
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